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ULRICH,GRAF VON 3R0CKD0RFF-RANTZAU
1869 - 1928
This picture probably dates from the end 
the First World War*
Source % Outlook, CXXII (May 7, 1.919), 25
PREFACE
This thesis grew out of Dr* A * Stanley Trickett's 
graduate history seminar at the University of Omaha, inquir­
ing into the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* In the course 
of a study of Germany's initial reaction to the Treaty of 
Versailles I  became interested in the German Peace Delega­
tion, and especially Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, who, as the 
Weimar Republic's first Foreign Minister, was the Delega­
tion's leader. My preliminary search for material unearthed 
very little that was easily accessible. Almost everything 
from contemporary English language sources and journals was 
written in a hate-the-Kaiser1s-Germany vein, and the few 
items concerning the German Foreign Minister were, I dis­
covered, usually out of context, inaccurate, or merely hear­
say with little factual basis. Many writers who mention him 
tell only one vignette before dismissing the subject alto­
gether: A portrait of his ancestor, Josias Rantzau, who was 
a Marshal of France, hung in the Galerie des Marechaux at 
Versailles* Asked by a French journalist (some say it was 
a French officer) his opinion of the story that the Marshal 
had actually been the father of Louis XIV, the Count replied 
that indeed,
there is a tradition in our family to that effect 
dating back two hundred years* What comforts one
iii
iv
about it is that, if the tradition is based on fact, 
the Rantzaus are not illegitimate Bourbons, but the 
Bourbons bastard Rantzaus
It is now possible to discuss the days of Versailles 
more objectively and dispassionately* This thesis is by no 
means intended as an apologia. It is an attempt, nearly 
fifty years later, to understand and interpret the German 
response when the Treaty was presented to the Delegation at 
Versailles, and the resulting repercussions among the Allied 
leaders. To do this I have used materials usually inacces­
sible or little known. This material I have tried to relate 
to documents, books, and memoirs which, although they are 
well known and definitive works on the subject, have not 
been used extensively to help shed light on this aspect of 
the Paris Peace Conference. My lifelong intense interest in 
the German language has been indispensable.
Professor James T , Shotwell, noted historian of the 
Peace Conference and its aftermath, has written that " . . .  
prudence as well as a sense of fair play provided the German 
negotiators with more support for a revision of the terms of 
the Treaty than they seem to have appreciated. This phase 
of Peace Conference history has never been explored - . ."
Shotwell's observation can be applied to the Treaty writers
-^ Kar 1 Friedrich Novak, Versailles (New York: Payson 
and Clarke Ltd., 1929), p. 259*
2James T Shotwe 1.1, At the Paris Peace Conference 
(New York; The Macmillan Co.,, 1937), p. 47.
Vin Paris as well as the Germanso In this work I have at­
tempted to approach the question from both sides, stressing 
the origins of the German Delegation and the Foreign Mini­
ster who led it--a history apparently little understood by 
the Allied and Associated Powers and by those who are now 
their descendants.
It is not unrealistic to ask the question; "Would
not any Allied statesman, in Brockdorff-Rantzau1s place,
have tried for as favorable a deal as possible for Germany?"
My search for material turned up a book written by the
British Lieutenant Colonel Stewart Roddie, who was posted
for seven years in Germany as a member of the Disarmament
Commission, and knew and worked with all the government
officials and other dignitaries of the Weimar Republic. In
a passage describing Reichspresident Ebert, Colonel Roddie
relates the following story;
It was in the Holtzendorff house in the victoria 
Strasse; the question of extradition of "War Crim­
inals" was being discussed, and Noske, the Minister 
of Defence, put to me the embarrassing query, "Tell 
us what you English would have done if we Germans 
had won the war and demanded of you the surrender 
for trial as criminals of your King George, your 
Prince of Wales, your Field Marshal Haig, etc0 Tell 
us— would you have let us have them?"
Then the President, who had been quietly listen­
ing, laid his hand on my arm and said, "Don't answer 
that question, Colonel, it's not a fair one--just 
take it for granted that we know,"^
■^Stewart Roddie, Peace Patrol (New York; G 0P 0 Put­
nam's Sons, 1933), p 0 98*
There are many people who have helped me whom. I would 
like to thanko My family has put up with more than two years 
of my complete preoccupation with this subject and consequent 
neglect of their needs at times. I would especially like to 
thank Dr. Trickett for his inspiration and guidance, and Miss 
Ella Jane Dougherty of the staff of the Gene Eppley Library 
at the University of Omaha for her tireless efforts to obtain 
obscure books for me, a task at which she was 99% successful. 
The University of Nebraska Library and the Omaha Public 
Library were also very helpful. I owe many thanks to Dr. Kurt 
Rosenbaum of West Virginia University, author of Community of 
Fate; German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations 1922-1928, who furn­
ished information on Erich Brandenburg's unpublished manu­
script biography of the Count and other important leads to 
valuable material. I am grateful to Dr. Alma Luckau Molin 
and Dr. George Bonnin for answering questions for me. I am in 
debted to Dr. T'heo Christiansen of Schleswig, Germany, who pro 
vided a valuable article on the Brockdorff family history and 
other advice as to sources. He and Frau Christiansen were 
graciously hospitable to me during my few days in Schleswig 
while visiting Germany in 1964. I also thank Herr and Frau 
Christoph Sindt of Schleswig for their friendship and Gemut- 
lichkeit. Much appreciation is due my typist, Mrs,, Earl D. 
Wagner, who entered into this project with enthusiasm and 
great competence. The responsibility for errors and inacura- 
cies rests with me.
Bellevue, Nebraska.
November, 1966.
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INTRODUCTION
It was May, 1919. Germany had admitted military de­
feat in World War I over six months earlier. German representa­
tives had signed the armistice terms dictated by Marshal Foch 
for the Allies. When the guns became silent on November 11,
1918, Germany surrendered great quantities of arms, military 
equipment, rolling stock, and her Allied prisoners of war, meet­
ing Armistice deadlines as nearly as possible. The Allied and 
Associated Powers did not return their German war prisoners, and 
the Allies continued their blockade in the northern waters for 
several months,
When the Kaiser fled to Holland on November 9, 1918, the 
old order had already collapsed in Germany. Out of defeat, muti 
nies, workers' strikes, starvation, despair, and the threat of 
Bolshevism grew a German Republic. Hastily proclaimed, ill-sup­
ported, and with no precedent to guide it, the new Republic 
faced scorn and mistrust at home and abroad. It was rocked by 
party conflicts from within and menaced by Bolshevik violence 
from without. In order to convene safely, the members of its 
National Constituent Assembly met in Weimar instead of riot-torn 
Berlin, whence came the historical term "Weimar Republic." To 
this Government fell the multifarious task of picking up the 
pieces after the Empire's surcease: convening a National Assem­
bly, writing a constitution, continuing the fight against Bol-
1
2shevism, helping a starving, apathetic populace toward recovery, 
-“and concluding peace,, The first confrontation with the harsh 
peace terms of the Allied and Associated Powers fell to the Re­
public's Foreign Minister, Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau.
"The Conference of Paris," wrote Professor James To 
Shotwell,
was a meeting of the enemies of the Central Powers which, 
dictated treaties for each of the ex-enemy States and 
hardly listened at all to their protests against the con­
ditions imposed upon them* . . . /The leaders of liberal
Germany_J7 had dared to hope that a peace based upon the 
Wilsonian program would offer the new German Republic an 
opportunity to co-operate to the full in building the 
structure of a wor ld-community.
But this was not to be, French Premier Georges Clamenceau 
dominated the Conference proceedings. Regarding policy deci­
sions, France's "Tiger," together with American President Wood­
row Wilson, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and Ital­
ian Premier Vittorio Orlando (although the first three greatly 
overshadowed Orlando) reigned supreme as the "Big Four." In 
the words of Lord Riddell, chief representative of the British 
press at the Conference, "No four kings or emperors could have 
conducted the conference on more autocratic l i n e s .
The war psychosis had not abated one bit. The dominant 
European chiefs of state were in Paris on the premise that they
1James T. Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference (New 
York; The Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 41.
2Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the 
Peace Conference and After, 1918-1923 (London; Victor Gollancz 
Ltd., 1933), p„ 48. See also Lord Hankey, The Supreme Control 
at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (London; Allen and Unwin 
Ltd. , 1963), Chs. XII and XIII especially, on the evolution of
"summit" control of the Peace Conference.
3would demand everything possible from Germany. In France, 
understandably, this feeling verged upon hysteria. Clemenceau 
was a "moderate" compared to the really extremist desire to dis­
member Germany politically, but he demanded the utmost in disar­
mament and reparations. To insure the acceptance by the others 
of the League of Nations Covenant, President Wilson altered his 
views to accommodate much that the French, British, and other 
national groups demanded. In this way, the idealistic Wilsonian 
Fourteen Point program of January, 1918, which Germany claimed 
to be the basis of the armistice and coming peace negotiations, 
was gradually eroded during four months of facing the realities 
of European nationalism, war-hysteria, and practical politics. 
The latitude of Wilson's swing of opinion can be appreciated by 
comparing the Allied ultimatum to Germany on June 22, 1919, de­
manding that the German Government: accept unconditionally the 
unnegotiated Treaty of Versailles within twenty-four hours, or 
face the alternative of military invasion, with the words of 
Wilson's speech of January 22, 1917, seeking an end to the war
through a negotiated "peace without victory":
Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's 
terms imposed upon the vanquished. it would be accepted 
in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, 
and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory 
upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but 
only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can 
last, only a peace the very principle of which is equality 
and a common participation in a common benefit.3
3Arthur S. Link, Wilson; Campaigns for Progressivism
and Peace 1916-1917 (Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 
 —
4As for Lloyd George, Lord Riddell has described his
attitude on April 9, 1919s
To-day /Lloyd George__7 said that the Germans would have 
to pay To the uttermost farthing. He pushed aside eco­
nomic difficulties and said that if the Germans decline 
to fulfill their obligations, we can compel them by an 
economic blockade.^
When the German Peace Delegation arrived at Versailles, 
they were ostracized and treated contemptuously as the hateful 
Boche. The whole "spirit of Versailles" was revenge upon the 
militaristic Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II; all the wrath, how­
ever, descended upon the incipient Republic instead of the 
tumbled Empire.
During a ceremony at the Trianon Palace Hotel on May 7, 
1919, the peace treaty was presented to the German Delegation. 
Germany's Foreign Minister made a speech on behalf of the Repub­
lic. Considered a fair-minded, even eloquent appeal twenty and 
more years later, the Count's speech at the time had an incen­
diary effect upon the "Big Three." Leaving that historic meet­
ing with Lord Riddell, President Wilson said to him,
The Germans are really a stupid people. They always do 
the wrong thing. They always did the wrong thing during 
the war. That is why I am here. They don't understand 
human nature. This is the most tactless speech I have 
ever heard. It will set the whole world against them.^
The 80,000 word Treaty had strong critics among the 
Allies. Many Allied economic experts agreed with the American 
General Tasker H« Bliss, who had stated on March 25, 1919,
"We cannot both cripple her and expect her to pay. We must
^Riddell, p. 48. ^Ibid., p . 74.
5offer terms which a responsible Government in Germany can expect 
to carry out. "6 on May 8, American Secretary of State Robert. 
Lansing remarked, "The impression made by it is one of disap­
pointment, of regret, and of depression. The terms of peace 
appear immeasurably harsh and humiliating, while many of them 
seem to me to be impossible of performance."^ Arthur Walworth, 
one of Wilson's biographers, notes that the president said on 
May 1% "if i were a German, I think I should never sign it."®
The new German Republic wanted peace and a chance for 
a new beginning among the community of nations. Yet the man who 
represented it at Versailles succeeded only in arousing the ire 
of the "Big Three," who dictated peace terms so gever-6 that even 
prominent Allied dignitaries critized them at the time. What 
stood behind the appointment of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau as the 
first Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic? Was he really, 
as Lloyd George insisted, an "insolent Junker"? What brought 
him to Versailles as chief plenipotentiary of the struggling 
German Republic?
^Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement 
(3 vols.; New York; Doubleday,- Doran and Co., 1922), II, 495.
^Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, A Personal 
Narrative (Boston; Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1921), p. 272.
p
Arthur Walworth, Woodrow Wilson, Vol. II: World Pro­
phet (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1958), p. 319.
CHAPTER I
"PER ROTE GRAFc
One of the most unusual and forceful personalities of 
modern German history was the man who became the first Foreign 
Minister of the Weimar Republic. The overwhelming problems 
faced by Germany after the complete collapse of the old order 
called for strength and decision in the leaders of the new Re­
public. In Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau the Majority 
Socialists found a man of experience, conviction,, and authority, 
who, unlike many of his peers, was willing to work with them to 
build a democratic Germany.
Dr. Edgar Stern-Rubarth, author of the only published 
biography of the Count, has subtitled his study "Wanderer zwi- 
schen zwei Welten, ,! because Brockdorf f-Rantzau bridged the gap 
between the diplomacy of the German Empire and the Republic's 
desperate struggle for recognition.,-*- in February, 1919, Brock­
dorf f-Rantzau concluded his first foreign policy speech before 
the newly elected National Assembly in Weimar with the words; "I
■*"Edgar Stern-Rubar th, Graf Brockdorf f-Rantzau, Wanderer 
zwischen zwei Welten (Berlin; Reimar Hobbing, 1.929), p. 18. This 
phrase was used by Gustav Stresemann and Professor Otto Hoetzsch 
in their eulogies after the Count's death in September, 1928. 
There is also an unpublished biography by Professor Erich Bran­
denburg, which is based upon Brockdorff-Rantzau1s private papers. 
The German Foreign Office prevented its publication in the early 
1930's. This MS is available on microfilm as part of the Foreign 
Office Documents captured during World War II. It has been used 
as a major reference for this thesis.
6
7hope to prove to you that a man can be both a Count and a con­
vinced D e m o c r a t . His war-time history of active and success­
ful cooperation with various radicals and with Danish and German 
trade unions, his friendship with the German Social Democratic 
leaders Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, his ability to 
get along with all shades of liberal opinion, and his willing­
ness to play a prominent part in the post-war republican experi­
ment earned him the enmity of many members of his own class, of 
militarists, and of arch-conservatives generally. From this pro­
ceeded the epithet "der rote Graf" and the sarcastic phrase 1 le 
comte malgre lui . 113
The Red Count was an aristocrat and a German patriot.
He was one of the few men of his class who realized early that 
the war could not be won and that far-reaching changes must be 
made if Germany was to survive as a united nation. In the words 
of Gustav Hilger, who was a member of his staff at the German 
Embassy in Moscow in the 1920's, Brockdorff-Rantzau:
combined a sharp sense of reality with fervent patriotism.
He knew that the majority of his own social set would call 
him a traitor to his class for entering the "revolutionary" 
cabinet. But instead of deterring him, this attitude drew 
only his scorn and derision. These gentlemen were in his 
opinion doing the same thing they constantly .attributed to 
the Socialists: they put the presumed interests of their 
class over those of the nation, whereas he had, with patri-
2Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente (Charlottenburg: 
Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik u. Geschichte, 1920),
p . 62 .
Stern-Rubarth, p. 18.
8otic effort, put aside all instincts and predilections 
in jblacing himself at the disposal of the Council of 
Peoples Deputies.4
Early Years
On both sides, Brockdorff-Rantzau1s family can be traced 
back to the Middle Ages. Family background is of great impor­
tance in understanding the personality and outlook of the Count. 
His father's family was distinguished in the service of the 
Kings of Denmark; three Rantzaus were Danish Field Marshals, and 
Josias Rantzau became a Marshal of France under Louis XIII.5 
Among his mother's forebears, Cai Lorenz, as the first Count 
Brockdorff, was one of the first Danish feudal L o r d s . ^
Ulrich Karl Christian and his twin brother, Ernst Lud­
wig Emil, were born in Schleswig on May 29, 1869. Their father,
Count Hermann zu Rantzau, was district judge and Prussian 
assessor in Schleswig. When he died unexpectedly in 1872,
Countess Juliana went to her father's estate in Holstein,
Schloss Kletkamp, with her four sons, Friedrich was two years 
older than the twin brothers, and Christian, somewhat younger.
Soon afterward, her uncle, Baron Ulrich von Brockdorff, adopted 
his namesake, the young Count Ulrich? He received the surname 
von Brockdorff-Rantzau, so that he might eventually inherit the 
uncle's estate in Schleswig, called Annettenhoh, where he had
^Hilger, Gustav, and Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible 
Allies, A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations 1918-1941 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953) , p~. 89.
^Stern-Rubarth, p. 21.
r li
°Henning von Rumohr, Schlosser und Herrensitze in Schles­
wig-Holstein und in Hamburg (Frankfurt a. Main: Wolfgang Weidlich,
1963) , pp. 81-82, 94. His mother was Countess Juliana von Brock­
dorf f-Kletkamp (1843-1923).
9been born. This accounts for the difference in surname from 
his twin brother, Count Ernst zu Rantzau, Identical in appear­
ance, the two brothers enjoyed a very close relationship all 
their lives. Ernst died in 1930, two years after his brother. 
Admiration for his great-uncle inclined the young 
Count Ulrich toward a diplomatic career from his earliest 
years. Baron Brockdorff, a cultivated man, had been the Danish 
King's Ambassador in Madrid, Paris, and Berlin, and had found 
it hard to accept Prussian rule in Schleswig-Holstein after 1864.8 
Count Ulrich's education was a preparation for the dip­
lomatic service, and he was a brilliant, scholarly young man 
with little inclination toward the "studentische Bummelei" then 
so prevalent. He completed the Gymnasium in Eutin in 1888, then 
studied at four Universities: Neuchatel (where all work was in 
French and he acquired many French cultural ties), Freiburg, 
Berlin, and Leipzig, where he became Doctor of Jurisprudence. 
Having completed an outstanding student career at the age of 
twenty-two,^ he faced the problem of what he should do, for,
^Helgo Klatt, "Die Brockdorffs in der Stadt Schleswig 
und auf Annettenhoh," Beitrage zur Schleswiger Stadtgeschichte, 
Heft 6, (1962), pp. 15-16. Ownership of the estate passed to
him in 1912, after the death of Baronin Brockdorff, See National 
Archives Record Group 242, World War II Collection of Seized 
Enemy Records, Records of the German Foreign Ministry and the 
Reichschancellery covering the Weimar Period, Microcopy No, T~ 
120, "Nachlass Brockdorff-Rantzau, 1 Serial 9101H/Roll 3435/Frame 
H229 901. Hereafter cited as "Nachlass B-R;, " serial/roll/frames.
8stern-Rubarth, pp. 32-33; Klatt, p. 16. Baron Brock­
dorff often spent the winter in France, and he had much to do 
with planning his nephew's education before his death in 1875.
^Stern-Rubarth, pp. 34-35. professor Friedburg of Leip­
zig had his scholarly dissertation published in a journal of 
canonical law.
10
"with every diploma in his pocket which was required or desir­
able for the diplomatic service" he was three years too young 
to enter i t . ^
The Army provided an ideal solution for the young noble­
man. Through his aunt, Countess Therese von Brockdorff who was 
the Kaiserin1s Mistress of the Robes, he obtained a commission 
in the elite First Regiment of the Foot Guards. He enjoyed his 
Acmy years, becoming a Lieutenant in 1892. After two years he 
resigned and spent the six months prior to entering the diplo­
matic service practicing law near Schleswig with his brother 
Ernst.^
Beginning of Diplomatic Career
In 1894 Brockdorff-Rantzau embarked upon his diplomatic 
career which was to span over thirty years. His first post was 
attache in Brussels for two years. In 1897 he passed various 
further examinations and then went to St. Petersburg as a Lega­
tion Secretary, where he remained until 1901, forming strong 
friendships with German diplomats Prince Radolii* and Baron 
Richard von Kuhlmann. The next eight years he spent in Vienna, 
where he became Counselor of Embassy in 1905. For a short time 
during the Vienna period he also served at The Hague as Coun­
selor of Legation. In 1909 he received his first independent 
post, that of Consul-General in Budapest, and there he remained 
until 1912, when an important vacancy occurred for which he was
•LQIbid. , p. 35. The age requirement was twenty-five.
I]~Ibid. , p . 37 .
eligible, and most desirous of obtaining: that of German
12Minister in Copenhagen.,
The Count was an extraordinary individual. Tall, slen­
der, impeccably tailored, he was the grand seigneur par excel­
lence. Visibly, one's first impression was that of refinement. 
Paintings, photographs, and word descriptions all stress his 
sharp-cut, aristocratic features— dark hair, high forehead, deep- 
set eyes, carefully trimmed Guardsman's mustache, pale counten­
ance, strong chin surmounting an ever present old-fashioned high 
white collar. He smoked cigarettes continually and greatly e n ­
joyed fine wines and French cognac and champagne.
His mode of life was as distinctive as his appearance, 
even bizarre by normal standards. A lifelong bachelor, he had 
time and interest only for his career and intellectual pursuits? 
he was a connoisseur of art, a scholar of literature and his­
tory, and anything he wrote was polished to a high literary 
style. He completely reversed the hours kept by ordinary people. 
Except for essential diurnal appointments, he preferred to sleep 
until late in the day. In the evening he dined sparingly but 
elegantly, and habitually worked at his desk throughout the 
entire night. when necessary, he could drive himself relent­
lessly; during diplomatic and political crises he worked day and
■^National Archives, Washington D.C., Microcopy T-120, 
"The Brandenburg Manuscript," 1689H/1012/396 686-87. Hereafter 
cited as BMS/serial/roll/frames. Bee also Stern-Rubarth, pp. 
45-46.
13
Dr. Edvard Brandes^ "Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau und die 
danische Neutralitat," Europaische Gesprache, VII (January, 1929) 
pp. 33-34. Stern-Rubarth, pp. 33-34, 132-33, 143, 150.
12
night„ Of himself, the Count once said that " . . . mein Lebens-
element /Tst_7 di.e politike. All during his rather sequestered 
life, his closest confidants were his mother, who died in 1923, 
and his twin brother in Berlin
Reserved, but courteous to casual acquaintances, he most 
enjoyed salon-type gatherings with old French cognac and his 
few good friends. Of this, Professor Moritz J„ Bonn observes, 
"The nearer midnight, the brighter his light was shining. He 
was a brilliant conversationalist as the hours went past, with 
those he liked and trusted."15 Drawing on his long experience 
in diplomatic circles, he was a trenchant and witty raconteur.
He was notorious for his ready wit, which took the form of 
clever sarcasm "from which he spared no one, including him­
self . " -*-6 clever at coining stinging epithets, he often lashed 
out at those present without warning, and this tended to keep 
others at a distance. He also loved classical allusions and 
references to historical writings such as the Memoirs of Saint- 
Simon. Wipert von Blhcher, who, as a young member of the For-
l^BMS, 1691H/1013/397 349. Living in Berlin, Graf 
Ernst was recognized as Graf Ulrich's veritable alter ego and 
as such was a vital link between Brockdorff-Rantzau and Berlin, 
especially during the war years and later during his tenure as 
Ambassador in Moscow from 1922 to 1928. Graf Ernst had married 
Carmelita von Noer in 1894. Divorced in 1916, they had one son, 
Graf Frederik-August zu Rantzau-Noer, who died in a Russian 
prison camp in 1945. Stern-Rubarth, p. 63; Klatt, p. 28.
^Moritz J. Bonn, Wandering Scholar (New York; The John 
Day Co., 1948), p. 229.
■^Wipert von Blucher, Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo (Wies 
baden: Limes Verlag, 1951), p. 43. See also "Brockdorff-Rantzau: 
Man of the Hour in Germany," Current Opinion, LXVIX (July, 1919), 
p. 21, and Otto Hoetzsch, "Botschafter Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau," 
Europjiische Gesprache, VII (January, 1929), p. 14; Novak, p. 185.
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eign Office in the early days of the Republic, knew the Count 
well, includes an excellent sketch in Deutschlands Weg nach 
Rapallo%
When /Brockdorff-RantzauJ7 was 1n Berlin he lived with
his twin brother in a house in the Viktoriastrasse, furn­
ished with cultivated taste and ornamented with elegant 
antiques. Through Baron Lanqwerth I was, despite my youth, 
brought into the group which met in the Viktoriastrasse.
It was an oval room in which the Foreign Minister received 
guests with great pleasure and used to converse with them 
as they sat in comfortable chairs along the walls. The 
intellectual lightning bolts flew here and there and the 
most striking remarks and sharpest points were always made 
by the hosto Even when a guest had found a fortunately 
precise expression, the master of the house always had a 
superior,, more intensive answer. It was an intellectual 
effort to take part in this exchange of thoughts, and an 
aesthetic pleasure to listen to him.
Personality Observations
Despite his charm and erudition, other aspects of his
personality proved to be serious drawbacks. He was high-strung,
nervous, finicky, and oversensitive to real or imagined slights.
Often quick to anger, he who was aptly described after his
death as "der letzte Ritter”1® was only too quick to throw down
the gauntlet when his dignity was affronted. Observations of
this nature show up in the ensuing quotations from those who
knew him. well.
While Minister in Copenhagen, the Count enjoyed a warm.
friendship with Maurice F. Egan, the American Minister there.
Through Egan's eyes, Brockdorff-Rantzau appears as a charming
intellectual, an aloof, very refined gentleman:
A more delightfully amusing, sophisticated, well-read man 
of the world I  have never met. He was one of the few Ger-
17Blucher, p. 43. l®Stern-Rubarth, p. 165.
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mans who knew a good cocktail from a bad one, and whose 
taste in champagne was impeccable* He was not generally 
beloved by his "dear colleagues," although they never ex­
pressed their disapprobation in loud tones. . . . Socially
an aristocrat, he was in politics rather liberal. Tall, 
graceful, he needed only to take a reasonable amount of 
exercise to make him as handsome as he was distinguished. 
One could talk with him of the coulisses de Rome as well 
as of the intricacies of German party politics with great 
pleasure s ^
In a previous book, Egan predicted that the Count would later
have great influence in German politics, and expressed a rather
startling opinion: "Count Rantzau, if he lives, will be heard
of later; he is one of the well-balanced among diplomatists."
Continuing this train of thought, Egan added,
If he lives, he ought to go far, as he is plastic, and 
sees the signs of the times. I found him delightful; 
but he infuriated other people. One day, when he is ut­
terly tired of life, he will consciously exasperate 
somebody to fury, in order to escape the trouble of com­
mitting suicide himself* I shall always miss him. He 
is the kind of man whose society you covet on this earth, 
because if all signs prove true, you are not likely to 
meet him in Heaven--until late in Eternity! ^ 0
Count Johann von Bernstorff, cousin of Brockdorff-Rant­
zau and Ambassador to Washington from. 1913-1917, offered a 
brief but valid observation in his Memoirs:
Rantzau was very gifted and intelligent, but had 
serious disabilities; his extreme suspiciousness, which 
bordered on persecution mania, and his inability to 
make even the briefest impromptu speech before a large 
assembly. Added to which there was his personal sensi­
tiveness, which made him take every divergence of view
^Maurice F . Egan, Recollections of a Happy Life (New 
York: George H.»Doran and Co,, 1924), pp. 263-64.
7 0 -Maurice F. Egan, Ten Years Near the German Frontier 
(New York: George H= Doran and Co*, 1919), pp. 56, 270.
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as a personal matter. When he mentioned anyone, he 
never said: "He takes this or that view"; but "He is
for me or against m e .  "21
Eugen Schiffer, Democrat and Vice Chancellor under
Scheidemann, describes his first meeting with the Count at the
end of 1918. He was, wrote Schiffer,
an extremely elegant man, dark eyes in a pale counten­
ance, impeccably attired, with almost overly polite 
manners and courtly dexterity. . . . he belonged to the
feudal diplomacy, and as the nephew of the Chief Lady 
in Waiting of the Kaiserin he had stood especially close 
to the Court. But he definitely made no use of these 
advantages of birth. In our following conversation 
lasting far into the night., he reiterated that the posi­
tion'of the Party made no difference to him and that he 
was ready to serve any government that would allow him, 
within agreed-upon limits, a free hand in foreign policy.
. . . He was sensitive and suspicious, of an easily
aroused nature, a real bundle of nerves.22
Professor Moritz J. Bonn, who became a trusted and valu­
able advisor to the German Delegation at Versailles, had some 
incisive observations regarding Brockdorff-Rantzau, whom he 
came to know very well. The Count was, wrote Bonn,
a liberal by temperament, not by conviction, as many of 
his more intelligent colleagues have been. Being an 
individualist of almost anarchistic proclivities, he 
disliked bureaucrats and soldiers. A courtier rather 
than a statesman, he was far better fitted to deal with 
persons than with problems. . . . He could work equally
well with Communists and conservatives, pacifists and 
nationalists, provided they respected his sensitive ego.
For he did not identify himself with a cause; he identi­
fied the cause with himself; everything with him. was 
personal. His ambition was limitless--he would have 
liked to be German chancellor or even president of the 
Reich; he would not have minded the political color of 
the party that chose him. . . . /ne was 7  an extremely
9 ^“Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, The Memoirs of 
Count Bernstorff (London: Heinemann, 1936), p. 254.
9 9Eugen Schiffer, Ein Leben fur den Liberalismus (Berlin 
Grunewald: F„Ao Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1951), pp. 222-23.
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interesting personality who needed but a small amount of 
common sense and a little less egotism to achieve actual  ^
greatnessc He was a lonely man; few people trusted him.
Perhaps the best discussion of his personality and atti- 
tude by one who knew him well is given by Gustav Hilger, who 
wrote of him:
Rantzau was in no way preoccupied with "social justice" 
and paid no allegiance to political ideals like liberty 
and equality. The range of values that mattered to his 
own inner personality might have seemed to be primarily 
aesthetic, not social. Nothing gave him greater pleasure 
than the enjoyment of fine style, be it in a masterpiece 
of fine arts from his exquisite collection, a literary 
gem, or in personal conduct, . . . The length to which he
went in his sensitivity to style was indeed, in the nature 
of an obsession; . . . But Rantzau's arrogance was not 
simply the narrow ancestor-pride of the aristocrat who 
has nothing but noble forebears to boast of; his was the 
nervous, finicky arrogance of the aesthete who has ab­
sorbed the highest standards of his culture and abhors 
those unable to reach the same heights. . . .
He advocated democratic reforms from the firm con­
viction that Germany could no more be governed in the 
old ways without inviting the most serious internal dif­
ficulties* Thus his vigorous espousal of social and 
democratic reforms stemmed from the desire to aid Ger­
many's war effort by preventing internal convulsions. 
Moreover, sensing the coming defeat long before the ma­
jority of generals and politicians were ready to admit 
the possibility, Rantzau wanted to deprive the demo­
cratic enemies of Germany of the argument that Germany 
was a bastion of reaction* 24
Relations with the Court 
As a former Imperial diplomat, his standing with the 
Kaiser is of interest and importance in regard to his later al­
legiance to the Republic. "Not being of old Prussian origin," 
said Professor Bonn of the Count, "he was not encumbered by the
traditional loyalty that bound the Junker to the House of Hohen=
23Bonn, pp. 228, 229-30* 24Hilger, pp. 85-86, 87
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zollern, and he had not found it hard to throw in his lot with
25
the Republic*" Brockdorff-Rantzau was well acquainted at
Court and he had known the Kaiser since 1891. According to
Stern-Rubarth,
The Kaiser was always friendly and benevolent toward 
Brockdorff-Rantzau, and had his eye on his capabilities 
ever since asking^ Professor Schottmuller for the exam­
ination papers /Prufungsarbeiten 7  of the extraordinary 
young officer upon his joining the f^irst Guard Regi­
ment, the first Doctor of Jurisprudence and junior 
barrister who had entered the Prussian Army . . 0
Apparently, the young Count never took the Kaiser’s lead in es­
tablishing a genial relationship; before the All-Highest his 
mien was always professional, intellectual, and dignified.
It is appropriate to relate here that Count Ernst was 
Chamberlain at the Imperial German Court for many years, even­
tually becoming Privy Councillor* The Kaiser's partial abdi­
cation on November 9, 1918, when he gave up the throne as Ger­
man Kaiser, but refused to abdicate as King of Prussia, was a 
monstrous political gaffe c It was Graf Ernst, who, as delegate 
from the Council of People's Representatives, obtained Wilhelm“s 
signature on the instrument of complete abdication, dated No­
vember 28, 1918, which began, "I herewith renounce for all time
my right to the Crown of Prussia, and to the German Imperial
Crown connected therewith.^ Both brothers wished to see the
^Bonn, p. 229., ^Stern-Rubarth, pps 44_45o
Ibid*, p 0 63; Joachim von Kurenberg, The Kaiser, A 
Life of Wilhelm II, Last Emperor of Germany, tr. H 0T 0 Russell 
and Herta Hagen (New York? Simon and Schuster, 1955), p„ 380* 
After the war Graf Ernst acted as administrator for the ex- 
Kaiser's estates in Germany* He submitted his resignation from 
this position in November, 1926* Ernst zu Rantzau to ex-Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, November 30, 1926, "Nachlass B-R, " 9101.H/3434/H228 
212-13 *
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ex-Kaiser adequately provided for. When the Council of People's 
Representatives (Majority Socialist forerunner of the Weimar 
Government) discussed what should be done with the former Kai­
ser ' s property,
/Brockdorff-Rantzau "7 suggested that it should neither be 
expropriated nor be~“lianded back to be disposed of freely„ 
Instead, the Kaiser's private property should be used by 
the German state to pay him and his family a life-long 
annuity that would enable them to live according to their 
status. Rantzau wanted to prevent the house of Hohenzol- 
lern from using their tremendous fortunes to the detriment
of the republic.28
Former Imperial Chancellor Prince Bernhard von Bulow
recorded in his Memoirs a conversation with Wilhelm II on June
27, 1909, when they discussed possible successors to Bulow as
Chancellor, and wondered also who would be a good prospect for
Foreign Secretary:
Bulow? Brockdorff-Rantzau is also talented.
Kaiser: I don't care for him. He's the nephew of Therese
Brockdorff, my wife's Mistress of the Robes, and I don't 
like personal relationships between the Foreign Office and 
my people at C o u r t . 29
The Kaiser remembered Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, however, when
three years later, he needed an exceptionally able diplomat and
a writer of lucid and detailed dispatches in the sensitive post
of German Minister in Copenhagen.
2 8Hilger, pp. 87-88.
O Q
Prince Bernhard von Bulow, Memoirs of Prince von 
Bulow, tr. Geoffrey Dunlop (4 vols.; Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1932), II, 575.
CHAPTER II
THE VIEW FROM COPENHAGEN
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau was German Minister in Copen­
hagen from 1912 until the end of the First World War. He was 
very pleased with this assignment, for he considered the German- 
Scandinavian relationship of great diplomatic i m p o r t a n c e . D e s ­
cended from Danish and German nobility, he was uniquely quali­
fied for this position.
Since the turn of the century, several war scares had 
ruffled the serenity of what was otherwise a golden age for 
Europe, and nationalist ambitions continually built up dangerous 
pressures. With the inception of the Triple Entente in 1907, 
German and Austrian military chiefs became obsessed with the 
fear of encirclement, or Einkreisung. Glancing northward from 
Budapest, where, as German Consul-General he had been close to 
the explosive Balkan situation, the Count realized the potential 
importance of Scandinavia to Germany's security. As enemies, 
the northern countries would force Germany to keep permanent 
contingents of troops on the north coast, but as "friendly neu-
^Although seniority made him eligible for Sofia or Lis­
bon, he declined these posts, preferring to remain in Budapest 
until that in Copenhagen became available,: where he believed he 
would "really be in a position to accomplish somethinq useful." 
BMS, 16893/1012/396 7 26. The post in Copenhagen was considered,
as "an old tradition of the Foreign Office," as preparatory to 
the Ambassadorship in St. Petersburg. Stern-Rubarth, p. 45.
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trals" their proximity to shipping lanes would be useful to Ger­
many and they could be a source of food and raw materials. 2 fje 
was especially interested in the Danish-German relationship.
Denmark's "German Course"
The reign of King Christian X of Denmark had begun 
shortly before Brockdorff-Rantzau assumed his ministerial duties 
in Copenhagen. Under the Radical-Socialist ministry of Prime 
Minister Carl Zahle, Denmark continued the so-called "Tysker- 
Kurs1 (German course) aimed at friendly relations with the 
mighty German E m p i r e .  ^ They feared to do otherwise; despite 
protective treaties, no one had come to Denmark's aid in 1864 
when Prussia took Schleswig-Holstein. Danish Conservatives 
still hoped to rectify this injustice some day, perhaps by join­
ing Germany's adversaries if a European war broke out.^
2BMS, 1689H/1012/396 730-31.
^Christian X also favoured this course. BMS, 1689/1012/
396 731, 786. According to a pre-World War II expose of Danish-
German relations, the policy of not antagonizing Germany began 
in 1901, when a Liberal Government supplanted the Conservatives. 
See Joachim Joesten, Rats in the Larder; The Story of Nazi Influ­
ence in Denmark (New York; G.P. Putnam's Sons, pp. 223-26.
^Article V of the Treaty of Prague between Prussia and 
Austria provided that a plebiscite should decide whether predomi­
nantly Danish North Schleswig should be returned to Denmark. By 
a Danish-German Treaty of 1907, Denmark agreed to the post-1866 
North Schleswig boundary without a plebiscite. Danish resistance 
continued, however, despite long-standing Prussian subjugation. 
See Ralph H„ Lutz's extensive introduction to Hans Peter Hanssen, 
Diary of a Dying Empire, tr. Oscar Osburn Winther (Indiana Uni­
versity Press, 1955), pp. xix-xx, xvi-xvii.
Thus evolved the paradox of Danish politics vis-a-vis Gerr 
many. In Joesten's words: "While the Conservative and Right-
Wing Liberals, though ideologically more in sympathy with the 
Kai ge rreich 's regime than with the Western democracies, refused 
to capitulate to the mailed fist, Social-Democrats and Radicals 
were all in favor of surrender. Joesten p. 235.
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The Count, therefore-, bent every effort to maintain the 
Danish democratic elements in power„ He was on good terms with 
many Cabinet Ministers, especially Foreign Minister Eric; von 
Scavenius, and, as the scion of Danish and German noble families, 
he was respected at the Danish Court, Brockdorff-Rantz.au, him­
self a Schleswiger, urged that the German-Danish hostility in 
this northern part of Germany be played down in order to avoid 
giving encouragement to the Danish conservatives * "Again and 
again," wrote Erich Brandenburg, "he stressed that, domestic poli­
tics must not be allowed to dominate foreign p o l i c y . This was 
one of his cardinal precepts, though it was often ignored in Berlin.
Outbreak of the First World War
War clouds gathered over Europe again in the summer of 
1914, and this time they did not disperse. Brockdorff-Rantzau 
was attending the Kiel Regatta when news of the assassination 
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was received. Like the other diplo­
matic representatives of Germany abroad, the Count received only 
scant information from the imperial Government regarding the 
negotiations taking place between the governments involved.
During the tense period following the Austrian ultimatum to 
Serbia, he received no directions as to what he should do in 
case war broke out, except "to see that Denmark realized the 
seriousness of the s i t u a t i o n He was not even apprised by 
the Foreign Office of the German declaration of war against Rus-
5BMS/ 1689H/1012/396 730-32.
^BMS# 1689H/1012/396 734; Luigi Albertini, The Origins 
of the War of 1914, tr. and ed. by Isabella M. Massey, (3 vols.; 
London: Oxford University Press, 1957), III, 673-76.
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sia. Brandenburg relates that Brockdorff-Rantzau received in­
structions to aid the homeward journey through Denmark of the 
Russian Ambassador to Berlin when the special train crossed 
over the Danish border, and from this !,he had to conclude that 
the diplomatic relations between Germany and Russia were broken 
and that in all probability a state of war between the two 
countries already existed,, "
Brockdorff-Rantzau's first duty, of course, was to in­
sure Denmark's neutrality. On his own initiative he indicated 
that Germany had no wish to violate Danish neutrality, and ob­
tained a statement from the Danish Government on August 3 that
Q
Denmark would not join with Germany's enemies. Two days later 
he was directed by his Government to request that Denmark mine 
certain of her territorial waters (the Big Belt and the Little 
Belt) herself, if she did not wish Germany to do so. This was 
a hard decision for Denmark to make. But once again, fear of 
German reprisal forced her to comply; if the Danes refused to 
mine the Belts themselves, then Germany would do it and station 
German troops on the various islands to guard the installations. 
It took all Count Brockdorff-Rantzau1s skill and diplomatic
7BMS, 1689H/1012/396 734.
8BMS, 1689H/1012/396 734-35.
8A Danish Royal Proclamation of August 1 had declared 
absolute neutrality; furthermore, according to a 191,2 neutrality 
agreement between Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, the Belts and 
Sound were to remain open to all vessels, merchantmen and war­
ships, in war and peace. Joesten, p. 231. King Christian X 
wired his cousin, King George V of England, appealing for his 
understanding of Denmark's position. Ibid., p. 236.
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adroitness to make the necessary demands upon Denmark regard” 
ing sea defenses and to restrain Germany's military and naval 
authorities from infringing on Danish neutrality during the 
next four years.10
Danish-German EdDnomic Ties 
From 1912 on, Brockdorff-Rantzau had strived for a 
closer economic relationship between the two countries, often 
with much difficulty.H  He successfully fostered friendly re­
lations, which, when war came, developed into an economic ar­
rangement vital to both sides. For wartime deliveries of coal 
to Denmark, Germany received essential foodstuffs. This Kohlen- 
politik was necessary even if it hurt Germany? otherwise, Den­
mark would be forced to look again to England if the German 
coal supply failed, and Germany might find the friendly larder 
door closed.
Brockdorff-Rantzau appreciated every nuance of the 
del icate relationship between Denmark and the two warring 
powers, Germany and England. He sometimes made recommendations
l^ing Christian X respected Brockdorff-Rantzau, and is 
reputed to have said after the war, "Denmark should really put 
up a monument to him." BMS, 1689H/1012/396 859.
^ H e  vigorously advocated, for example, the building 
of the Fehmarn Railroad line (Hamburg-Lubeck-Fehmarn Island-to- 
Copenhagen) which, cutting hours off the old Kiel-Korsor-Co- 
penhagen route, would have greatly benefited businessmen.
This earned him the ill will of German naval authorities who 
resented the by-passing of the important naval headquarters of 
Kiel. Brockdorff-Rantzau complained that "it was incomprehen­
sible „ o „ that they /are building railroads_7 in Asia to 
strengthen German political influence, and, where a similar pos 
sibility exists right at our doorstep thev reject it," BMS, 
1689H/1012/396 732-33 .
180^43
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which Berlin found difficult to accept and to which the German 
Admirals were especially opposed. Through 1916 he insisted on 
a realistic approach in view of Britain’s naval superiority,
In order to retain Denmark as a "friendly neutral" Germany 
simply had to tolerate some Danish shipments of grain to Eng­
land, one of Denmark's essential markets,, If the Danish econ­
omy collapsed, there would be no more food shipments to Ger-
m a n y reminded Berlin that Danish dependence on a com­
mercial relationship with England ha$ developed as a result of 
Germany's previous Schutzzollpolitik,13 and he now sought to 
direct Denmark’s commercial orientation southward without up­
setting her economyo Constantly, in conversations and reports, 
he reiterated his conviction that the nation which first in­
jured Danish neutrality would become Denmark's enemy. Germany, 
he said, would be wiser to refrain from provocative acts and 
let England be the first to get tough with Denmark about neu­
trality violations„ It was even better to offer to protect
■^Accjorciing to Dr „ Edvard Brandes, Finance Minister in 
the Zahle Cabinet, as much as two-thirds of Denmark's exported 
produce went to England and the other one-third to Germany,
See Brandes, p. 33.
In a memorandum of April, 1917, Brockdorff-Rantzau 
noted; "if we deliver coal and iron to a greater extent, the 
feeling of being forced into economic dependence on England 
will disappear. Herr von Scavenius has mentioned that, in this 
case, in addition to other concessions, he would also be an a 
position to increase significantly the quota of horses,," BMS, 
1689H/1012/396 790.
l^BMS, 1689H./1012/396 792-33. Cf. Hanssen, p. xxv, 
which describes the expansion of Danish” agricultural export 
trade to England in the latter 19th century, since "the only 
open market left was the British . "
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Denmark from British coercion .A4
The ultimate goal of Brockdorff-Rantzau1s Danish policy 
was twofold. First, he wanted to avoid incurring the enmity 
of Sweden and Norway, which he felt would be the result of 
German military pressure on Denmark. He wrote to Chancellor 
Bethmann-Ko1lweg in April, 1917, "If we, for economic reasons, 
attack Denmark militarily, Denmark will cease to exist politi­
cally, and the hostility toward us of both the other Scandina­
vian lands is c e r t a i n .  "1-5
His second objective was both shrewd and practical; 
German military pressure, he wrote in the same month, "would 
ruin our whole Scandinavian policy. We need Denmark as a neu­
tral broker after the conclusion of peace, in order to rein­
state relationships with the nations with whom we are now at 
war, and to rebuild our economic life."16 F0r this, a long 
standing economic partnership between the two countries was es­
sential o
14BMS, 1689H/1012/396 766, 769, 784, 786, 836.
■*~~^ BMS, 1689H/1012/396 799. Other neutrals could be 
easily antagonized,. Richard von Kuhlmann had warned in Octo­
ber, 1916, that Holland's 700,000 man militia would fight Ger­
many if unrestricted U-boat warfare began. Link, Campaigns, 
1916-1917, p „ 185, Hans Peter Hanssen, Reichstag member for 
North Schleswig, also mentions Dutch hostility toward Germany. 
Hanssen, p„ 55.
16BMS, 1689H/1012/396 826, 862-63, 792,93,99.
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U-Beats and the Americans 
Six years in Copenhagen, the "whispering gallery of 
Europe, !l made Brockdorf f-Rantzau much more aware of events and 
opinions in other countries than many German statesmen and mili­
tary leaders at the time« He was among those Germans who 
warned against intensifying the submarine warfare when the 
military and naval commanders promised to subdue England within 
months if Germany unleashed the U-boats. The Count considered 
this a foolhardy measure because he was one of the few German 
diplomats in contact with representatives of neutral and Allied 
states during the whole war.
In addition to keeping Denmark a friendly neutral, 
Brockdorff-Rantzau considered it of greatest importance to 
remain on friendly terms with the Americans who were in Copen­
hagen. Even worse than Danish alignment with the Allies was 
the possibility of armed American intervention against Germany. 
The Count was one of the first Germans to realize the enormity 
--and then the probability of this. He cultivated the friend­
ship of the American Minister in Copenhagen, and was consider­
ate of American diplomats and travelers whenever requests were 
made of h i.m- 7
One of the most interesting and prescient accounts of 
diplomatic life in the Danish capital is Ten Years Near the
 ^7 •' He was always decent to Americans," wrote Maurice 
Fo Egan, the American Minister to Denmark, of Brockdorff-Rant­
zau, "and he was shocked when he found that his laissez passer, 
which I obtained from him for the Hon, Do I„ Murphy and his 
wife to pursue their journey to Holland, was treated as a 
“scrap of paper» ! i:i Egan, Ten Years . , . , pp, 306-08, Un­
fortunately, German military authorities and border guards 
usually paid no heed to these diplomatic niceties.
German Frontier, by Maurice Francis Egan, who was the American 
Minister to Denmark from 1907 to 1918. Respected at the 
Danish Court, where he became Dean of the diplomatic corps in 
Copenhagen about 1917 as the senior representative, Egan was 
well regarded by the other diplomats gathered in that enclave 
of neutrality so close to the scene of war. In this book he 
refers many times to Brockdorff-Rantzau as "my colleague across 
the street." Although Egan became more and more mistrustful 
of Germany's actions and intentions, he and the Count struck 
up a close friendship over the years. Propinquity undoubtedly 
played some part in it., yet it was not surprising; both were 
men of letters, good taste, and elegant manners, who delighted 
in refined conversation.
Despite the genuine friendship with the German Minis­
ter, Dr. Egan never lost sight of the menace of German mili­
tarism. His whole book was a warning against Germany's aggres­
sive intentionso Well before the war broke out in 1914, Egan 
realized the danger of German influence over Denmark, which 
would lead, in the case of German occupation of Denmark, to 
German ownership of the Danish West Indies I Largely as a re­
sult of Egan's skillful handling, these outer Caribbean islands 
with strategic deep water harbors were purchased by the United 
States from Denmark "just in time"--December, 1916. They were
renamed the Virgin Islands.
As late as 19.16, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau continued to 
impress Americans in Copenhagen very favorably. "Count Rantzau,
28
wrote Egan,
was desirous of keeping peace with the United States., I 
think that he regarded war with us as so dangerous as to 
be almost unthinkable,. I found Count Rantzau a very 
clever man; he played his game fairly. It was a game, and 
he was a colleague worth any man's respect. He is one of 
the most cynical, brilliant, forcible diplomatists in Eur­
ope, with Liberal tendencies in politics.18
Several times in 1916, James W. Gerard (American Ambassador in 
Berlin since the end of 1913) passed through Copenhagen on the 
way to and from the United States. At least twice, Egan ar­
ranged luncheons for him and his wife, to which Brockdorff- 
Rantzau and others connected with the German Legation were 
also invited. Conversation was partly in French; although 
Gerard told Egan that he spoke little French, "he /perard_/7 
got on immensely well with Count Rantzau, who spoke no Eng­
lish. 1119 Gerard, not noted for friendliness toward Germans, 
considered the Count "a most able diplomat" and set down his 
impressions after further meetings with him in Copenhagen to­
ward the end of 1916-
In Copenhagen, too, both on the way out and in, we 
lunched with Count Rantzau-Brocksdorff /sie_J7, then 
German Minister there. Count Rantzau is skillful, and 
wily, and not at all military in his instincts; and, I 
should say, far more inclined to arrive at a reasonable 
compromise than the average German diplomat. He is a 
charming International with none of the rough points and 
aggressive manners which characterise so many Prussian 
officials 20
18Ibid., p. 270. 19Ibid., p. 282.
^0jam.es W. Gerard, My Four years in. Germany (New Yorks 
George H. Doran Co*. 1917), p. 425. Regarding one of his 
trips back into Germany Gerard relates; "I remained a day in 
Copenhagen, in order to arrange for the transportation to Ger­
many of the three tons of food which I had brought from New 
York, and. also, in order to lunch with Count Rantzau, the 
German. Minister, a most able diplomat." Ibid» , p. 352.
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Herbert Bayard Swope, correspondent for the New York 
World who had spent several, months in Germany, returned to New 
York with Gerard in August, 1916, via Copenhagen. Swope re­
ported extensively on wartime conditions within Germany, and 
gave his opinion in the New York World that intensified sub­
marine warfare was inevitable. Gerard had said as much in a 
somewhat indiscreet interview with Swope aboard ship.^! jn 
his Pulitzer Prize winning book. Inside the German Empire, In 
the Third Year of the War, published in 1917, Swope also re­
corded that; "Count Rantzau, a few days after he had paid a 
visit to the Kaiser and the great general staff, told me frank­
ly that he feared the plan /for all-out U-boat war_7 was rap­
idly becoming unavoidable „58 Swope considered Brockdorf f-Rant­
zau "unusually able" and identified him as "the very intelli­
gent German Minister to Denmark,,"^
21on the Swope-Gerard interview, see E„J0 Kahn, Jr t, f 
The World of Swope (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1.965), pp.
Count Bernstorff mentions Swope,, along with William, 
Bayard Hale, Karl von Wiegand, Cyril Brown, and Karl W„ Acker­
man, as American journalists who had helped to provide accu­
rate and favourable information on Germany for the American pub­
lic through 1916. Swope also pressed the theme of German hatred 
of Americans., but Bernstorff viewed this as an "election man­
oeuvre,” offset by Swope : s praise of German 'bff icienc^1" and or­
ganization on the home front. Count Johann Heinrich Bernstorff, 
My Three Years in America (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons,
ig2o) , PT ' 8 ..... .....
22fierbert Bayard Swope, Inside the German Empire, In 
the Third Year of the War (New York; The Century Co.. 1.917), 
pp. 8 8 , 5 5/ 7 7-78.
Before leaving Copenhagen, Swope wrote in a personal 
letter; "My dear Excellency;- My wife and I feel we can not 
leave Copenhagen without expressing to you the real pleasure 
we felt in meeting you. I congratulate Germany in being so 
ably represented at this important, post, and I  shall take plea­
sure in expressing this sentiment in Berlin and Washington. I
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Dr., Egan's position of official neutrality had become 
more and more difficult after the Lusitania tragedy in May, 
1915. He tells how, after hearing of Bernstorff's infamous 
advertisement (Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in 
Washington, was a cousin of Brockdorff-Rantzau) warning Ameri­
cans not to sail in British or Allied ships,
, o o I had said „ . „ "The day after an American is killed
w i t h o  ut warning at, sea, we will declare war I" It was 
undiplomatic, but. I had said it to Count Rantzau, to Prince 
Wittgenstein, to Count Raben-Levetzau, to Prince Vaidemar, 
to the Princes, to other persons, and, I think, at the 
Foreign Office.23
As already mentioned, Brockdorff-Rantzau did regard unrestric­
ted U-boat warfare as a reckless move, to be avoided. A year 
before the February, 1917, decision making it official German 
policy, he had given his opinion, in answer to a secret dis­
patch from, the Chancellor, that America would enter the war im­
mediately if the U-boat war was intensifiedo24
German official, circles believed that England, the most 
powerful and determined Allied nation in 1916, would only ac­
cept the idea of negotiations leading to a status quo peace if 
convinced that America would not join the Allies in the war„
regret that our stay in Copenhagen should have been so brief as
I should have Iiked our acquaintance to have ripened into 
friendship., Perhaps that opportunity will come, if not. before., 
when you are sent as Ambassador to America. We would be for­
tunate in having a man of such broad understanding, wide sympa­
thies, and attractive personality as the German representative 
--a worthy successor to Bernstorff who has done so well there .
. ."Swope, to Brockdorff-Rantzau, August ±5, 1916, "Nachlass
B“R, 9.105H/3438/231 37.1-82,■. By June, .1917, Swope was "sweep- 
ingly characterizing all the subjects inside the Empire as 
'those damned Germans."" Kahn, pp. 183-84«,
2^Egan, Ten Years 0 . ., pp. 290-91.
24BMS 1689H/1012/396 752.
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President. Wilson seemed to want to keep out of the war, but his 
fundamental pro-English feeling was becoming apparent, and 
would certainly be sparked by another incident like the Lusi­
tania or the Arabic, as Bernstorff constantly warned from 
W a s h i n g t o n .25 yet the German High Command evidently ascribed 
little importance to possible American intervention, and pres- 
sed harder for the unrestricted use of submarines„ Egan des­
cribes Brockdorff-Rantzau1s attitude at this times
We were still "neutral," and the election was eome 
months off. Count Rantzau saw the danger which the mili­
tary party was courting. He was too discreet to make 
confidential remarks, which I would at once repeat to my 
Government; he knew, of course, that. I would not repeat 
them to my colleagues, who never, however, asked what he 
said to meo He was equally tactful, but we saw that he 
was exceedingly nervous about the outcome of the U-boat 
aggressiono It was worthwhile to know his attitude, for 
he represented much that was really important in Germany.
He began to be more nervous,, and many things he said, which 
I can not repeat, indicated that the military party was 
running a m u c k . 2 6
In Copenhagen, Egan held a magnifying glass upon the 
German situation. He saw that, despite the existence of oppo­
sition views and those who would conclude a reasonable peace, 
Germany was hopelessly dominated by the military. He felt
^Bernstorff, My Three Years „ . , , p. 295. In their
books on wartime Germany, Gerard, Egan, Swope, (and Bernstorff) 
all refer to the persistent belief in Germany that ';er.ma.o -Am.eri - 
cans, remaining loyal to Germany, would actually prevent an 
American declaration of war against Germany„ Gerard and Egan 
did what they could to refute this notion., and Swope notes that 
Egan was aided by Brockdorff-Rantzau., "who finally came to this 
view and helped eradicate the mistaken one that had been held 
in Berlin." Swope, pp. 77-78.,
Some things contributed to the notion. In a secret 
meeting of the Finance Committee, March .10, 1915, Secretary of 
State Heifferich mentioned that " < . . appreciable sums were
subscribed to the second /German war_7 loan in Scandinavia, 
Switzerland, and America, especially by the Germans in the last- 
named country." Hanssen, p„ 101.
^Egan, Ten Years „ . . , p., 306,
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events would inevitably drag America into the conflict, espe­
cially if Russia collapsed. By the end of 1916 Egan realized 
that "we must enter the war eventually, yet the depth and
breadth of German preparedness was horrifying; and we are so
2 7unready; we must gain time !
Egan's frequent contact with the Count did not go un­
observed and uncriticizedo The British were increasingly 
worried; Egan relates thats
A messenger came to warn me— a messenger from one of 
my best English ,friends--that it would be well for me not 
to see so much of Count Rantzau, It was easy, my friend 
said, for me to be attracted by mere cleverness and to 
forget what England was fighting for. It had been repor­
ted that I had said that when Rantzau was Voltaire, he 
was frightfully diabolical; when he was Heine, he was de­
lightfully diabolical; but when he was just Rantzau, he 
was the devil himself,! This had reached the ears of some 
of my English friends, and they thought such companion­
ship might lead me to take the war issues too lightly.^8
For over two years Egan walked the tightrope of neutrality and
worked toward the one contribution he could make toward his
country's preparednesss the timely purchase of the Danish
West Indies.
If they feared that Maurice Egan might be charmed over 
to the wrong side of the fence, the British representatives in 
Copenhagen recognized "Brock," as they called him, for what he 
was: the most influential and best supported diplomat in the
2 7Ibid,, p. 300. At the beginning of the war, Sir 
Henry Lowther (at that time British Minister in Copenhagen) 
had astonished Egan with the prophecys "Our great weakness is 
Russia; if you do not come in and offset it, I fear greatly." 
Ibid., p o 311.
^ Ibid. , pp„ 299-300.
Danish capital as long as the radical government remained in 
power.29
Peace Feelers through Denmark 
Politically and geographically, Denmark was in a u- 
nique position to offer mediation for peace. Married to Prin­
cess Alexandrine of Mecklinburg-Schwerin, King Christian X was 
also related to both the British and Russian ruling families. 
In the first two years of the war, the Danish King had offered 
Germany a tenuous means of contact with Russia or England. Two 
approaches to Russia in this manner f a i l e d . 20
The English diplomats in Copenhagen were a good baro­
meter of Britain's reactions toward peace feelers, and Brock­
dor ff-Rantzau left no stone unturned in gathering such infor­
mation. On December 12, 1916, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg had
made a speech in the Reichstag in favor of peace negotiations. 
Because this move seemed to flaunt the strong German military 
position, Lloyd George spoke out against the idea until Ger­
many would guarantee reparation and restitution of invaded
On January 17, 1917, an article called "Denmark’s
Uncrowned King" appeared in The Bystander, an English language 
newspaper circulated among dTpTomatic circles in Copenhagen. 
Picked up in the British press also, it described "Brock's" in­
ordinate influence over Danish affairs, which was credited to 
the existence of a strong German element in Denmark and the 
well-staffed and funded German Legation and spy system over 
which "Brock" ruled with an iron hand. BMS, 1689H/1012/396 
874-76, "Nachlass B-R," 9101H/3439/H232 804-12.
-^According to Birnbaum, p. 104, King Christian " .
o offered to make confidential approaches through Hans Niels 
Andersen, a Danish ship-owner with international contacts, in 
order to sound the feelings towards peace in official circles 
in Britain and Russia." Nothing came of either attempt, in 
1914 and 1916. Rudolf Stadelmann, "Friedensversuche im ersten
34
t e r r i t o r y . England was officially unreceptive to the German 
offer, yet Brockdorff-Rantzau reported that peace feelers 
would not be altogether ignored by England at the end of 1916.32 
The year 1917 was the turning point for England as 
well as America. Germany's decision for all-out U-boat war­
fare plus the intensified raids on England by bombers and Zep­
pelins launched England on a "crusade" against Germany.33 As 
Prime Minister of the coalition government formed at the very 
end of 1916, David Lloyd George was the leader of Britain's 
determined war effort. Three months previously he had said
Jahre des Weltkrieges," Historische Zeitschrift, CLVI (1937), 
516-18, gives h  more detailed account of the 1914 approach to 
Russia through Copenhagen and describes Brockdorff-Rantzau f s 
part in promoting it.
^Brockdorff-Rantzau reported, after December 12, that 
he had heard that the British Minister in Copenhagen /sir RajLph 
PagetJ7 had said that any English government accepting the 
peace offer of the Central Powers would be hanged. BMS, 1689H/ 
1012/396 915. Perhaps this was merely an English idiom!
See Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare 
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wikseil, 1958) , p"! 25On, which mentions 
a dispatch from Brockdorff-Rantzau to the Foreign Office on 
December 18, 1916, "suggesting a desire for peace on the part 
of the Entente." A report written by the Count in 1922 for a 
committee investigating various peace attetnpts mentions Eng­
land's readiness to discuss peace at the very beginning of 
1917. BMS, 1689H/1012/396 898-903. See also Link, pp. 177- 
84, 230-31.
^ F o r  a good account of the air raids, see Dr. Douglas 
H. Robinson, "Zeppelins in the German Navy, 1914-1918," United 
States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXII (July, 1956), pp. 
742-61. “ “
In his 1922 report on peace attempts, Brockdorff-Rant­
zau said that in February, 1917, "It was revealed to me through 
an intermediary that the English negotiator who had arrived in 
/copenhagen__7 refused to meet with me because he had nothing 
Turther to say to me." BMS, 1689.H/1012/396 901.
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that England would settle for nothing less than complete de­
feat of German militarism and the ruling classes in Germany—  
the impassioned declaration that became known as the "knock­
out blow,"34
In January of 1918, King Christian considered the 
time ripe to approach England about ending the war before a 
new spring offensive began, and Danish Foreign Minister 
Scavenius informed Brockdorff-Rantzau that the King was wil­
ling to attempt mediation again. Chancellor Hertling, the 
Kaiser, and Field Marshal von Hindenburg discussed this offer 
and decided that Germany's position was too unfavorable for 
an acceptable settlement. Brockdorff-Rantzau urged modifi­
cation of German demands in vain; London, however, had al­
ready declined the Danish King's confidential i n q u i r y . 35
Plans to "Revolutionize" Russia
From the beginning of the war, the object of German 
diplomacy was to break up the Entente by concluding a sepa­
rate peace with Russia or France. Germany expected to gain 
more in that, way than from the results of a general peace 
conference. This policy in all its variations is examined 
by Karl E. Birnbaum in Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare. Ever 
since the summer of 1915, Brockdorff-Rantzau had been inter­
ested in the project of provoking revolution in Russia, in
3*^See Link, Campaigns, 1916-1917, p. 176, for Lloyd 
George's "knock-out" interview with the American reporter 
Roy W. Howard, September 28, 1916. For a very good German
study of Lloyd George's position of wartime leadership in 
Britain, see Erwin Holzle, "Lloyd George im Weltkrieg," His- 
torische Zeitschrift, CLVI (1937), 40-70.
33;b mS, 1689H/1012/396 902; S tern-Rubar th, pp. 54-57.
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order to weaken the Entente.
During his years in Copenhagen, the Kohlenpolitik kept 
the Count in constant touch with Danish and German Social Demo- 
crats including Philipp Scheidemann and Friedrich Ebert, who 
became leaders of the early Weimar Republic, In this w^y he 
had met a certain Dr. Helphand (known as Parvus among revolu­
tionaries), an ex-Russian belongihg to the German Social Demo­
cratic Party. Helphand had many ideas and contacts that might 
exploit the revolutionary movement in Russia to Germany's advan­
tage. Brockdorff-Rantzau advised the Chancellor to use any 
means available, including Helphand's scheme of shipping known 
revolutionaries to Russia— above all Lenin, who was then biding 
his time in Switzerland. m  an extensive report to the For­
eign Office on December 6, 1915, Brockdorff-Rantzau had warned
that Germany's "existence as a great power is at stake— perhaps 
even more. . . . Victory, and as reward the first place in the
world is ours, however, if we succeed in revolutionizing Russia 
at the expedient moment, thereby destroying the Coalition."37 
At first Bethmann—Hoilweg and the Foreign Office had hesitated.
A recent study of Lenin's "shipment" through Germany refers to 
memoranda and secret dispatches from the Count to the Foreign 
Office in the first week of April, .1917, urging that Lenin be
36see dispatches in Z.A.B. Zeman (ed.), Germany and the 
Revolution in Russia 1915-1918 (Londons Oxford University Press, 
1958) " pp. 8 , 9', 30-3l, 32-33. On Helphand and Lenin, see Ed­
mund Taylor, The Fall of the Dynasties (New York: Doubleday,
1963), pp. 283-88.
3 7 -Fritz Fischer, "Deutsche Kriegsziele, Revolutiomerung 
und Separatfrieden im Osten 1914-1918," Historische Zeitschrift, 
CLXXXVIIX (1959), 259-60, 301, treats this report extensively,
noting that it does not appear in the Zeman collection of docu­
ments relating to Germany's part in creating the November revo­
lution in Russia. See also Birnbaum, p. 18n.
sent to Russia without further delay. When General Ludendorff 
approved the idea, the trip was accomplished early that month.38
With America on the side of the Allies, the move had become im­
perative .
It remained for Germany to conclude peace with the 
Soviets after the November Revolution in 1917. Always with his 
eye on future German-Soviet relations, Brockdorff-Rantzau recom­
mended lenient terms and no annexations. "The peace," he had 
said on April 1, "can be either a German-English one or a German
Russian one. I hold the latter prospect for the more probable."
But the harsh terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March, 
1918, were a complete refutation of the Count's long-term Rus­
sian policy.
Peace and Reform Movements in Germany
The cordial working relationship with Social Democrats 
of Denmark and Germany which developed during the war years pro­
foundly influenced the Count’s diplomatic career. Kaiser Wil­
helm II is said to have referred to Brockdorff-Rantzau at this 
time as "the only sensible man among my diplomats--he has under­
stood even how to deal with the Social Democrats I"40 writing 
of it later on, the Count described being well received at an
38Werner Hahlweg, "Lenins Reise durch Deutschland imi 
April,1 9 1 7 Vierteljahrheft fur Zeitgeschichte, IV (October 
1957), 312-22T “ -------- --
39BMS, 1689H/1012/396 920-28; 1690H/1013/396 941.
^Edward Hallett Carr, German-Soviet Relations between 
the Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1951), p . 67; Stern-Rubarth, p. 60.
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audience with the Kaiser in May, 1916. Wilhelm, he said, had 
evidenced the "liveliest interest" in the Danish negotiations. 
After 1917, the Kaiser's opinion changed abruptly. Brockdorff- 
Rantzau's memorandum continues, "Since I was suspected by the 
Kaiser, after the opening of the unrestricted submarine warfare, 
of being a defeatist, he received me very ungraciously in May, 
1917 . . . "41
Exactly as predicted, the resumption of unrestricted U- 
boat war early in 1917 had brought the United States into the war 
against Germany. The divergence of German military and civilian 
viewpoints was thrown into sharp relief with the passage of the 
Reichstag Peace Resolution of July 19, 1917, masterminded by the
impetuous Catholic Center Party member Matthias E r z b e r g e r . 4 ^ 
Although it realigned the political parties, bringing togther 
the Social Democrats, Centrists, and Progressives, General Luden- 
dorff remained virtual dictator. Three Chancellors and three 
Foreign Secretaries were to fall in thirteen months, while the 
Supreme Command dangled the prospect of military success.
Before the Peace Resolution, the inexperienced Chancellor 
Georg Michaelis, Bethmann-Hollweg's successor, had cast about for 
a suitable man to replace Arthur Zimmermann who had resigned as 
Foreign Secretary. The choice narrowed to Baron Richard von
4 -^The Kaiser explained that after America's declaration 
of war he could have no further consideration for small neutral 
states. See Stern-Rubarth, p. 58, and BMS, 1689H/1012/396 803.
42On Erzberger and the Peace Resolution, see Klaus Ep­
stein, Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democrapy 
(Princeton University Press, 1959), p p . 182-213. Erzberger 
was a rash opportunist who, however, always had the best inter­
ests of his country at heart. He was to have profound influ­
ence on Germany's Versailles decision.
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Kuhlmann and Count Brockdorf f-Rantzau „ On July 18,, 19.17* the 
Count penned a memorandum in Copenhagen regarding the conditions 
under which he would accept the appointment0
The action was characteristic of the man; Brockdorff- 
Rantzau's suspicious nature and legal-trained mind never allowed 
him to accept any position of responsibility without first metic­
ulously setting forth his concept of the job and the conditions 
under which he would undertake it„ He wrote:
If I take over the office of Foreign Secretary, it will 
be my duty to work toward a peace which will be commensurate 
with the sacrifice which the German nation has made, and 
which will guarantee the future of the nation and her right­
ful place in the w o r l d c 4 3
He then demanded to know the truth from the Supreme Command and 
the Navy about the military situation0 A second memorandum (Au­
gust 1) is very critical of the ascendancy of the military over 
the political leadership,, Ludendorff 1 s promises of victory were 
simply not materializing and the submarine campaign had failed 
so far to break England down,, Facing a bleak fourth winter of 
war, he recommended a Wilson-like peace without victorys
If we are led on further by the military authorities, 
it only remains for us to perish in grandeur, in my opinion„ 
As things now stand, it is the duty of the politicians to 
ask if the people would not, instead of this, prefer to 
live o
We must therefore strive for a peace of understanding„
The present military situation offers a suitable basis 
to reach this goal „ Nicht besiegt werden, heisst doch
nicht s i e g e n 0 4 4
43bME, 1690H/1013/396 9340
44jbidQ, 1690H/1013/396 939-40ff„ On May 4, 1917, 
Brockdorff-Rantzau had expressed his opinion to General Luden­
dorf f that Germany's allies,, especially Austria-Hungary, were 
"at the end of their strength1" and that the military situation 
was very unfavorable for Germany,, BMS, 1690H/1QI3/396 948„
40
Nothing, he said, should be done without consulting the people's 
representatives, "who now have a strong voice," Not only that, 
but the Kaiser must take the initiative in setting up a parlia­
mentary government.
To Michaelis, who paid little attention to the Peace 
Resolution, Brockdorff-Rantzau's views must have been too radi­
cal. He chose Richard von Kuhlmann.
After almost a year in office Kuhlmann, too, concluded 
that diplomatic action would be needed to end the w a r *45 Gener­
al Ludendorff insisted that the Kaiser replace Kuhlmann with 
Admiral von Hintze, then German Minister in Norway, whom the 
Supreme Command could control. A fifth grim winter of war 
loomed ahead, and Germany's allies were deserting one by one. 
Count Hertling (Chancellor for a year after Michaelis's four 
months) resigned when the Ilindenburg line broke on September 29, 
1918, and the high office devolved upon the reluctant Prince 
Maximilian von Badeno A man of integrity, respected for his 
work toward the humane treatment of prisoners of war, Baden's 
task was to work with the Reichstag, majority in putting through 
constitutional reforms.. General Ludendorff, however, had even 
more urgent plans for Prince Maxa
His first day in office Prince Max was astounded by 
Ludendorff S,s sudden demand for an armistice through the good of­
fices of President Wilson. The new Chancellor hesitated, but 
the situation was desperate: Field Marshal von Hindenburg con­
curred, and Austria had already asked for peace. By October 3,
^^Harry R. Rudin, Armistice 1918 (New York:, Yale Univers­
ity Press, 1944), p„ 6 ^ BernstorTTTMirThree Years . . . , p., 415 =
41
the first German note, accepting Wilson's Fourteen Points as the 
basis of an armistice and future peace negotiations, was on its 
way to the President046
The following day, the Chancellor was occupied with 
forming his new government. He intended to break with the past 
by appointing men who were not associated with the policies 
which had pursued the war,. '“We must form a Government of men in 
whose case there is documentary proof that they strove for this 
peace of justice even at the moment of our greatest victories 
„ . ."47 He hoped to save Germany's colonies with one important
choice. "The post of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
had fortunately not been demanded for the parties. I hesitated 
between Solf and Count Brockdorff-Rantzaua our Minister in Copen­
hagen. . . .  I then decided finally for Solf." Dr0 "Wilhelm Solf 
had spoken out for "a peace of understanding, tL and as former 
Govenor of Samoa and Colonial Secretary, Baden considered his 
appointment to be "a pointed assertion of our just claim to 
colonies 0
46RU(3in : s book Armistice 1918 explores in minute detail 
the reasons for Ludendorff1s loss of nerve and his demand that 
Prince Max ask for an armistice immediately. Rudin effectively 
blasts the military's later ,3stab-in-the-back" charge against 
the Government. See Rudin, pp. 1-137.
47Prince Max of Baden, Memoirs, tr„ W.M. Calder and 
C„WoH. Sutton (2 vols„; New Yorks Charles Scribner's Sons, .192 8),
I, 370.
^^Baden, II, 28. Prince Max noted happily that '"The ___ 
phrase CA colony is a mission field, ’ had been coined by ^/Solf__/ 
and was in his case no mere form of speech." Ibid.
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It is doubtful if Prince Max could have prevailed upon 
Brockdorff-Rantzau to take the post at that moment„ At the end 
of September, Ebert and Scheidemann had made a second appeal to 
him to come in as Foreign Secretary. The message, relayed to 
Copenhagen through his twin brother, Count Ernst zu Rantzau, was 
answered with a memorandum dated October 3 , Aware of the mili­
tary and naval animosity towards him as well as the "malicious 
opposition of the Pan-Germans and heavy industry, and the mis­
trust of the Conservatives" he considered the post of Foreign 
Secretary too devoid of authority to accomplish anything. Even 
as Chancellor he would not have the backing of the Supreme Com­
mand and the Monarch.^9
Prince Max chose Dr., Solf for the Foreign Office, but 
he had other plans to utilize the talents of Brockdorff-Rantzau„ 
He intended to name the Count as his own successor, should he 
resign as Chancellor. Meanwhile, the Count remained a valuable 
source of advice, especially in formulating the answers to Wil­
son's notes, and his location in a neutral capital was a diplo­
matic advantage.
Requisites for an Armistice 
The drafting of Germany's reply to President Wilson's 
second note caused a last debate over submarine warfare. On 
October 19, Prince Max met with several German Ambassadors, in—
^^Brandenburg notes that Brockdorff™Rantzau was unwill­
ing to serve under Hertling, who was unacceptable to the Social 
Democrats. At the time he wrote this memorandum, the Count did 
not know that Prince Max would be Chancellor and institute con­
stitutional reforms. The distance from Copenhagen to Berlin 
made prompt, communications difficult. See BMS, 1690H/1013/396 
946, 949ff, and Stern-Rubarth, pp^ 53-54.
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eluding Brockdorff-Rantzau, who all concurred that U-boat war­
fare must be dropped or there could be no hope of an armistice. 
The sinking of the Leins ter on October 11 had caused great reper­
cussions in England. "Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, ! relates Prince 
Max,
spoke impressively of the fix in which we found ourselves 
today. He described the devastating effect it had had upon 
the German representatives abroad when Gne day they woke up 
and read that Germany had asked Wilson for an armistice.
The first was the decisive step; now there was no alterna­
tive but to follow out the path we had once set foot upon,^
All thus, according to Baden, convinced the Cabinet, Naval oppo­
sition was squelched and a third German note was off to Wilson 
on October 21.
The next bastion to tumble was the authority of the Su­
preme Command. When the third American note refused to treat 
with the "military masters and monarchical autocrats" of Germany, 
Baden insisted upon the dismissal of General Ludendorff as proof 
of the new Government's authority. The very next day a fourth 
German note asked for an armistice.
Constitutional and authoritative changes notwithstanding, 
Prince Max's regime was viewed with suspicion by the Allies from 
the very beginning. It was all too sudden— a "camouflage democ­
racy, " a “peace trap." President Wilson felt a moral obligation 
to end the slaughter as soon as possible. Although he moved
SOBaden, II, 150. The other Ambassadors declaring 
against U-boat warfare were Count Wolff-Metternich (formerly in 
London), Dr, Rosen (Minister in the Netherlands), and Count Berns- 
torff, who telephoned his anti-submarine views from Constanti­
nople. Just before the Leinster incident, Herr von Romberg, the 
German Minister in Switzerland, had warned that U-boats "might 
aggravate the situation, Philipp Scheidemann, The Making of New 
Germany; The Memoirs of Philipp Scheidemann, tr0 J.E„ Mitchell 
(2 vols. ; New York; D. Appleton and Co.,, 1929), II, 185.
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cautiously regarding an armistice, Wilson had many critics at 
home and abroad., France, Britain, and many Americans wanted 
nothing less than the complete surrender of Imperial Germany.
On October 7, the New York Times had trumpeted "No peace with 
the HohenzollernSc"51
The Monarchy represented, therefore, a last stumbling 
block in the road to an armistice. Scheidemann and the Social 
Democrats were now demanding the Kaiser's abdication lest the 
war continue until Germany disintegrated. Already Bolshevist 
agitation was apparent in Berlin, and in Bavaria "there was 
serious talk about seceding from the Empire."52
Still hoping for a constitutional Monarchy, Prince Max 
sought more information on how important the act of abdication 
would appear abroad. He sent a trusted adviser, Dr. Kurt Hahn 
(Head of the English Section of the Foreign News Service), to 
Copenhagen to meet with two American diplomats and with Count 
B r o c k d o r f f - R a n t z a u o H a h n  returned with his anxiously awaited 
report on October 30, revealing that the Americans had stressed 
that Wilson needed grounds to defend his "peace of justice" 
against the "chauvinists of the Entente who are now at the helm 
in England and France, " Ludendorff’s dismissal, would help, they
-^Rudin, pp, 106-08.  ^ 197-216,,
Baden, II, 233-35. One of the Americans was Li.thgow 
Osborne, Second Secretary of the American Legation in Copen- 
hagen. See Rudin, pp. 226, 232« Osborne later went to Germany
as a member, of the Dresel Commission * See Chapter III, infra ,
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had intimated, but since 'in the eyes of hundreds of thousands
the Kaiser and Crown Prince are the embodiment of all that Is
hateful and * „ „ dangerous in Germany’ only the elimination of
the Hohenzolierns would furnish drama tic proof of change,, One
American had concluded the conversation with an outburst of emo -
Lion^ "For God’s sake,, do something to make Wilson strong
against the Entente militarists 0 0 51 Count Brockdorff-Rantzau
agreed that the German people would be in no position to resist
dishonorable armistice conditions if the Kaiser remained,, 54
In his Erinnerungen, the late Dr0 Theodor Heuss recalled
a visit at the German Legation in Copenhagen in mid-1918o He
told of a long conversation with Brockdorff-Rantzau.s
He knew the war was lost and said it right out.,, He con­
sidered his essential task fulfilled; he told of Danish 
trade unions and the German coal agreement, which helped 
overcome the people’s historic resentment,, I recalled 
his complete lack of bias toward the workers" movements, 
not exactly in keeping with his noble status, when Ebert 
appointed him. Foreign Minister 0 0 0'-55
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau did not hesitate to advocate
the changes he considered inevitableD ,JHe became more and more
convinced that an attempt must be made, while there was still
time, to conclude an acceptable peace, and that it was likewise
necessary to revive the tottering situation in Germany with
54saden, II, 2 3 3-34; Rudin, p„ 2 320 Reluctant to take 
the step himself, Baden tried to get. Brockdorff-Rantzau, among 
others, to take on the onerous duty of suggesting abdication to 
the Kaiser, The Count declined because of the lack of_consti- 
tutionality /for_such a step_/ implicit in his office g Mini­
ster to D e n m a r k " Stern-Rubarth, p„ 540
55Theodor Heuss, Erinner ungen 1.90 5-1933 l Tubingen;: 
Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1963), pp„ 223-24„
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inner reforms."^ Here was an experienced diplomat of inde­
pendent convictions and high standing who would cooperate even 
with a working man's republic for the sake of Germany's future. 
It did not take long for the Social Democrats to turn to him 
for help and support.
56BMS, 1689H/1012/396 928.
CHAPTER III
3R0CKD0RFF-RANTZAU BECOMES FOREIGN MINISTER
Abdication and Armistice
In Germany, a bewildering race of events followed mili­
tary defeat in the field and the appeal for an armistice„ Sig­
nificantly, Matthias Erzberger( a prominent Catholic Center 
Party leader and a civilian, was chosen as chief German repre­
sentative to the coming armistice talks. Prince Maximilian von 
Baden, Chancellor during these last anxious days of October, 
1918, informed Erzberger that. Germany's desperate situation made 
an armistice imperative. The Chancellor also wanted Brockdorff- 
Rantzau to accompany Erzberger as Foreign Office representative 
at the armistice proceedings, but the distance from Copenhagen 
made this impossible.
The first full week of November witnessed the spread of 
revolution and the downfall of the Hohenzollern Monarchy. Aus­
tria, the only other remnant of the Central Powers, capitulated 
on November 3, Disorder convulsed Germany; riots and sailors' 
mutinies spread from northern seaports to Berlin, and in the 
south the Independent Socialist leader Kurt Eisner deposed the 
old Wittelsbach Dynasty in Bavaria and declared a Bavarian Re-
■j
Upon Solf :s advice, Count Alfred Oberndorff, the war­
time Ambassador to Bulgaria, went instead. Epstein, p. 2 71.
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publico By the sixth of November, with Erzberger on the way to 
armistice talks. Prince Max realized that the immediate abdica­
tion of Wilhelm II was the only means of preventing a violent 
revolution in Germany as well as proving to the Allies that Ger­
many was no longer dominated by the war regime. The Social 
Democratic leaders Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, un­
der pressure from their party, were demanding the abdication of 
the Kaiser and Crown Prince by November 8. Unable to obtain 
any word from Wilhelm IX or his military entounage at their head 
quarters in Spa, Baden declined at first to declare the abdica­
tion himself. In his eyes it would have been "nothing less than 
a coup d 1 etat. 112 Yet he had failed to secure the Kaiser's volun 
tary abdication before the deadline set by the Social Democrats, 
and they resigned from the government as they had warned„ Un­
der the circumstances, Baden wished to resign as Chancellor, 
and at first he intended "to recall Rantzau to Berlin by tele­
gram and send in his name to Spa as my s u c c e s s o r . "3
There was no time for Baden to carry out any such plan. 
On November 9, the Kaiser fled to Holland, convinced at last 
that the army would no longer support him. Prince Max had fi­
nally announced the abdication on the strength of a military 
communique from Spa„ Very soon after that, Philipp Scheidemann
^Baden, II, 347„ Until the last moment Baden hoped to 
retain the monarchy by the device of an abdication coupled with 
the Kaiser's naming of a Chancellor to carry on,* under these 
conditions he even thought a regency could be arranged,, Ibid., 
pp. 351-57 o
3Xbido , II, 335,,
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proclaimed the German Republic from a Reichstag balcony, lest 
the milling crowds in the streets desert Ebert and the Majority
Socialists for Soviet-inspired Karl Liebknecht and the Sparta-
cists0 Prince Max then relinquished the Chancellorship to Fried­
rich Ebert.^ with Ebert and Scheidemann as leaders, a Council 
of People's Representatives, which included three Independent
Socialists in a total of six members, hopefully retained author-
5lty on November l h  The war ended that day, after Matthias 
Erzberger had signed an armistice designed by the French to pre­
vent any German renewal of hostilities.
Brockdorff-Rantzau Replaces Solf
Dr. Solf, who had signed the last three of the German
notes to Wilson,^ was not to remain Inng ih office as Foreign
Secretary after the CPR assumed its precarious political author­
ity. Although a "good democrat," he believed that the Independent 
Socialists were incompatible with the Majority Socialists and on 
December 9, 1918, in a CPR meeting, he went so far as to accuse
the prominent Independent Socialist Hugo Haase (one of the six
A 1Ludwig ziramermann, Deutsche Aussenpolitik in der Ara der 
Weimarer Republik (Gottingen; Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1958), p. 42. 
Dr. Simons, legal expert in the Foreign Office greatly respected 
by Prince Max, "already regarded Ebert as the man for the post of 
Chancellor" on November 8th. Baden, II, 335.
^At Compiegne, Marshal Foch (and Erzberger himself) won­
dered what government the German armistice delegates actually 
represented. Rudin, pp. 370-73; Epstein, pp. 279-80.
^Because of the possibility of a Chancellor crisis, Erz­
berger advised that subsequent notes (after the first) be signed 
by Foreign Secretary Dr. Solf instead of Prince Max. Matthias 
Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-An- 
stalt, 1920), p 3 2 5 =
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7CPR members) of collaboration with Russian Bolshevists, Solf's
past utterances on colonies were also something of a liability.
If the CPR was to hold out until the election of a National Con­
stituent Assembly, it would be necessary to replace Dr. Solf 
with a man acceptable to Majority Socialists and Independents 
alike«,
Although fatal in Solf’s case, previous connection with 
the Imperial regime did not absolutely prevent a man from serving 
under the CPR. Erich Eyck, in A History of the Weimar Republic, 
explains that while the two Socialist parties retained political 
authorlty,
they quickly realized that they would have to look outside 
their parties for men to direct those offices which required 
professional competence. . . , They sought to solve this
problem by excluding "bourgeois" ministers formally from 
the true cabinet, and making them instead responsible to 
the Council of People's Representatives. Furthermore, these 
ministers were given Social Democratic undersecretaries or 
assistants.®
Prior to Baden's appointment of Dr. Solf, Ebert and 
Scheidemann had unsuccessfully offered Brockdorff-Rantzau the 
post of Foreign Secretary. If he was prepared to accept the bid
-j
Zimmermann, p. 34. According to Zimmermann, Solf and 
General Groener both wanted immediate elections in order to end 
the revolution and the provisional CPR of Ebert and Scheidemann. 
On the other hand, the Independent Socialists wanted to get rid 
of Solf. Kurt Eisner (of the Bavarian Republic) and others ac­
cused him "of having burnt the documents of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs relating to the responsibility of the Imperial 
regime for the outbreak of the war." See W„M„ Knight-Patterson, 
Germany from Defeat to Conquest 1913-1933 (London; George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 1945), p. 231. Erzberger had called Solf "to­
tally ignorant of political affairs." Epstein, p. 262.
Q
Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, tr. Harlan 
P. Hanson and Robert G.Lo Waite (2 vols.; Harvard University 
Press, 1962), I ,  53-54. Eyck notes here that the Foreign Office 
received Dr. David, a Social Democrat, and Karl Kautsky an Inde­
pendent Socialist leader.
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now, in view of the drastically altered political situation and
the fact of civilian leadership, the new Republic would benefit
from his professional experience and known liberal outlook.
Count Brockdor£f-Rantzau had previously declared himself ready
9
to work toward rebuilding things if a collapse occurred0 Clear­
ly, the time had come.
The Count had already prepared the way with characteris­
tic thoroughness, since Ebert and Scheidemann had been in con­
tact with him before Solf's break with the Independents,^ In a 
letter to Scheidemann on December 9, Brockdorff-Rantzau set 
forth his main condition for accepting the post of Foreign Sec­
retary ; he must also participate in the solving of Germany's 
internal problems0 The foremost problem, preserving the po­
litical unity of the Reich, made necessary the creation of a
1.1republican army to combat further inroads of Bolshevism.
Toward the end of the letter is a paragraph of great interest,
in view of the events which followedt
In regard to the duty which would ultimately rest with 
me, the concluding of peace, I should like here to touch 
upon a point which must not be overlooked. __If the peace 
terms, which the enemy will dictate to us /.are such that_7 
they do not allow our people an existence compatible with 
human dignity, I must know if I would be empowered to re­
fuse my signature, or if it would be the intention /of the 
Government^/ only to ratify the treaty under protest/^
9BMS, 1690H/10X.3/396 949. At that time (October 2,
1918) he had spoken in terms of the Chancellorship, since he 
considered the post of Foreign Secretary completely ineffective0
-*-9BMS, 1690H/1013/396 959; Hajo Holborn, "Diplomats and 
Diplomacy in the Early Weimar Republic, 1 in The Diplomats 1919- 
1939, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1953), p„ 133. Hereafter, Holborn, "Diplomats."
■^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp. 4-5.
-^^ Ibid. , pp. 5~6o
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Brockdorff-Rantzau1s inevitable Promemoria followed the 
letter, dealing for the most part with political and economic 
matters. First and foremost, the world must be convinced of the 
stability of the new German Government if Germany hoped to pur­
sue any sort of foreign policy. To this end the National Assem­
bly must be called before February 16, and the authority of the
! "3Republic firmly established within Germany.
Of greatest importance was the restoration of Germany's 
economy and her credit abroad, and the encouragement of her own 
industries. Loans from abroad would be indispensable to the re­
covery of the German economy, and he considered America the best 
prospect for such credit if Germany took sensible steps to re­
vive her economy.
A people that evidences no propensity for governing it­
self, which yesterday possessed the most authoritative govern 
ment and today is no longer capable of erecting a new and 
modern national government, would be refused American or any 
other foreign credit. . . .  I think that the question of 
foreign credit must be thoroughly and carefully examined by 
the best financial and economic authorities in the country,
* * * inquiries made through neutral channels
He ended his letter to Scheidemann with one last consideration.
He would serve as Foreign Secretary if his health would permit.
During the last few months in Copenhagen he had found it neces-
sary to consult a doctor about heart trouble.
Hugo Haase at first balked at the idea of an aristocrat 
and former Imperial diplomat replacing Solf. Apparently, it was
•^The Congress of Workers and Soldiers which had just met 
in Berlin (December 16-19, 1918) throwing its support to the Maj­
ority Socialists, had set a deadline of January 19 for elections 
to a National Assembly. See Evck,, I, 51, and BMS, 1690H/1013/396
964. By February 16, a third renewal of the Armistice would be 
necessary.
l-^Brockdorf f-Rantzau, Dokumente , p. 9. -*-5 I b i d  . , p 0 6»
documentary proof of Brockdorff-Rantzau1s early condemnation of 
unrestricted submarine warfare which, in addition to Ebert and 
Scheidemann's obvious confidence in the Count, induced Haase to
*i sr
agree. The Count presented the CPR with a brief five point 
version of his essential conditions, demanding full authority 
in selecting personnel.^ Although, as Erich Brandenburg points 
out, the CPR did not like being presented with conditions, they 
agreed to Brockdor f f-Rantzau ' s demands.-*-®
Brockdorff-Rantzau was duly appointed Foreign Secretary 
on December 20, 1918. Accepting both the physical and mental 
burdens of office, he declared from Copenhagen on the 24th;
I have no illusions about the tremendous difficulties 
which await me in my new office. What gives me strength 
and confidence however, is my unshakeable faith in the Ger­
man people and their future. My first and most important 
duty . . .  is the conclusion of a just peace.^
The "just peace," of course, rested upon President Wood­
row Wilson's Fourteen Points and subsequent Wilsonian utterances 
on settling European affairs equitably. Germany had accepted th 
Fourteen Points in the first October note to Wilson; the final 
American note of November 5, said Brockdorff-Rantzau, indicated 
also the acceptance by the Allies of this basis for peace, with
1 6Victor Schiff, The Germans at Versailles 1919, tr. Geo 
frey Dunlop (London? Williams and Norgate Ltd., 1930), pp. 35-38
1 7
Not only Solf had objected to Haase. Brockdorff-Rant- 
zau mentioned in a secret memorandum "die Frage Haase. 1 He 
feared Haase's alleged Soviet connections would jeopardize futur 
German relations with the United States and the Entente. BMS, 
169OH/1013/396 963.
•*-®BMS, 1690H/1013/396 962-66. Ebert and Haase signed th 
letter informing him he had been appointed and the conditions 
accepted„
19Br ockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, p. 13.
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reservations about freedom of the seas and reparations.20 Since 
self-determination was mutually agreed to be "a fundamental 
right of all peoples" Brockdorff-Rantzau demanded it for Germany 
also. When he took office on January 2, 1919, he concluded a
statement to the Wolff Telegraph Bureau with the words, "If the 
principle of "The Balkans to the Balkan peoples' holds true, 
then it must also mean 'Germany to the Germans.'" He would re­
fuse, he said, "a peace of oppression, of annihilation and en­
slavement. "21
The change-over in the Foreign Office was very sudden 
and without much formality. According to Stern-Rubarth, Dr. Solf 
knew little of this decision of the CPR. When Brockdorff-Rantzau 
came down to Berlin and called on Solf, the latter thought it was 
his twin brother on an errand connected with the Kaiser in Hol­
land. "The explanation," concludes Stern-Rubarth, "must there­
fore have been somewhat of a surprise.
Upon taking office officially in January, the Count 
echoed the words of Prince Max at the outset of his unhappy Chan­
cellorship: "Ich will versuchen zu retten, was zu retten ist,
Karl Kautsky, the Socialist Foreign Office expert, declared 
that, of all the Ambassadors' reports he had examined, Brockdcrff-
9 0 • ■Ibrd., p. 13. See Preliminary History of the Armistice:
pp. 143-44" For the text of the November 5th note. —— — —
9 1Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp. 17-18.
2 2Stern-Rubar th, p. 73. Accepting Solf's res igiid lion on 
December 13, Ebert had requested Solf to carry on until a succes­
sor could be named. Ebert to Solf, December 13, 1918, "Nachiass
B-R," 9105H/3440/H233 353.
^Blucher, p. 42; cf. Baden, II, 2 5.
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Rantzau0s were the best. Ebert said simply, MWir haben den 
besten von den alten Diplomaten zu unserm Aussenminister ge- 
macht. 1 24 However., by December 27, the three Independent So­
cialists had left the CPR, objecting to the use of Noske's 
troops to quell the Berlin r i o t s o n  the need for using such 
troops, Solf and Brockdorff-Rantzau had both been of the same 
opinion„
Foreign Policy Outlook
It is enlightening to sthdy Brockdorff-Rantzau's assess­
ment of the major vestern powers and the enigma of Soviet Russia 
after the war 8s end. For Ebert and the Cabinet on January 21, 
he outlined briefly the possibilities for German foreign policy. 
Since the former enemies would doubtless give little considera­
tion to international law and the moral claims of Germany, she 
must build her case iipon the twin threats of imminent economic and 
political collapse. England and France insisted upon maintaining 
the blockade and forcing Germany to demobilize completely, and 
this left only one course open:
We must therefore seek to convince the enemies that, 
the economic collapse and political weakness of Germany 
would be contrary t.o their own interests and that in truth 
we have common interests.. The means for this is reference 
to the danger of Bolshevism.
"All our enemies," he continued, “"have placed heavy claims
against Germany for war damages." They must, then, be made to
realize their own very literal stake in the prompt economic re-
24Blucher, p. 43.
2^Eyck, I, 51. The Independents Haase, Dittman, and 
Barth were replaced by Social Democrats Gustav Noske and Ru­
dolf Wissell. BMS, 169OH/IQ13/396 970.
habilitation of the German Republic- In the same vein., it 
would be expedient for Germany and the western nations to come 
to an understanding on three points:
1 - A common defensive effort to keep Bolshevism from 
encroaching on Germany's eastern border.
2. The granting of a reasonable and just peace leaving 
Germany economically and political healthy (lebensfahig) .
3.. Agreement on the common /desinability 7  of the 
economic restoration of Russia. ^
Only the improvement of economic conditions in Russia could al­
leviate the dangers of terrorism and revolution? until then, 
Germany had to convince the western nations of the need for a 
middle European power strong enough to keep Bolshevism at bay. 
Meanwhile, after the strategic mistake of Brest-Litovsk, Brock­
dor ff-Rantzau was determined that Germany should do nothing fur­
ther to jeopardize future relations with Russia, in case the Al­
lies proved intractable.
From the outset of his tenure as Foreign Office Chief, 
Brockdorff-Rantzau placed all hope for Germany in her relation­
ship with the United States. England he believed to be given 
over entirely to a policy of annihilation (Vernichtung) of Ger­
many, while Wilson's peace program held out a hope of justice. 
Moreover, signs pointed to the dominance of American economic 
might in the post-war world. If Germany offered American 
capital attractive possibilities, such economic ties would have
26BMS, 1690H/1013/396 987-92, See also Herbert Helbig, 
Die Trager der Rapallo-Politik (Gobt:ingen: Vandenhoek und 
Rupprecht, 1958), p. 13. ”
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the further nuance of hindering future British domination of 
Europe. indispensable though American capital might be, the
Foreign Secretary hoped also that "the working classes of the 
enemy nations, recognizing in the new Germany a worthy partner 
in the struggle for the achievement of their aims, would advo­
cate justice in their behalf„" The effectiveness of war propa­
ganda, however, made this extremely doubtful in the immediate 
future.
It was clear that the Allies disagreed among themselves 
on the handling of major problems connected with the peace.
This situation could well be advantageous for Germany, but 
Brockdorff-Rantzau realized the danger of any overt German at­
tempts to exploit it as the Peace Conference in Paris embarked
^General Groener had argued in the same Cabinet meeting 
for a stronger army to defend the eastern front against Poland. 
This would also make Germany "bundnisfahig1 if, in the future, 
any one of the Allies needed a counterweight against the others. 
Brockdorff-Rantzau, from the beginning, refused to press for 
military requirements above what was absolutely necessary to 
quell the Bolshevist uprisings. In a secret memorandum to Groe­
ner on the same day he warned against the word "bfindnisfMhlg1 as 
"unbedingt zu vermeiden." A better word would be leistensfahig:" 
since Germany must cultivate America as an economic partner.
The Count recognized Wilson's political weakness revealed by 
the recent elections to the Senate and feared that the Entente, 
no longer needing America in the war effort, might conduct an 
economic war against Germany after peace was signed. BMSs 1690H/ 
1013/396 991, 397 040-050.
Groener also urged the Foreign Minister not to stress 
the right of self-determination so much, because it would en­
courage the German separatist movements, BMS, 1690H/1013/397 040.
28BMS, 169OH/1013/396 995.
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upon heated and secret discussions destined to last well over
p Q
four monthso
Conflict with Erzberger
By the time the elections for the National Assembly 
took place on January 19, the Spartacists had succumbed for the 
time being to Noske's army.^ The Armistice, renewed for the 
first time on January 17, provided a thirty day political breath­
ing spell during which the Assembly met in Weimar, a city rich 
in German cultural tradition and safely removed from, sporadic 
Bolshevist violence in Berlin. Out of 421 seats, strength 
rested with the Majority Socialists, the Catholic Center and the 
unexpectedly large number of members of the new Democratic 
Party.
Respected by all factions, Friedrich Ebert was elected 
President on the 11th of February. Philipp Scheidemann became 
Chancellor and selected his coalition Cabinet of seven Social­
ists, three Center members, and three Democrats plus Brockdorff- 
Rantzau as Foreign Minister without political affiliation, and 
the Center's Matthias Erzberger as Staatssekretar in charge of
293rockdorff-Rantzau declined to follow up the possi­
bility of establishing contact between President Wilson and 
Prince Max von Baden through the Geneva Red Cross, to arrange 
for the exchange of German prisoners of war„ Baden outlined 
his plan for a rather high-handed approach to Wilson in a letter 
to the Count on January 2C 1919, Brockdorff-Rantzau feared that 
such an attempt would arouse Wilson's and the Entente's mistrust 
BMS, 1690H/1013/396 990^397 002.
^Their most effective leaders, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Liebknecht, had been murdered on January 16, almost a week after 
the Spartacist riots in Berlin, including an attack on the 
Reichskanzle.i, had been beaten down by Noske ' s Freikor ps
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Armistice affairs.^1
It was the successive Armistice renewal negotiations 
that confirmed certain impressions about the coming Allied atti­
tude toward Germany at the peace table. What happened when Erz­
berger met the implacable Foch at Trier in mid-January, mid-Feb­
ruary, and mid-March did much to crystallize Brockdortt-Rantzau's 
attitude and determine his strategy in dealing with the Allies.
The Compiegne-Trier meetings were indicative in many 
ways of what was to come at Versailles,, In his book Armistice 
19.18, Harry Rudin shows how France feared that the exchange of 
notes between Germany and President Wilson would prevent the 
military defeat of a Germany which now hid behind a "camouflage 
democracy" to plead for an armistice. ^ 2 French Premier Clemen- 
ceau had asked Marshal Foch to draft armistice conditions guar­
anteed to keep Germany from renewing the war later. No Ameri­
cans were present at the initial armistice meetings of November 
7-11, and Foch ! s terms were severe, his manner gruff.
Erzberger submitted countersuggestions and actually suc­
ceeded in getting some significant, though minor, changes made.
He signed the still onerous terms of November 11, and tendered 
a statement that Germany would honestly try to fulfill the con­
ditions although some of them might prove impossible. "The
German Delegates," his declaration continued,
. . . also wish to reemphasize their view that the consum­
mation of this armistice must throw the German people into
3lEpstein, p. 288. The Foreign Office chief became For­
eign Minister (Aussenminister) instead of Foreign Secretary. The 
old term, Staatssekret&r, now designated permanent undersecre­
taries in each M2.ni.st«ry; See Kurt Rosenbaum Community of Fate; 
German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations 1922-1928 (Syracuse University 
Press, T&&4) , p. if
3 pp. 89-90.
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anarchy and famine. They had a right to expect conditions 
which, while guaranteeing the full military security of 
our enemies, would at least end the suffering of non-com­
batant women and children.
The German people, who stood steadfast against a world 
of enemies for fifty months, will preserve their freedom 
and unity no matter how great the external pressure. A na­
tion of seventy millions can suffer but it cannot d i e . 3 3
At each Trier meeting Foch complained of Germany's 
failure to meet various deadlines and tightened up the terms. 
Erzberger was able to defend Germany's claim on Danzig, but Foch 
held all the trumps and always forced Erzberger to sign or see 
Germany invaded. At Compibgne the German Armistice Delegates 
had been confined to a large fenced area around the railroad 
spur, doubtless for their own safety; at Trier, they were "im­
prisoned" in a hot.elc.35 Klaus Epstein describes Erzberger's 
valiant efforts in Germany's behalf. Ignorant of the oppressive 
circumstances, many rightist Germans denounced his weakness.^
Brockdorff-Rantzau had also objected to Erzberger's 
management of armistice affairs, and their great feud was precip­
itated by the first renewal of the armistice. The Count had 
instructed Erzberger to ask for the return of German war pris­
3 3Epstein, p. 281. Note similarity of phraseology to 
Brockdorff-Rantzau“s May 7th speech at Versailles. See Chapter
V , infra„
34RUCjin, p. 37 3. 35Epstein, pp. 291-92,.
^After signing the Armistice extension in February, 
Erzberger lashed back at one of his critics; "He forgot the in­
convenient fact that, we have unfortunately lost the war." See 
Epstein, p. 298. Erzberger was also aware that the Allies, if 
Germany refused to sign, would march into Germany and consider 
themselves free of further obligations under Wilson's note of 
November 5th. Ibid,, p. 299.
oners since Germany had returned Allied prisoners, and for a 
relaxation of the blockade. If exorbitant demands were pressed 
by the Allies, Erzberger was to return home to consult his Gov­
ernment o Erzberger not only failed to alleviate the prisoner 
and blockade issues, but advocated handing over to the Entente 
the Soviet revolutionary Karl. Radek, who had been imprisoned 'in
~4 —}
B e r l i n . " T h e  new Foreign Minister," says Epstein,
was horrified by such unorthodox diplomacy, which would de­
grade Germany in the eyes of the world, threaten future re­
lations with Russia, and cause a domestic explosion on the 
part of the Independent Socialists. He also thought the 
matter should be handled by the Foreign Office rather than 
the Armistice Commission.38
A more serious crisis developed when Erzberger accepted 
Foch's armistice extension terms on February 19th. Five days 
before, at Weimar, Brockdorff-Rantzau had delivered his princi­
pal address on foreign policy. The Foreign Minister now claimed 
that the concessions made by Erzberger, especially regarding
39Poland, were very much at odds with the tenets of his speech., u 
As Foreign Minister he needed solid support to contest 
excessive Allied demands. He had sent a note to the Armistice 
Commission at Trier a month before, saying Germany would fulfill 
the armistice requirements to the best of her ability, and re-
37Epstein, p, 290; Helbig, pp., 15-18= On Brock.dor.ff- 
Rantzau's instructions to Erzberger, see BMS, 1689H/1012/397 010
3®Epstein, p. 290o
^Epsteirx, p. 295, says; "Foch demanded - . . that Lhe
German Fre.lk.orps / forces in the East stop operations against, 
the Poles on a demarcation line set by himself. Erzberger. as 
always confronted by the threat, of an Allied invasion of Germany 
was forced tc accept Foch 1 s terms." For a synopsis of Brockdorf 
R.antzauhs February 14 speech, see Chapter IV, infra 0
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commending a committee of experts to study the problem. When 
the Cabinet approved Erzberger s signature to the February terms 
in spite of Brockdorff-Rantzau1s disapproval, he asked to resign. 
In a letter to Ebert he pointed out that the Allies were not in 
agreement about resuming the war. He demanded to take over the 
German Armistice Commission, ending the letter with a forceful 
paragraph:
. . , I see the impossibility of further positive work; I
foresee further that the last bit of our prestige in foreign 
eyes will, be lost after we give ourselves up, and that this 
confession will afford our enemies the opportunity of tight­
ening the screw of extortion without limit (die Erpresser- 
schraube ohne Ende anzuziehen). Our present concessions, in 
my opinion, mean only a postponement and no solution.^0
Both Ebert and Scheidemann urged him to stay in office, 
and he did. What induced him to remain is uncertain, since his 
methods were already challenged; perhaps, as Erich Brandenburg 
says, he realized that someone had to assume the duty of stand­
ing up for Germany's rights in the face of anything. And it was 
obvious that the masses on both sides wanted p e a c e . ^1
First Days in Weimar
Erich Brandenburg reveals that just before the Armistice 
renewal crisis, Brockdorff-Rantzau briefly considered joining a 
political party. Hitherto intentionally unaffiliated, he was 
considered in sympathy with the Social Democrats.^2 Had he
40BMS, 169 OH/1013/397 026-30,
41BMS, 1690H/1013/397 030-33. Brockdorff-Rantzau asked 
that Scheidemann sign the note authorizing Erzberger to sign the 
armistice terms, so that he, the Count, would not be responsible.
42scheidemann, II, 304, says; "We counted him as a So­
cial Democrat, though he was not a member of the Social Demo<- 
cratic Party„"
joined a party, however, it would have be6n the new Democratic 
Party. Brockdorff-Rantzau had always felt that in order for 
foreign policy to be consistent and effective, its leader should 
not be identified with a particular domestic political program, 
thereby risking his own downfall when his party no longer com­
manded a majority. Brandenburg includes the text of a letter 
to Democratic leaders, dated February 7, 1919, in which the 
Count, contemplating party membership, discussed a Foreign Mini­
ster 's need to be independent of party struggles, and then added
On the other hand, I realize that in such decisive 
times as these it is important for everyone to be artic­
ulate in supporting a cause. Therefore I shall join the 
German Democratic Party /Deutsche Demokratische Partei ~7 
whose entire program is closest to my own political con- 
victions.
He absolved the party from collective responsibility for his 
leadership of foreign policy and likewise requested that he not 
be obliged to leave office if the party did not remain in the 
majority.43
This letter, Erich Brandenburg has concluded, was never 
sent, for the signed original as well as the draft copy remains 
in the files of Brockdorff-Rantzau1s correspondence. But Fritz 
Max Cahen, who assisted Brockdorff-Rantzau at Versailles, and 
Erich Eyck, both assert that the Count did belong to the Party.'44
His letter of February 7 proves Brockdorff-Rantzau6s
party inclination beyond any doubt, but it can be inferred that 
he did not formally join their ranks. In August of 1.919, he
43BMS, 1690H/1013/397 034-35.
44Fritz Max Cahen, Der Weg nach Versailles (Boppard/
Rhain: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1963), p. 348,* Eyck, I, 90.
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wrote in a personal letter to his good friend and colleague at
Versailles, Dr. Walter Simons 3
Meanwhile I see that the possibility is net far off, 
when I can take a discreet part in affairs; X wi 11 
not encumber myself with party politics . „ „ ,r~Xpa~r-
teipolitisch will ich mich nicht belasten)45
The following year, the Democrats unsuccessfully sought 
Brockdorff-Rantzau as their candidate for Reichsprasident if an 
election was to be held, but Ebert retained the post. Composed 
Largely of republican theoreticians— Hugo Preuss, who wrote *the 
Weimar Constitution was a member— the Democratic Party was an 
important part of the original Weimar coalition, but its influ­
ence declined steadily after the Treaty of Versailles,46
On February 10, four days before his major1, foreign 
policy address, Brockdorff-Rantzau made a brief statement in 
the National Assembly, saying that he supported the provisional 
Constitution and Dr. Preuss's efforts in framing a more perm­
anent document. in accord with President Wilson's philosophy, 
he added, "I am determined not to conclude any secret treaties."4^
45BMS, 1691H/1013/397 259.
"^Founded in December, 1918, the Democrats combined old 
Progessives and National Liberals with intellectuals devoted to 
the establishment of a republic,. Although it hoped to unite 
all liberals, Gustav Stcesemann attracted many of its potential 
adherents by forming his German Peoples Party (Deutsche VoIks- 
partei). Eyck, I, 60-61. Many prominent intellectuals among 
the Democrats were Jews; the rightists, as early as January, 
1919, "attempted to discredit /the Democratic Party_J7 as a red- 
tainted, unpatriotic viewish creation." Lewis Herzman, D N V P 
Right Wing Opposition in the Weimar Republic, 1918-1924 (Lin­
coln , Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 4b. The 
racist slur against: tne Democrats is a major factor in Herzman's 
study.
47pie Deutsche NatIona.1 versammlung im Jahre 1919, X, 66. 
Fourth Sitting, February 10, 1919.
CHAPTER IV
PEACE RECONNAISSANCE
Interviews and Press Conferences 
From the beginning of 1919 the Allies and Germany each 
prepared for an eventual confrontation at the peace table, 
using whatever information they could obtain regarding each 
other's intentions and often building upon sheer conjecture, 
Colonel Arthur Conger, an intelligence officer on General Per- 
shing's staff, went into Germany as a military observer and met 
with General Groener, Erzberger; and Brockdorff-Rantzau early 
in the year„ As a link between German officials and President 
Wilson, Conger was to have some decisive effects on the German 
attitude at Versailles.^ Other Americans were members of fact­
finding deputations? through the Gherardi and the Dresel Field 
Missions to Germany, the United States Commission to Negotiate 
Peace learned of Germany's internal and political situation 
from, on-the-spot, observers,. The British and French undertook 
similar missions.,
About twenty prominent, men of the new German Government 
were interviewed by members of the Dresel Mission early in Jan­
uary. Brockdorff^Rantzau's interview took place on the third, 
the day after he formally came into office as Foreign Minister., 
In this colloquy, the Count stated his policy and outlook
■^ On Conger’s good educational background, see Epstein, 
pp. 305-06o
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clearly. For the purpose of this thesis it is worth quoting 
the American version in full-2
Count Rantzau began the conversation by stating his 
aims. He said that his policy would be to sign any peace 
on the basis of the fourteen points of President Wilson, 
but that he would not accept conditions which made Germany 
the slave of the Entente. He said that he had accepted 
his office with reluctance. The German people could not 
be destroyed, nor would he sign any peace whatever but a 
peace which would grant Germany the possibility of continu­
ing a decent existence..
He stated that he had always stood for President Wilson, 
and that at the time the offer for an armistice went to the 
President it was he who had particularly urged it„ and he 
had thus taken upon himself a great responsibility before 
the people. He said that he had great faith in the Presi­
dent's honesty, and had great admiration for him. He said 
he appreciated the difficulties under which the President 
worked in Paris, and that he could understand the French 
and Belgian attitude. He said that he would not whine or 
beg, but that the /coal and food situation_J7 was exceed­
ingly serious, so serious indeed that it mTght result in 
Bolshevismo . . . Germany and America, he believed, /had.J
similar interests and were akin to one another, and could 
for the future of the world cooperate profitably.
In discussing the Peace Conference, he mentioned the 
question of Bernstorff being sent there, and expressed his 
doubts whether he would be acceptable.
Count Rantzau stated that he was optimistic for Germ,any, 
because he had not lost his faith in the German people, 
which had been deceived and misled, and which had followed 
a phantom to the edge of an abyss. Optimism, he believed, 
was the only possible basis for a constructive program, and 
he intended to draw a sharp line at the foot of the happen­
ings of the wpr and to proceed to reconstruct,.
Count. Rantzau stated emphatically that, a /^nonarchical^/ 
reaction was out of the question.
Berlin, January 3, 1919.
In the first, three months of 1919 the Foreign Minister 
was also in touch with various British officers and investigate
2UoSo, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference 1919 
(13 vo1s „;"WasKington, D 0C „ ; 1942-1947), II, 162-63. Hereafter 
cited as F.RUS.
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ing commissions. In the opening chapter of his study of Ger­
many's Ostpolitik leading to the Rapallo agreement, Herbert 
Helbig discusses the fear of the Entente that the new German 
Government was really double-dealing in 1919. While supposedly 
in league with Soviet Russia, Germany was suspected of exag­
gerating the dangers of Bolshevism in order to win easier peace 
terms» In February and March Brockdorff-Rantzau spoke at dif­
ferent times with the British Generals Sir Richard Haking and 
Spencer Ewart regarding the Bolshevist menace» Quite forth­
rightly, General Haking said that the purpose of the British 
Commission, sent to investigate the activities of Karl Radek, 
was also to determine the authenticity of the German Government's 
fight, against Bolshevism.3
Other British investigators were finding the situation 
in Germany critical; Prime Minister Lloyd George wrote:
I was receiving constant messages from our representa­
tives in Germany as to the urgency of supplies reaching 
the hungry civilians if disaster were to be averted, and 
Mr. Hoover, who was in charge of food supplies, had reported 
difficulties and delays„ In March I felt bound to call the 
attention of the Allied representatives once more to what 
was going on„
Brockdorff-Rantzau held several press conferences with 
representatives of foreign papers and granted interviews to 
British and American newspaper correspondents. He discussed 
Germany’s right to her colonies, his approval of the idea of a
^Helbig, pp. 17-20.
^David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference 
(2 vols.; New Haven; Yale University Press, 1939), I, 190.
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League of Nations, the international negotiation of workers' 
rights, the Fourteen Points as the basis of a just peace,, the 
injustice of the proposed occupation of the Saar valley and the 
left, bank of the Rhine, and the unreality of declaring Germany 
solely guilty of causing the war,. In each interview he stressed 
that economic cooperation was the only road to post-war recon­
struction,:. Germany recognized certain weighty financial obli­
gations that were the legacy of the war, but she must possess 
the means to carry their, out. The Fourteen Points, he declared, 
must apply to Germany as well as the other nations, including 
territorial questions«. This of course left the matter of An­
schluss open for the Germans in Austria to d e c i d e on Janu­
ary 24, the Foreign Minister spoke to foreign newspaper corres­
pondents in the same vein, saying;
The statesmen of today and tomorrow must have the inten­
tion of changing the /spirit of 1914 which led to the death 
of millions As long as thoughts of revenge live, there
will be wars, As long as a nation’s territory is taken by 
force, people will take up arms in defense of freedom.. As 
long as there are irredenta, stateBmen will only be able 
to discuss things hesTtanuly and secretly/
^Brockdorff-Rantzau met with Austrian Secretary of State 
Bauer in February to discuss terms under which Anschluss could 
take place at a later date if German Austria desired it. He did 
not want to antagonize the Allies with a fait accompli or. this 
point, BMS, 1690H/1013/397 051-54; Brockdorff-Rantzau, Doku- 
mente . p p „ 77™7 9 0
^Brockdorf f-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp.. 29-30. See also 
similar interviews, I b i d , passim. Helbig, p. 20, mentions Ger­
many's hope that intervie ws”*with foreign press representatives 
would help to convince the .Entente countries that Germany2 s 
very existence was at stake in the fight against. Bolshevism..
In December, 1918, a report, from the Dresel Mission 
noted; '’Persistent endeavors will be made to convert observers 
to the German view. , „ . In this connection, attention is
called to the great undesirability of allowing the entry into
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The Speech of February 14, 19.19
Brockdorff-Rantzau was probably more successful in mak­
ing his views known abroad through the newspaper interviews 
than in his "Count and Democrat" speech to the National Asem- 
bly on February 14, 1919, in which he stated his entire program
and outlook for Germany in the post-war world. The speech was 
all but ignored outside of Germany. German foreign policy, he 
stated at the outset, had two goals; the ending of the war and 
the restoration of normal relations among nations. No longer a 
military power, Germany agreed with the Allies on the Fourteen 
Points, which should apply to her own situation as well as to 
other nations. Germany and Allied nations faced a moral obli­
gation to disarm. The question of war guilt could only be 
decided by an impartial commission in which all nations had con­
fidence o
That the peace should be concluded on an economic as 
well as a political basis was the underlying theme of his whole 
policyo In the interest of economic recovery, Germany should 
not be required to give up all her colonies and her merchant 
fleet., Germany recognized her duty to rebuild Belgium, and 
northern France and was resigned to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, 
if a plebiscite so decreed, but other territorial questions 
must be decided by the peoples involved. Poland's access to
Germany at present of American newspaper reporters, some of whom 
have already in several cases obtained interviews with German 
public men." FRUS, II, 12-13. On February 11, a Gherardi Com­
mission report, referring to Bernstorff, said; "I am told he has 
been pressing 'inspired interviews’; that is, prepared and type­
written answers to supposed questions by the United Press cor­
respondent." FRUS, II, 1.3 o
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the sea could be guaranteed by internationalizing the Vistula 
River„
The speech fully endorsed the League of Nations idea,
with the requisite that neutral nations should be members and
that Germany be admitted after the peace was signed. Other
than the Fourteenth Point, plans for such a League had not yet
been unveiled, The Foreign Minister anticipated the League's
need for a supra-national administrative authority, a general
assembly {3undesparlament), and some means of enforcing decisions,
"Germany," he said,
/will 7  cooperate in every respect in establishing the 
League, even though the other nations would only admit us 
with deep misgivings and the League is primarily founded 
to stop Germany from, continuing her warlike policy, which 
is now the farthest thing from our desires. We must over­
come this distrust, with proof of a sincere love for peace.
Brockdorff-Rantzau repudiated Germany 8s former "sword 
rattling" to get her way; the course was now "to convince the 
opponent that it is in his own interest to examine our views."
Led by the working class,, the new German Government also 
included socialists and the middle class,and could now speak
for the nation. As Foreign Minister he needed and valued the
National Assembly’s support, which his predecessors had lacked, 
and he hoped "to prove that a man. could be a Count and at the 
same time a convinced Democrat," Having selected their leaders 
from, the best talent available, the people could also correct 
their mistakes; he knew he would remain in his post only as 
long as the Assembly agreed with his policies. "We are de­
feated, but not dishonored," he concluded, and he swore to
defend the honor and dignity of the German people.7
This speech, in English translation, duly appears in the 
Dresel report. It was aimed at the peacemakers in Paris as well 
as the Weimar National Assembly, but Wilson, Lloyd George, and 
Clemenceau were unattentive— they were either indisposed or not 
present in the French capital,
German Preparation for Peace Negotiations
Although they had little official knowledge of what was 
to come as a result of the deliberations of the Paris Peace Con­
ference which had convened in January of 1919, the German Gov­
ernment made extensive preparations for its part in concluding 
peace. Dr. Alma Luckau, chronicler of the activities of the 
German Peace Delegation, describes the organization and work of 
the Paxkonferenz, which assembled expert opinion and documentary 
evidence on all anticipated questions of peace. Count Bernstorff, 
former German Ambassador in Washington and the only German 
statesman who knew President Wilson, Colonel. House, and other 
prominent Americans personally, directed its work. By March,
7The entire speech is in Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, 
pp. 37-63. For an English translation, see FRUS, II, 16-26. A 
Gherardi Mission report, noted: "The press comments on Brock­
dorf f-Rantzau E s speech indicate that it is thought, to be very 
broadminded, Germany expects that her delegates will come to 
the Peace Conference, not as representatives of a defeated coun­
try, but as statesmen who expect to assist in the reconstruction 
of Europe. Wilson's 14 points are regarded as Germany's great­
est safeguard." FRUS, XII, 15. The American Minister at the 
Hague (Garrett) reported he had heard "that Count Brockdorff- 
Rantzau in framing future policy considers it to be of first im­
portance that, he learn American opinion regarding his speech . .
FRUS. XII, 26-2 7.
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however, the hopes for a negotiated peace began to fade .,8
As the Paxkonferenz prepared Germany's case,- the prob­
lem of who would lead the peace delegation had to be decided. 
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau at first did not want this duty him­
self. He considered it better strategy if he, the Foreign 
Minister, remained in Berlin. Then, in case of a dictated peace 
with excessive demands, as the Armistice negotiations portended, 
the Delegation could delay its decision by having to communicate 
with Berlin for instructions. He would, if President Ebert 
desired, be present in Paris at the opening and conclusion of 
the proceedings.^
Toward the end of March, however, Brockdorff-Rantzau was 
convinced that Germany must, try for negotiations with the Allies 
While the Paris Peace Conference continued throughout the first 
quarter of 1919, the critical food situation in Germany pro­
duced two significant results. On the one hand Spartacist vio­
lence broke out again in Berlin, where a general strike began in 
March, and Soviet, republics cropped up in various parts of the 
countryo The other event in March involved successful negotia­
tions with the Allies over provisioning Germany through the
^Later on, at Versailles, the pressure of time did not 
permit extensive use of the tremendous amount of material assem­
bled by Paxkonferenz experts for the German Delegation. Of the 
work of the Paxkonferenz Dr. Luckau observes; "The thoroughness 
of this preparatory work was as extraordinary as its futility 
was pitiful," Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris 
Peace Conference (New Yorks Columbia University Press, 1941), 
p . '31 o
9.BM3, 1690H/1013/397 038-43. Bernstorff was felt to be 
unacceptable to the Allies. Although Brockdorff-Rantzau appeared 
in Weimar when necessary, he apparently stayed in Berlin most of 
the time, where the Foreign Office conducted its affairs.
summer. Talks in Spa had foundered early in the month when Ger­
many asked such an assurance before handing over her entire mer­
chant fleet to the Allies. On March 13th, however, Allied-Ger­
man discussions resumed in Brussels, where agreement was reached 
on these points as well as the technical matters involved. This 
resulted in a partial lifting of the blockade, allowing the 
delivery of "200,000 tons of food into Germany in ten days."
But there was no basic change of attitude. Herbert Hoover, in 
charge of food shipments, met with continued Allied objections 
to further relaxation of the blockade, which was considered by 
France and Britain as a potent weapon to force German acceptance 
of the peace terms .
While encouraging, this was by no means an indication 
that the coming peace negotiations would follow the same pattern. 
Time appeared to be running out for Germany, however, and nego­
tiation/ over technical matters was the only possibility of ad­
justing a dictated peace. At a Cabinet meeting on the 21st of 
March, Brockdorff-Rantzau presented a protocol on handling the 
problem of a peace which obviously would not conform to Wilson's 
principles. As he saw it., Germany had three alternatives;
1.. Refuse such a treaty.
2. present the Allies immediately with Germany's own 
treaty draft.
3, Study the Allied treaty, then offer counterproposals.
^Herbert Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York; 
McGraw-Hill, 1958), pp. 170-78, 229-36. "Despite all our efforts,
wrote Hoover, "the blockade was not removed until the ratifica­
tion of the Peace Treaty of Germany on July 7, 1919." Ibid., p.
178 .
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The third possibility, he said, would be the best; the delegates 
should be so well prepared that they could give their decisions 
on the spot This the Paxkonf erenz had already seen to.
It. took the Cabinet two days to discuss fully the ap­
proach to the expected terms of peace. Having accepted the 
Fourteen Points and the Wilson-Lansing Note of November 5th, 
which left certain territorial questions untouched, Germany 
could argue convincingly for justice. In the Count's words, "Not 
covered in Wilson's Points are several important questions of 
peace for which we must propose solutions in the spirit of the 
Wilsonian program.
Regarding the reparations payments, he observed that 
other peace considerations affected Germany's future size and 
strength, but only this question involved her very existence.
The Lansing Note and certain of Wilson's Fourteen Points could 
be interpreted as setting limits on what could be demanded. 
Closely bound up with this was the question of war guilt, for 
the Allies based their exorbitant reparations demands on the pre­
supposition of Germany's sole guilt as aggressor. In November, 
1918, Dr. Solf had sent a note to the Allies "proposing to turn 
over the examination of the causes of the world war to a neutral 
commission whose members should be given free access to the ar­
chives of all the Powers. The proposal /was rejected_J7 by the
X1BMS, 169OH/1013/397 059.
12BMS, 169OH/1013/397 059-60.
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Allied Governments, who found that it was unnecessary to explore
1 3what was self-evident,, Jl
Brockdorff-Rantzau revealed that England had very re­
cently rejected a similar request from him, saying, 'According 
to the opinion of the Allied Governments Germany's guilt for the 
war had long been indisputably established."44 Ebert and the 
Cabinet decided to refute the English assertion with another 
note and to request a neutral investigation once again,, The 
German Delegates were not to give up the idea that the question 
of war guilt could only be decided in this manner„
At last the Cabinet meeting adjourned, having given its 
full support to the Count's proposals. They considered it "im­
possible to accept a peace going beyond the limits which he had 
characterized." Brandenburg points out here that the unity of 
the Cabinet behind Brockdorff-Rantzau1s program was not unchal­
lenged. General Groener, among his other criticisms, called for 
a much sharper opposition to the war guilt question, and Staats- 
sekretar Erzberger had no scruples about approaching the peace 
question behind the Foreign Minister's back in any way he saw
l^BMS, 1690H/101.3/397 066-74; Holborn, "Diplomats,"
p. 140„
14BMS, 1690H/1013/397 074; "Nachlass B-R," 9105H/3443/ 
H234 910. Brandenburg notes that President Ebert, who agreed 
that the Lansing note of November 5 was acceptable as a basis 
for peace negotiations, stated that if the Allies dictated a 
peace which went beyond Wilsonian principles, then Germany 
should submit a counterclaim to them.
15BMS, 1690H/1013/397 076.
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fit. They had already clashed over the Armistice renewal.
Erzberger, one of the Catholic Center Party's most prom­
inent and knowledgeable members, was looked upon by Ebtert, 
Scheidemann, and the Count as an intriguer. Erzberger's recent 
biographer, Klaus Epstein, describes the antipathy between the 
aristocratic Brockdorff-Rantzau and the jovial Swabian--two men 
who were poles apart in every respect. "Rantzau," says Epstein, 
"resented Erzberger's restless, incautious, and meddling activ­
ity; Erzberger resented Rantzau's noblesse oblige attitude 
towards parliamentarians and his ill-concealed disdain for ama­
teurs in diplomacy„"16
Toward the end of March the Cabinet also debated whether
or not to make public the Kautsky Documents dealing with the
Empire's diplomacy before the outbreak of the war. Not yet 
knowing the content of this collection fully, the Ministers 
were divided in their opinion. Some, like Democrat Eugen Schif- 
fer, feared they would actually help to prove Germany's war 
guilt. Brockdorff-Rantzau decided to withhold them for possi­
ble later use, since what awaited the Germans at the Peace Con­
ference was yet unknown. On April 8, the Cabinet agreed that
-*-^Epstein, p. 302. Erzberber complained to Scheidemann 
on April 26 that the German Peace Delegation had no diplomat 
with personal experience in France, England, Italy, Belgium or 
Japan. The Count naturally considered this an insult. He 
asked Erzberger, however, to accompany the Delegation to Ver­
sailles , hoping in this way to prevent Erzberger from under­
mining the Delegation's position in Weimar. Erzberger refused 
to go as a member; he would have preferred to lead the Delega­
tion himself. See BMS, 1690H/1013/397 094, 100,
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they should be held in reserve. Two days later, the Foreign 
Minister delivered his second majcr address in Weimar, touching 
on foreign policy and his program of reform at the Foreign 
Office,17
"Invitation8 to Versailles 
A week later came Clemenceau°s note summoning qualified 
German representatives to Versailles on April 25 to receive the 
terms of peace. The word "receive8 implied only a dictated 
peace; Brockdorff-Rantzau1s reply named three delegates "fully 
empowered to receive draft text of preliminary peace negotia­
tions, " who would be accompanied by four minor officials0 To 
this the Council of Four replied that they "would treat only 
with plenipotentiaries."18
l70n war guilt and the Kautsky Documents, see BMS, 1690H/ 
1013/397 074, 76; and Fritz Dickmann, "Die Kriegsschuldfrage auf 
der Friedenskonferenz von Paris 1919," Historische Zeitschrift, 
CXCVII (1963), 64, 72-7 4. This recent German study of the war 
guilt question criticizes Brockdorff-Fantzau for not publicizing 
and utilizing the Kautsky Documents before and during the Peace 
Conferenceo By revealing the actions of the Imperial regime, 
Kautsky wanted rto avoid the identification of the new Germany 
and its^  government, which had no conduct the peace negot.ian.ions, 
with /those who had caused the war/  even if it had only been 
through their helpless incapability that the last diplomatic 
threads had been cut in 1914„"
For the April 1.0 th speech, see Brockdorf f-Rantzau, Doku- 
mente, pp. 83-94.
l^Luckau, pp. 58-59, 210; Schiff, pp. 27-29. Lord Rid­
dell, pp0 54-55, records some interesting words of Lloyd George 
regarding this exchange of notes. 'M0G 0 said the result of the 
message to the Germans might bring about the fall of the German 
Government, and that we were at a critical period of the negotia­
tions. He thought the Germans0 reply would show their disposi­
tion. If they agreed to send representatives, that would show 
they were anxious for peace. If they_decl.ined to do so, it 
would show they were indifferent/' /On the next day, Apr’il 21,, 
Lloyd George revealed at dinner/ that “The Germans have replied 
saying thtey will send great personages. That, is a regular climb- 
down and very significant."
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On April 20, Dresel reported an interview with Brock-
dorff-Rantzau. The Count, according to Dresel, averred that
the formal invitation to Versailles had astonished him, and 
that he should only go if he were specifically directed by 
the government to start. As far as he could see, an ulti­
matum was intended /and 7  it was not clear why he should go 
to Paris to receive” this1. Passing to discussions of terms 
he said that conditions apparently proposed would reduce 
Germans to abject slavery. . „ . He would never sign any
peace nor would the Ministry in his opinion agree to one 
which deprived Germany even temporarily of /the Saar and 
upper Silesia_7 and he was convinced that the German people 
would back this up.
His attitude was of great depression and he showed a 
remarkable irritation towards the French. He gave the im­
pression of sincerity although I /am_7 not convinced he 
will not ultimately recede from his position. From the 
papers, a proclamation just issued by Ebert, and interviews 
with several well-informed persons, I have guarantees that 
the views of Rantzau meet with much support.-*-^
Brockdorff-Rantzau replied to Clemenceau that Germany 
would send plenipotentiaries. He himself would lead the dele­
gation, with the understanding that the draft treaty to be 
presented would be negotiated. He asked also that the German 
Delegation have "complete freedom of movement and full tele­
phonic facilities for the purposes of communicating with their 
Government."20
19FRUS, XII, 83. The Count's memorandum of this inter­
view is very detailed and bears out most of Dresel's observations. 
Several times he told Dresel emphatically that he would not sign 
a treaty ruinous or dishonorable to Germany, and that all infor­
mation from Paris indicated that just such a treaty awaited Ger­
many. "Nachlass B-R, " 9.105H/3441/H234 180-93.
2^Schi.ff, p. 30; Luckau, p. 210. When asked to comment 
on the leader of the German Peace Delegation in May, 1919, Mau­
rice Egan, now returned to America, said: "Rantzau is intel­
lect personified, and it will require not mere idealism but the 
most scrupulous knowledge of diplomatic tactics on the part of 
the Allies to deal with him." New York Times, May 4, 1919, IV, 1.
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At the end of April, members of the Dresel Mission sent 
back conflicting reports together with some perspicacious advice. 
Ellis Loring Dresel and Lit'hgow Osborne disagreed on the nature 
of the new German Government. Osborne concluded in his report 
on April 30, 1919,
Personally I am inclined to believe that .... a coali­
tion Socialist government here is best for all concerned.
The present Government, under the circumstances, is a 
thoroughly dishonest one. (Ellis disagrees here, and I 
probably have overstated the case. He agrees that the Gov­
ernment is weak, opportunistic, time-serving and employs 
idiotic measures. I suppose that there are sincere demo­
crats in it, but no "feel" for democratic methods has been 
acquired, and couldn’t be made use of if it had been.) It 
consists of tame pseudo-Socialists, still tamer pseudo-Demo- 
crats and of persons who pretend to base their democracy on 
Catholicism. (Imagine politics based on revealed religion 
in this day and age). The Government’s instruments are the 
old "Beamtentum", and as regards democracy, no more need be 
said about them.
The government’s methods undoubtedly smack strangely of 
the old regime; it depends on military forces; there is 
still the attempt tQ " imponieren1 . " imponieren" is the 
basis of foreign policy-^see Rantzau's answer to the first 
"invitation" to Versailles. And that whole incident is re­
garded here as a "diplomatic victory" for Germany! !
On May 3rd, a report from Dresel himself opined thats
It . . „ seems probable that the somewhat uncompromising
utterances of government officials and publicists need 
not be taken too seriously, and that, the Government will 
sign in the end,, especially if it can save its 1 face ' by 
being able to point to actual 'negotiations at Versailles.^
Dresel likened the German appearance at Versailles to a "pil- 
grimmage to Canossa" and included observations which might 
well have been useful-,
I venture to suggest that whatever definite statements 
can be made indicating that at least a limited amount of 
discussion of terms will be permitted might have reassuring 
influence„
21FRUS, XII, 101. 22FRUS, XII. 89. Italics mine
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I emphasized /Tn his April 19 interview with Brockdorff 
Rantzau_J7 throughout the talk the belief that German econo­
mic rehabilitation will be in the interests of the whole 
world and that on the conclusion of peace our attitude will 
be only cooperation to this end. I also pointed out the 
ruinous consequences of summary rejection of peace.
The whole Dresel Mission, continued the report, was re­
garded in German official circles as "an advance courrier to 
mitigate the shock of the coming Treaty."24
In view of the conditions which were to prevail at Ver­
sailles in May, the concluding information in Dresel's report 
fell on deaf ears;
I venture to draw attention to the sensitiveness of 
the government and of the delegates as to their probable 
treatment at Versailles. They evidently fear that they 
were likely looked on as Pariahs. In view of their ex­
cited and almost abnormal frame of mind I am convinced 
that as concilliatory an attitude as can be_ adopted to­
wards them in non-essential matters may have important 
bearing on final result. Even insignificant concessions 
and the form in which distasteful demands are phrased 
will mean much to some of delegates. I believe therefore 
that latitude in such matters as material comforts, the 
widest liberty that can properly be afforded the dele­
gates, occasions for informal intercourse, and ample op- 
-poftunity to prepare and state their case, cannot fail 
to have a favorable effect,
My personal opinion, gathered from a large series of 
interviews, is that the present government will refuse to 
sign peace if the conditions are such as are stated in 
the press. 2^
23FRUS f XII, 83, 85. Dresel ended this report with a
rather pathetic pleas "I shall endeavor to impress this as strong
ly as possible in future conversations and shall be grateful for 
any suggestions as to anything that can be said further along 
these lines."
24FR.U5, XII, 84. This is exactly how Brockdorf f-Rantzau
described Tt In his own report covering the April 19th Dresel
interview: "I have the impression that /Dresel as well as Os­
borne are here on an official mission To work with all means to 
prepare the people and government for the acceptance of the 
peace." "Nachlass B~R," 9105H/3441/H234 190.
25FRUS, XII, 85-86.
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Although he no longer believed that "Wilson would 
strain every nerve /to prevent_7 Germany's position among the 
peoples of this world from being reduced to n o t h i n g , .
Dresel 's assurance of American realization of the importance of 
the economic rehabilitation of Germany in the post-war world 
fitted in with Brockdorff-Rantzau's concept of a just peace 
acceptable to both sides. The future rested upon the prompt 
restoration of commercial and economic ties and the participa­
tion of all western nations in the League of Nations.
On the way to Versailles, however, the Foreign Minister 
received news from the American Army Colonel Arthur Conger that 
confirmed every suspicion that the harshest of peace terms a- 
waited Germany. There was little left of President Wilson's 
Fourteen Points after four months of the Paris Peace Conference.
^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, p. 10.
CHAPTER V
CONFRONTATION AT VERSAILLES
A Last Interview with Conger 
Two special trains carrying the leading members of the 
German Peace Delegation to Versailles left Berlin on the after­
noon of April 28, 1919. During this journey the American Colo­
nel Arthur Conger had a final interview with the German Foreign 
Minister. Conger, who had his headquarters at Trier, had sent 
a telegram requesting a meeting with Brockdorff-Rantzau en 
route, to which the Count agreed. The Colonel boarded the 
train at 2;15 A.M* on April 29, and the twenty minute discussion 
lasting from Essen to Duisburg, was of great significance. It 
was here that Brockdorff-Rantzau learned in some detail how far 
the Treaty terms fell short of the Fourteen Points and that. 
President Wilson was allegedly unwilling and unable to make any 
changes in view of the French thirst for revanche and the de­
mands of other nations at the Paris Peace Conference. Germany, 
now safely hors de combat, was simply to be shown the "dotted 
line o 1
According to the secret memorandum, written that day by 
Brockdorff-Rantzau, Conger had three important and confidential 
disclosures to make. Since the traveling time between Essen 
and Duisburg would be short, he launched into a speech "almost
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memorized verbatim, "-®- He began by revealing that direct tele­
phone contact between Paris and Trier now existed, and added 
that arrangements could even be made whereby communications from. 
Berlin could be transmitted to the American Delegates in Paris. 
Secondly, said the Colonel, it might be possible for the Ameri­
can military officer included among the French officers to be 
assigned as custodians, or guards, of the German Delegation in 
Versailles to establish contact with its l e a d e r . ^
But the most important revelations concerned the im­
placable position of the Allies regarding the peace terms. Con­
ger implied that unity would prevail despite the trouble with 
the Italians, who had left the Conference. Then, according to 
Brockdorff-Rantzau's memorandum, Conger remarked that all the 
Treaty conditions were still not determined and that it was pos­
sible that the Germans would only receive a part of it to start 
with. Although President Wilson had done all in his power, it 
now appeared certain that no more modifications in the Treaty 
could be attained. The fifteen year French occupation of the 
Saar Basin, for example, was not even subject to further dis­
cussion. Put simply: President Wilson wished that the Germans
would sign whatever terms were placed before them, By so doing,
LBMS, 16 9 lE/.l 013 /3 9 7 108-12.
2Ibid. Brockdorff-Rantzau gives this officer's name as 
R.oyl /si.c"~7r~Tyler . Major Royal1 Tyler was the American liaison 
officer with the Germans, according to Charles Seymour, Letters 
from the Paris Peace Conference, ed. Harold B. Whiteman, Jr. 
(Yale UnlVersity-PressT 1965), p. 221. A Major Gibson served 
in this capacity for the English. "Nachlass B-R," 9105H/3443/ 
H235 655 o
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the Germans "would assure themselves of the sympathy of Wilson 
and the American people and possibly after ten or fifteen years 
modifications could be secured.
The Foreign Minister was not interested in possible 
changes a decade or more in the future. He considered the Saar 
occupation a "poorly veiled annexation." Germany was willing 
to make reparations to France and to supply her with coal as 
long as necessary, both of which would be impossible in the 
face of economic distress augmented by the loss of the vital 
Saar region,, Brockdorff-Rantzau, who never really trusted Con­
ger, stressed the imminent danger to the new-fledged Republic:
No government would be able to risk signing such a 
treaty. If the Entente wishes to render the present 
German government, which it has itself designated as 
qualified to negotiate, incapable /of existing_7, that 
is their concern, and they will also be responsible if 
it leads to unavoidable chaos in Germany.^
When Colonel Conger reminded him of Germany's totally defense­
less condition, which Marshal Foch was eager to exploit, Brock­
dor f f-Rantzau countered with the Bolshevist threat:
We are indeed no longer capable of military resistance, 
but a nation of 70 million cannot be annihilated. If 
the Entente really enforces the plans that have just 
been revealed to me, then Bolshevism in Germany will be 
inevitable. It should be clear to our enemies that /Bol- 
shevism_J7 would not stop at the French border. By no 
means do I wish to use Bolshevism, as a threat--! merely 
state the fact s. 5
BMS , 169lfl/1013/397 111.
^BMS , 1691E/1013/397 112. On mistrust of Conger, see
Epstein, p. 306.
5BMS, 169 111/1013/397 112.
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At Duisburg Conger had to leave., He said that he roust 
report the course of the conversation immediately to President 
Wilson, to which Brockdorff-Rantzau emphatically agreed, repeat­
ing again that he could not sign a treaty that was not based 
upon the Fourteen Points. Conger"s interview seemed an obvious 
attempt to sound out the German Delegation leader, who now sus­
pected the worst. Colonel Conger had said in effect that Ger­
many would be expected to sign the draft treaty without demur; 
the forthcoming meeting of ex=belligerents in Versailles was to 
be a mere formality and any intransigence on Germany's part 
would only arouse Allied and Associated wrath. What sort of 
reception awaited the Delegation at Versailles?
The ''Spirit of Versailles"
The journey took on an ominous character soon after 
crossing the border of the as yet unbombarded Vaterland. Under 
French auspices,, the Germans were subjected to an intentionally 
slow and bitterly enlightening trip through the war-devastated 
regions of Belgium and northern France. The trains chugged 
into Vaucresson, near Versailles, on the rainy evening of April 
29, 1919.
Colonel Henry of the French Army, who acted as liaison 
officer during the seven weeks that the Germans actually spent 
at Versailles, met the leader of the German Delegation on behalf 
of the French Government. It was an icily formal greeting, Mo-
^Eest described by Victor Schi.ff, pp. 45-57. Actually, 
their journey was planned by the Frehch so that they would ar­
rive in the evening , Luc kauy p. 211.
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tor vehicles then conveyed the entire group to the three hotels
7
allotted to them in Versailles. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and 
the most prominent Delegates occupied part of the HStel des 
Reservoirs, the secretarial staff was housed at the HStel 
Suisse, and members of the press were assigned to the Hotel 
Vatel. A contingent having arrived two days previously, the 
German deputation now numbered about 180 persons, including 
communications technicians and printers.
French soldiers, although willing to do so, were for­
bidden to assist the Germans in carrying their luggage into 
their quarters^ and members of the Delegation soon found them­
selves completely isolated from any contact with the outside 
world, although they had access to newspapers and were in touch 
with their Government in Weimar. A part of the park at Ver­
sailles was reserved for them to walk about in, but after an 
"incident" or two, the town of Versailles was placed out of 
bounds.. Only traffic among the three hotels, located near each 
other on both sides of the Rue des Reservoirs, was permitted.
The French wished to preclude all contact between the Germans 
and the inhabitants of Versailles,* French journalists faced the
7Noting that the cars had "little yellow pennants," Pro- 
fessor Bonn of the Delegation wrote: "The French had very
tactfully chosen yellow for the German delegation; it denotes 
pestilence on board.," Bonn, p. 226. Perhaps Brockdorff-Rant­
zau indulged in similar macabre humor at the Treaty presentation 
ceremony on May 7s his overcoat, bowler, suit, and gloves were 
all in funereal black.
^General Seeckt. himself helped with this task. Fried­
rich von Rabenau, Seeckt, Aus seinera. Leben 1918-1936 (Leipzig: 
Hase u ., Koehler, 1940), p. 163.
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threat of court martial if caught conversing with members of
9the German party.
Victor Schiff, a Socialist member of the German press 
corps, who knew France and the French language well, made a 
strong contention regarding the German quarantine: "There was,
above all, the desixe Lo keep Lhose German Social Democrats who 
were known to be on our Delegation from meeting their socialist 
comrades in France."10 The Allied fear that German Socialists 
would try to unite organized labor behind objections to an im­
posed, imperialistic peace was very real.
"Only photographs," observed General Hans von Seeckt in 
a letter to his wife on April 30, "seem to be freely allowed."11 
Photographers' flashes had dazzled the arriving delegates the 
previous evening, and the results of these now appeared in the 
local newspapers. The world learned of the Germans mainly 
through the pictures and comments of the French newspapers, 
which sneered at "the very pale Count Brockdorff-Rantzau" only 
as "the ex-ambassador of Wilhelm II," and misrepresented other 
Germans, * Unable to make any reply to the French press, the
9Xbid.; Schiff, pp.55-56. The charges would be "communi 
eating with the enemy "
i nSchiff, p. 54. George Bernard Noble, Policies and 
Opinions at Paris, .1919 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935), p. 
j8'5. quotes from Veritjf and Humanite regarding the desires of 
French Socialists to make the treaty more acceptable to Germany.
11Rabenau, p. 163.
12Ibid,, Schiff, p. 58. Brockdorff-Rantzau was particu­
larly angr’y~abbut. the hate campaign which the Paris Temps car­
ried on against him. See Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente und 
Gedanken urn. Versailles (Berlin: Verlag fur Kulturpolitik, 1925),
p, 135. This is borne out in Noble, Chapter X.
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Germans could only wait for word iron the leaders of the Peace 
Conference,, On May 1. „ the quarantine was intensified by the 
construction of wooden palisades around the German compound, 
ostensibly to protect them from the Boche-hating F r e n c h . ^3
That day also, the diplomatic exchange of credentials 
took place in the Trianon Palace Hotely which had been Allied 
Headquarters during the war0 As plenipotentiary of the German 
Government, Brockdorff-Rantzau did not wish to attend this 
brief meeting himself; Clemenceau would not be present and the 
Count felt that lesser persons could well attend to this chore,
M. Jules Cambon, Head of the Allied Credentials Committee, made 
it known that Brockdorff-Rantzau was expected to be there, 
since all those to be present (Cambon for France, Henry White 
for the United States, Lord Hardinge for Great Britain, and 
Keishiro Matsui for Japan) were themselves plenipotentiaries.
The Count relented. At the meeting he exchanged greetings with 
Cambon, who had been French Ambassador in Berlin for seven 
years before the war. Brockdorff-Rantzau, however, delegated 
the actual job of examining the credentials to his fellow dele- 
gate, Reichs jus tizminis ter Landsberg0 Both nervous tension and 
excessive regard for punctilio can account for this„^ The 
Allies worried that Germany would ask for the Italian creden-
33Luckau, p 0 590 Literary Digest History of the World
War, ed„ Francis W 0 Halsey (10 vols.• New York. Funk and Wagnails 
Co«, 1920), X, 307, describes this stockade in detail and in­
cludes a photograph of a part of it, This big cage” enclosed 
an area of about 100 by 300 yards,,
l^Henry White „ according to his biographer,, was shocked 
by the agitation of Brockdorff-Rantzau„ who seemed on the point 
of collapse. His face was chalky, his knees shook uncontroll­
ably , and his hands trembled0 A few curt and formal sentences
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t.ials (Orlando had left the Conference after: the disagreement 
over Fiume), but the Germans accepted the Allied credentials 
after pointing out certain facts and discrepancies
Except for the diplomatic exchange of credentials, the 
Germans received no instructions or communications from the Al 
lies for seven days following their arrival. The lowering 
"spirit of Versailles" was palpably apparent,^ Having been 
summoned to appear quickly in Versailles, the German Delegates 
were now treated as persons under house arrest and simply ig­
nored while the Paris Conference still struggled over main 
points of the treaty. During these days of waiting while the 
Council of Three deliberated behind closed doors, the German 
Foreign Minister held discussions with his colleagues . He
were exchanged, documents passed from hand to hand/ the two 
groups bowed stiffly to one another, and the Germans retired.
' /white thought^/7 there was pathos in the humiliation of a 
once-great Empire, but Cambon said, coldly, that 'he was glad 
to report the Germans seemed to be in just such a frame of mind 
as they should b e . ' Allan Nevins, Henry White; Thirty Years 
of American Diplomacy (New York; Harper and Bros., 1930), p.
443. See a1sc BMS, '1691H/1013/397 117; Novak, pp. 209-11; Lord 
Hankey, pp., 138-39.
Cambon was the only French dignitary whom Brockdorff- 
Rantzau singled out later for courteous bearing. Dokurnente und 
Gedanken, p „ 2 03.
1 3lord Hankey, p. 138° Luckau p. 62. The French wanted 
to split up Germany by demanding credentials from Bavaria. Paul 
Birds a.1,1 . Versailles Twenty Years After (New York; Har court.
Brace and Co.,, Inc.,, 1941), pp. 218-2 3.
^ M a n y  writers have described this hostile atmosphere 
vividly, one of the best being Victor Schiff, who makes a great 
effort tc be impartial and notes many small incidents whose 
cumulative effect was to have tremendous influence on the Ger­
mans, The ai spirit of Versailles" is admirably captured by Her­
mann Lutz, who uses the phrase often in his book German-French 
Unity- Basis for European Peace (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 
1957), p p Q 30-88
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sought the group5s backing of his policy and assured them indi
who were among them0 The Count ostentatiously ignored General 
von Seeckt and Commodore Heinrich when greeting Delegates soon 
after the arrival, in Versailles« Seeckt was a peace commissioner 
but not one of the Delegates» He and Heinrich, the Naval rep­
resentative, feared correctly that they would not be asked to 
participate in any of the top level discussions among the 
Delegates Seeckt and Brockdorf f-Rantzau did hold amicable
discussions together while awaiting the pleasure of the Allies 
to be made known, but the Count3s flat refusal to stress Ger­
man military requirements quickly alienated Seeckto^
17See Brockdorff-Rantzau's speech of welcome to the 
Delegates at the H^tel des Reservoirs, April 30, 1919, BMS,
1691H/1013/397 115-16. At first, during conferences, everyone 
feared that the rooms were "bugged" with hidden microphones. 
Schiff, pp. 31-33, 79-80. "Nachlass B~R, 91 9105H/3443/H335 258., 
Cahen, pp. 227, 312, savs that, the Germans "listened in r on the
Soviets at Brest-Litovsk
Brockdorff-Rantzau and General von Seeckt, which apparently be­
gan at this time, developed into a feud which lasted into the 
1920Es. when Seeckt objected to the Count as Ambassador to So­
viet Russia in 1922. At Versailles, Seeckt at first wanted to 
press for a German Army of 300,000 men (Rabenau, p. 159.) He 
later settled on 200,000, but Brockdorff-Rantzau refused to ask 
for an increase over the 100,000 allowed by the Treaty, In 1918 
Seeckt had insisted "Deutschland muss bundnisfahig sein. Man 
ist aber nicht bundni'sTaHIg^l~wenn man waffenlos ist. S! Frock- 
dorff-Rantzau1s program called for Germany to lead the way in 
universal disarmament? he also spoke out against the re-forming 
of pre-war type coalitions. Seeckt accused him. of offering up 
Germany's national honor by refusing to negotiate from a position 
of military strength. See Rabenau, p p «, 17 5-80* Brockdorff-Rant-
zau, Dokumente, pp. 81-82,■ Walter Goerlitz, History of the Ger­
man General 5taff 1657-1945, tr . Brian Bat teFsTiaw' i N ew Yor k7%"
vidually of his 'ow. support, and confidence.
All, that is, but one group- the few military officers
18Rabenau, pp. 158, 165. The cool relationship between
„19Fpr exam 
May 4, "Yesterday
Praeger, l9b~3~) , p.
i .Seeckt wrote at a long time in a lettf with Broc> r to his wife on dorff-Rantzau and
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Presentation of the Treaty
Since no further communications from the Allies were 
forthcoming, the Count wrote a letter to Clemenceau on May 4, 
saying that certain Ministers, needed by their government in 
Weimar, would be obliged to leave late on May 5 unless the Al­
lies had definite plans. This ploy got results. Colonel Henry, 
the French liaison officer, informed Brockdorff-Rantzau that 
the peace conditions would be handed to the Germans at a cere­
mony m  the Trianon Palace Hotel on Wednesday afternoon, May 7, 
at three o'clock. After perusing the agenda for the approaching 
session, the Germans realized that they would have no part in 
oral negotiations and that only fifteen days were to be allotted 
to them for the preparation of their written comments in French 
and English.20 This, together with the tone of Conger's mes­
sage, appeared to leave Germany without any voice in negotia­
tions. Great attention, therefore, was given to a speech 
drafted for the Foreign Minister if he were permitted to have 
the floor. In fact, there were two alternative speeches? one 
was a short statement, and the other, very long and detailed. 
Premier Clemenceau!s attitude as presiding official was to
found him quite determined and competent in many questions.
Nous verrons." Rabenau, p. 165. Dr. Walter Simons, legal ad- 
visor to the Delegation, also mentioned in a letter describing 
"internal frictions" hampering the work of the Delegation "the 
fact that the Count has to fight a silent battle against our 
representatives of the war departments here . . . "  Luckau, p. 
126 ,
20Luckau, pp. 61-63; Novak, pp. 211-12. May 7 was 
also the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the Lusitania,
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determine the nature of the German reply.21
Descriptions of the fateful meeting on May 7 are plenti­
ful, but Lord Riddell's is one of the best. Riddell, acting as 
"an official link between the /paris Conference_7 and the Brit-
9 9
ish P r e s s , s t r i v e s  for accuracy by paying careful attention 
to the smallest details, and he evokes the mood of the hour- 
long proceedings very well.
The large, elegant room was arranged very carefully, 
with long tables forming a rectangle0 Chairs on one side for 
the six German delegates plenipotentiary (Bjcocrkdorf f-Rantzau , 
Landsberg, Leinert, Melchior, Schucking, and Giesberts) faced 
those at. the head table across the void, where Premier Clemen­
ceau, sitting with President Wilson and Mr. Lansing on one side 
of him. and Prime Minister Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law on the 
other, would preside. Premier Orlando was not present.
7 1Dr. Luckau says that at least ten drafts of Brock- 
dorff-Rantzau 1 s speech were made. She includes three of them, 
in addition to the one actually delivered, in her documentary 
volume, noting that it is impossible to tell who wrote them.
The text of the shorter speech, to be given if Clemenceau1s atti­
tude toward a defenseless Germany was "reasonable," appears in 
Luckau and Novak as follows: "The fortune of war has gone a-
gainst us, and we are ready to accept the conditions for which 
the preliminary negotiations have furnished the basis. We are 
prepared to go to the very limit of what is possible, but that 
limit is set by the dignity and the vital needs of the German 
people,. We shall examine the document handed to us with good 
will and in the hope that the result of our interview may be 
subscribed to by all of us„" Luckau, p. 65; Novak, pp. 7. 217-18; 
Schiff, pp. 69-70.
^Riddell, p. ix. Without an official pass, the New 
York WorId1s Herbert Bayard Swope, who had met and liked Brock- 
dorff-Rantzau in 1916 (see Chapter II supra), blustered his way 
into the building and obtained a good seat in the room, where 
the ceremony was held, Kahn, pp. 226-28. Apparently he had 
long forgotten Copenhagen, and the Count was just another "damned 
German." See Chapter II, supra, p. 29n„
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Gradually the room filled as those entitled to be there 
began to take their places. Photographers had a field day as 
the participants arrived at the building.^3 colonel Henry indi­
cated that the Germans were present, whereupon a French official 
announced; "Messieurs les delegues allemands I 1 and the six men 
filed into the room with their two interpreters "After a
moment's hesitation," noted Lord Riddell, "everyone stood up."
In acknowledgement, Brockdorff-Rantzau bowed ceremoniously to
2 5the head table before the Germans took their seats.
Clemenceau opened the session promptly at three o'clock,, 
and his terse speech set the stage all too well for the drama 
that followed. The powerful personality of the French Premier 
had all along been the driving force of the Paris Peace Confer­
ence. President Wilson had won his point on the League Covenant 
as an integral part of the Treaty, but the raison d'etre of the 
draft treaty, to strip Germany of the means to regenerate mili­
tary power for all time to come, was the result of Clemenceau's
^ L o r d  Riddell commented that outside "the whir of the 
cinema cameras was almost equal to that of a small aeroplane." 
Riddell, p. 70. Inside the building, the curious stood on tables 
and chairs placed along the walls, and the Germans were continu­
ously photographed as they walked by. BMS, 1691H/1013/397 118.
^Luckau, p. 65, notes that the five members of the 
Foreign Office were also present: Dr. Simons, von Haniel, von
Stockhammern, von Lersner, and R<3diger „
^Riddell, p. 71, Literary Digest History, X, 308.
Erich Brandenburg notes that Brockdorff-Rantzau bowed to Clemen­
ceau (BMS, 1691H/1013/397 118), as does Lord Hankey (p. 152).
Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (3 vols.? 
Doubleday, Page and C o ., 1922), II, 501, says: "The leader, Count
Brockdorff-Rantzau, tall, thin, black-clad, aristocratic appear­
ing, seemed to everyone who saw him under great strain. His face 
was pale, and his bow to the head of the table where stood 
Clemenceau, was awkwardly formal."
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relentless chairmanship, Twice now in his seventy-eight years 
he had seen Germany invade France — in 1.871 they had taken 
Alsace-Lorraine and demanded a large indemnity. Throughout his 
career in politics Clemenceau regarded German militarism with 
horror and apprehension.^ Germany had been defeated this time, 
but only after four dreary years of warfare such as civilized 
man had never endured, A trail of utter devastation in Eelgium 
and northern France remained in mute testimony to the horrors 
that had been; the drain of national treasure and the stagger­
ing casualty rate portended a long period of recovery, if in­
deed recovery from such carnage was ever possible.
There were those who would reduce Germany to a mere 
shadow of her former self by making the Rhineland regions inde­
pendent of her. Groups pressing for the most debilitating de­
mands included Marshal Foch( Aristide Briand, Louis Barthou, 
and President Poincare. "The Tiger" was influenced sufficiently 
by Wilson and Lloyd George to keep such agitation at bay, but 
he insisted on the uttermost demands for reparations, was ada­
mantly opposed to Germany1 s immediate admittance to the League, 
and compromised on a fifteen year occupation of the left bank 
of the Rhine although his original recommendation had been 
thirty years.
^Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace 
(Kew Yorks The Macmillan Co., 1944), pp. 152-56, gives a good 
picture of Clemenceau, his germanophobia, and his masterminding 
of the Peace Conference. Another good portrait and psycholog­
ical study is found in David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David 
Lloyd George, vol., V, 1917-1918 (6 vols Boston; Little, Brown 
and Co., 1936), pp. 194-205.
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The key to Clemenceau's idea of dealing with the Germans 
lay in his attitude,, Lloyd George tells how, during discussions 
of the disarmament provisions of the Treaty, Clemenceau had ex­
pounded on hew to negotiate from a position of strengths
- . o The Germans must, of course, be spoken to with
moderation and equity, but also with firmness and decision.
. o . The degree of pressure to be exerted would be made 
to fit each case as it arose. But the Germans must not be 
tolds 'Go on, do as you like. Perhaps we shall someday 
threaten to break off relations, but just now we will not 
be firm.!
» * If a German thought that the one having the
mastery showed any signs of hesitation, or failed to look 
him straight in the eye, he would concede nothing,^7
On May 7„ the time to exhibit the proper attitude had come. The
entire gathering knew what a stupendous moment of triumph and
revenge this was for the French Premier, He felt himself the
personal avenger of Bismarck at Versailles in 1871. "Gentlemen,
Plenipotentiaries of the German Empire," he began
This is neither the time nor the place for superfluous 
wordso You have before you the accredited plenipotentiaries 
of the great and lesser Powers, both Allied and Associated, 
that for four years have carried on without respite the 
merciless war which has been imposed upon them.. The time 
has now come for a heavy reckoning of accounts u You have 
asked for peace. We are prepared to offer you peace.
To make known to you something else that is in my mind,
I must of necessity add that this second Peace of Versailles 
which is now to be the subject of our discussions has been 
too dearly bought by the nations who are represented here 
for us not to be unanimously resolved to use all the means 
in our power to obtain every satisfaction that is due us.
There will be no verbal discussion, and observations 
must be subm.itted in writing. The plenipotentiaries of
^David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties 
(2 volSo; London? Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1938), I ,  586.
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Germany will be given fifteen days in which to put into 
French and English their written observations on the en­
tire treaty „ „ .,28
While Clemenceau's speech was being interpreted first 
into English and then into German. M 0 Dutasta, Chief Secretary 
of the Peace Conference, entered the quadrangle and placed a 
thick copy of the Treaty before Lhe Count, who arose slightly 
to make a "stiff little bow," and placed the large document to 
one side with his black gloves on top of it. Clemenceau asked, 
after the translation, if anyone wished to speak, and Brock­
dor ff-Rantzau raised his hand "after the manner of a school- 
boy."29 The whole German Delegation realized that this might
be the only time the Allies would consent to hear a German rep- 
30resentativef Clemenceau might be unassailable, but Wilson 
and Lloyd George would perhaps take certain facts to heart.
Perceptibly nervous, according to most witnesses of the 
scene, the Count donned his horn-rimmed reading glasses. Se­
lecting the lengthy and carefully prepared German reply, Brock- 
dorff-Rantzau proceeded to read it aloud without ri sing from 
his chair„ This action, construed by nearly everyone as inten­
tional. disrespect., became notorious as the typical insolence of 
the Hun. it was also the culmination of the psychological ef-
Luckau, pp. 223-24. Novak, in an emotional descrip­
tion of this tableau, asserts that Clemenceau seemed to depart 
from his previously determined words, as the significance of the 
occasion overwhelmed him, and that he returned to his text after 
a few sentences rasped out in an unmistakable passion of hate. 
See Novak, pp. 216-17 .
29RiddelI, p> 32; Literary Digest History, X, 309 
Luckau, p, 63o
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fects of the "spirit of Versailles" upon the German Delegation 
and its leader .
Reading the speech, the Foreign Minister acknowledged
Germany's military defeat and affirmed the sincere intentions
of his Government to rebuild and make good the damages to Pel-
gium and northern France, but repudiated the idea that the sole
guilt for the war rested upon G e r m a n y I n  Allied ears, one of
the most rankling phrases was the following;
The hundreds of thousands of non-combatants who have 
perished since the eleventh of November by reason of 
the blockade were killed with cold deliberation after 
our adversaries had conquered and victory had been as­
sured to them. Think of that when you speak of guilt 
and punishment.
Germany, said the Count, could not sign a treaty which would 
condemn her to economic ruin and thereby prevent the payment of 
substantial reparations, which she felt bound to undertake. He 
made a rational appeal for committees of experts from both sides 
to study the problem of reparations required from Germany and 
how she might best meet a substantial amount without going 
bankrupt.
The League of Nations now represented the world's hope 
in place of power politics and coalitions which had always led 
to war in the past. He ended with a plea for international 
good-will, within the framework, of the League;
Gentlemen; The sublime thought to be derived from, 
the most, terrible disaster in the history of the world 
is the League of Nations, The greatest progress in the 
development of mankind has been pronounced, and will 
make its way,, Only if the gates of the League of Nations 
are thrown open to all who are of good will can the aim. 
be attained, and only then the dead of this war will not 
have died in vain.
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The German nation is sincerely prepared to reconcile 
itself with its severe lot if the agreed-upon basis of 
the peace is not undermined«, A peace which cannot be 
defended before the world in the name of justice would 
always generate new resistance to it. No one would be 
in a position to sign it with a clear conscience, since 
it would be unfulfillable. No one could assume the 
risks which would be contingent upon signing.
We shall examine the document presented with good 
will and with the hope that the final result of our 
meeting can be signed by all of us.^l
The "Big Three" fidgeted uncomfortably and whispered to 
one another. Clemenceau was angered? Lloyd George and Wilson 
were visibly uneasy at the references to the blockade, the so­
phistry implicit in the German war-guilt theory, the abandon­
ment of the Fourteen Points, and the need for an all-inclusive 
League of Nations. Clemenceau asked if anyone else wished to 
speak, and then abruptly adjourned the session. The Germans 
left the room first.^2
Going down the steps outside, Brockdorff-Rantzau 
lighted a cigarette and stood silently, waiting for his staff 
and their transportation. The cigarette "caused a sensation" 
as an arrogant gesture; actually, the Count was a super-sensi-
31The complete speech can be found xn Brockdorff-Rant?au, 
Dokumente, pp. 113-18, and, in English translation, in Luckau, 
p p . 220-23. Lord Riddell, p. 73, noted that "The length and tone 
of the Count's speech were obviously a surprise to the Allied 
delegates." Lord Hankey, pp. 154-55, says that "the intrinsic 
merits of the speech were spoiled . «. by his failure to stand
up . . . and by his harsh and almost menacing intonation, /and /
by the loss of coherence due to the delivery and interpretation 
in sections . . . "
^ A c c o r d i n g  to the Literary Digest. History, "After the 
meeting the German delegates were the first to leave the Trianon. 
Before they appeared at the outer door, the military guard of 
the palace had been withdrawn so as to avoid any semblance of 
military honors." X, 316.
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tive, high-strung individual, now very much overwrought, and he 
was a heavy smoker
Analysis of the Speech of May 7, 1919
Overlooking the discourtesy of not rising, the speech 
has subsequently been characterized as "a powerful and digni­
fied expression of Germany's i n t e n t i o n s , W r i t i n g  in 1927, 
British historian George P . Gooch put forth the following opinion;
The Foreign Minister's declaration and the tone in which 
it was delivered appeared to certain members of his 
audience tc breathe a spirit of lowering defiance. But 
it merely reiterated the principles of his first address 
to the National Assembly /at Weimar, February 14, 1919 /
and if re-read to-day it will appear to most judges skil­
fully adapted to avoid the pitfalls of truculent self- 
righteousness and insincere contrition.35
In 1940, Professor Gooch referred to Brockdorff-Rantzau as "an 
able and liberal-minded man" and continued that "no German dip­
lomat could have presented the demand of the new Germany for 
fair play with greater argumentative skill,
the behavior of the "Big Three" during the speech, 
see Riddell, p. 73, and Dr. Simon's letter on May 10, in Luckau, 
p. 119, which also describes the Germans leaving the assembly= 
Novak, p. 225, describes the scene on the steps.
14
Ro B o Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy 19.14- 
1925 (Mew York; Longmans, Green and Co.., 1927), p. 151.
^George P, Gooch, Germany (New York: Charles Scribners 
Sons, 1927), p p „ 215—16. Professor Gooch also notes that "No 
attention, however, was paid to the /weimar, February 14_7 speech 
at Paris, where the victors were conTident of their power to en­
force whatever terms they cared to impose." Ibid., p. 213. 
Actually, Wilson and Lloyd George were both absent from Paris at 
that time, and Clemenceau was shot on February 19. See above, 
Chapter jyf,
^George P. Gooch, Recent Revelations of European Diplo­
macy , 4th edc, (London; Longmans, Green and Co., 1940) p. 59.
In 1938 even Lloyd George conceded "This appearance of arrogance 
was not reflected in the speech itself, which, although it con-
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Why, then, did the Foreign Minister deliver a well-framed
speech in such a discourteous manner? Several circumstances,
most of them generally unrecognized at the time, help to explain
this indisputable breach of etiquette. Those who saw him noted
the Count's "exceedingly broken, nervous physical c o n d i t i o n 37
Lord Riddell describes him upon entering the great hall:
Brockdorff-Rantzau looked ill, drawn and nervous. He 
walks with a slight limp. His complexion is yellowish, 
and there are black rings under his eyes which are sunk 
deep in his head. When he was taking off his coat, x 
noticed that his face was covered with beads of perspi­
ration „ 38
Two Americans, General Tasker H. Bliss, and the Ambassador to 
Britain, Henry White, considered the Foreign Minister too over­
come with nerves to stand up in front of the assembly, and the 
Englishman Harold Nicolson records a like view.39 jn accord 
with Wilson and Clemenceau, Lloyd George fumed: "Those insolent
Germans made me very angry yesterday. I don't know when I have
tained a protest, was characterized rather by dignity than de­
fiance o" Lloyd George, The Truth „ . .," I, 67 7.
^Lutz, p o 41 „
38Ri(3Hell, p 0 71. Lord Hankey had hastily observed in 
his diary on May 7 that "Brockdorff-Rantfcau was a sinister- 
looking rascal, a typical junker,, His speech was a strange mix­
ture of cringing and i n s o l e n c e Q u o t i n g  this diary passage in 
his book, he continues the story: "But when my private secre­
tary Sylvester, who had typed the translations of the speeches, 
showed me an advance copy X was not sure that my judgement was
not too hasty, . . . " Lord Hankey, p. 1.55» Hankey"s opinion in
1963 was that the speech "was in fact by no means a bad one, when 
read in its entirety later." Ibid„, p 154.
39Lutz, p. 41; Nevins, p. 444? Harold Nicolson, Peace­
making 1919 (New York; Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939), p. 329. 
Nicolson also gives A.J„ Balfour's reaction; "Didn't, he stand 
up? I failed to notice. X make it a rule never to stare at 
people when they are in obvious distress." Ibid., pp. 329-30.
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been so angry„ Their conduct showed that the old German is
still there* Your Brockdorff-Rantzaus will ruin Germany's
40chances of reconstruction„ Nineteen years later, however,
he devoted the better part of two pages in The Truth About the 
Peace Treaties to offering an elaborate excuse for Brockdorff- 
Rantzau's "boorishness, 1 attributing it to nervousness and
A T
stage fright* ±
There is no doubt that the previous six months had under­
mined the Foreign Minister's health* Photographs taken before
42and after .1919 show this clearly * The war years in Copenhagen
had been a continual nervous strain* Aware of heart trouble in
the latter half of 1918, he had made his acceptance of the
Foreign Office contingent upon health considerations as well as
43his political and diplomatic program* The heart condition was
apparently a minor problem immediately after the war* But in 
the latter 1920's Brockdorff-Rantzau was plagued with attacks 
of angina pectoris*
40Riddell., p* 76*
4^Lloyd George, The Truth * * * , I, 676-77* Still other
opinions were subsequently aired* Stephen Bonsai, French diplo­
mat and linguist, saids ‘I lean to the opinion that Brockdorff- 
Rantzau * * * was both ill and drunk* For weeks we have heard
of the enormous quantities of cognac he consumes daily and but a 
glance at his deadly white face, his sunken chest, his hollow 
shoulders reveals what must have been his physical condition for 
a long time past* * * * 5 Stephen Bonsai, Suitors and Suppliants g
The Little Nations at Versailles (New Yorks Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1945), pp* 270-71* Bonsai also quotes Balfour as saying* "Beasts 
they were and beasts they are* How rn the world can we contrive 
to live in the same world with them? Ibid*
4?Compare photographs in Novak and Stern-Rubarth*
43Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, p* 6* Cf* FRUS, II,
140*
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The first, months of the Republi.c had been a time of 
terroro Brockdorff-Rantzau had withstood gunfire and bombard­
ment with Ebert and Scheidemann when’ the Reichschancellery was 
besieged by Spartacists, and Government officials in Berlin were 
never safe from Bolshevist brigands.44 prom January, 1919, 
office hours in the Wilhelmstrasse began at 8 or 10 A 0.M„ and 
the Foreign Minister often stayed on until five or even seven 
o ’clock the next m o r n i n g . 45 He jea]_t personally with mountains 
of correspondence, attended lengthy Cabinet, meetings, met with 
the Paxkonferenz, worked out plans for Foreign Office reforms, 
gave interviews and press conferences, and endlessly speculated 
upon the Allied demands awaiting Germany at the peace table and 
what the German response should b e «, He strove to reconcile the 
divergent political viewpoints, for he believed that a German 
Government, without solid backing would stand no chance against 
exorbitant Allied terms» The week at Versailles preceding May 
7 had been full of frantic preparations for the coming ordeal 
foreshadowed by the last meeting with Colonel Conger„ The long 
conferences, perusal of the anti-German French newspapers to 
which reply was impossible, and waiting under the most psycho­
logically frustrating circumstances had taken its toll of every­
one .
44Stern-Rubarth, pp. 70-95; Blucher, pp. 42-45. Gustav 
Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp (Berlin: Verlag fur Politik und Wirt- 
schaft, 1920), although he makes no mention of Brockdorff-Rant- 
zau, gives a vivid description of these days.
45 Stern-Rubarth, p. 74.
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Brockdorff-Rantzau was not a good orator. He always 
read his meticulously prepared speeches and was naturally reti­
cent in front of a large heterogeneous group.46 jn small 
gatherings his acquaintances marvelled at the brilliance and 
often pedantic literacy of his conversation and his acumen in 
personal debate. But he was no rabble rouser, and his aristo­
cratic bearing and forbidding reserve could never evoke much 
feeling of rapport with an audience. He was a lawyer, a writer, 
a scholar, a diplomat in the old tradition, and a man of lib­
eral political opinions, yet he lacked completely the means tc 
communicate and inspire. Although he believed that Germany's 
future would best be served by the Republic, the Allies could 
see him only as the stereotyped Junker--the unrepentant and un­
changed face of the old regime.
The speech he read on May 7 was much longer than Clem- 
enceau's and contained points that he felt must be mentioned 
openly. His later excuse that it was easier to read this long 
document, sitting down was probably true.4  ^ Another factor 
also enters the picture. Clemenceau's comparatively short 
speech had been translated in its entirety, first into English 
and then into German, after the Premier had finished speaking. 
Those accounts long enough to give such details all note that
4^Ibid c, p 0 129; Schiff, pp. 40-41, 63; Bonn, pp. 230-31 ? 
Epstein, p 302 ? Bernstorff, Memoirs, p. 2 54. Eyck, I, 90, 
refers to the Count’s " . . .  keen mind and sense of style, 
thanks to which his communications were penetrating and emphatic, 
On the other hand he lacked, as do so many diplomats, the gift 
of extemporaneous speaking. Faced with any large audience, he 
could only cling nervously to his prepared manuscript and plunge 
ahead„"
4 ^Gooch . Recent Revelations , . . , p. 99; Schiff , p., 69,
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Brockdorff-Rantzau1s speech, given in German, was translated 
sentence by sentence, first into French and then into English. 
The Count himself chose this singular method of delivery.
Wot only did it render standing to speak impractical; it pro- 
longed the time needed to deliver the speech and destroyed its 
continuity„
The main reason, however, for the studied discourtesy 
is given by Dr. Simons and the Count himself. Simons tells 
that the Count asked him, on the way to the Trianon Palace 
Hotel, whether or not he should rise to speak; Simons recom­
mended that he should. As a lawyer, Brockdorff-Rantzau felt 
otherwise, because, as Simons related in a letter to his wife 
on May 10,
In a diagram of the hall of the session which appeared 
in the French newspapers, the German table had already 
been designated as "banc des accuses." The Count there­
fore had heard, in spirit, the words, "the prisoner will 
stand up," and it was for that reason he kept his seat.49
In 1925, an embittered Brockdorff-Rantzau vehemently denied any 
attack of nerves and wrote his own explanation, which corrobo­
rated that of Dr. Simons;
Riddell, p. 72; FR.US, III, 417. Writing in 1963, Lord 
Hankey recalls these detaiTs^clearly, and relates that there 
was only one copy of the speech, which had to be passed from 
the speaker to both interpreters and back again. Lord Hankey 
also includes the information that the Allies, knowing that 
Brockdorff-Rantzau spoke fluent French, had discussed "whether, 
when the Treaty was handed over to the Germans, he should be 
permitted to speak in German or should have to speak in French 
or English." See Lord Hankey, pp. 153-55, 139. The Count did
not know English.
49Luckau, p. 119 o In an interview for the Deutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung on May 10, the Count had only a cryptic ref- 
erence to this act,ion; "If I remained seated, while Clemenceau 
stood, it had its well considered reasons„" Brockdorff-Rantzau, 
Dokumente, p. 120.
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They certainly hoped to gloat over our downfall* If many 
were disappointed 3 0 . I regret that I  must point out
that my duty demanded that I disappoint them this time,,
Even today I can see the French newspapers before me with 
the plan of the great meeting hall, in which the place
assigned to us was designated with large letters as the
"bench of the accused* a"
. . . I felt myself to be a peace negotiator,, as the
representative of a power, defeated after dreadful strug­
gles and tremendous efforts, but still great, and I did 
not consider myself as an accused man who must rise be­
fore his judges*50
Although he always denied it, a state of nerves cannot 
be ruled out; indeed, as Professor Bonn has written, Brockdorff- 
Rantzau "did not want the Allied statesmen to see ^/him_J tremble 
before them."51 And he would not for one moment appear as the
prisoner in the dock. In a press conference at the end of May,
the Count likened Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau to 
Minos, Aeacus, and Rhadamanthus, the mythological three judges 
of the dead in Hades.52
50Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente und Gedanken, p„ 202.
5lBonn, p. 230. Eyck, I, 93-94, holds that a combina­
tion of all these factors, physical and emotional, is respon­
sible for the Count's remaining seated, and that Brockdorff- 
Rantzau, knowing he "would suffer a violent attack of stage- 
fright," used the "Defendant arise“" explanation as "an excuse 
which concealed his real reason*"
^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, p. 151; Stern-Rubarth,
p. 15.
CHAPTER VI 
"JUMMER DE KOPP BABEN1
Reactions of the "Big Three"
The morning after the presentation of the Treaty to the 
Germans found Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson deep in 
serious discussion. The fear that Germany's signature to the 
Treaty would not be easily obtained permeated the session. 
Angered over his indiscretion and bitter tone of voice, they 
nevertheless remembered Brockdorff-Rantzau's plea for committees 
of experts to study the questions of war guilt, European resto­
ration, and, above all, to prepare a financially workable repa­
rations program. They called for a translation of the Count's 
speech on that very point, then discussed it a bit further:
Lloyd George suggested that this did not constitute 
a definite proposal which need be replied to.
Clemenceau agreed that it would be better to take 
no notice.
President Wilson agreed and suggested that one pos­
sible interpretation of the phrase was that if the Ger­
mans signed the Treaty they would want the assistance of 
the Allied and Associated Powers in carrying it out.
(It was agreeds —-
that no reply should be made to this statement in 
Brockdorff-Rantzau1s speech.)!
At another meeting on the following afternoon, the Coun­
cil of Three remained convinced that the Junkers, personified
1FRUS, V, 510-12.
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by Brockdorff-Rantzau, still dominated Germany. Lloyd George, 
although he regretted the blockade, urged the occupation of Ber­
lin if the Germans refused to sign. As he put it,
It would be the outward and visible sign of smashing the 
Junkers. They would never be convinced otherwise.
President Wilson said the hope rested on the remain­
der of Germany ridding themselves of the Junkers.
Apart from Brockdorff-Rantzau, the other German dele­
gates had looked reasonable men.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that none the less 
they had allowed the Junker to take the lead. They 
could not free themselves from the sense of servitude 
to the Junkers.
President Wilson thought that Mr. Lloyd George's 
theory was correct that the insolent parts of Brock­
dor ff-Rantzau1s speech had been his own and the rea­
sonable parts supplied by the other d e l e g a t e s . 2
They then summoned Marshal Foch to ascertain whether or 
not sufficient military units were still available to impress 
Germany and invade her if necessary.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that it might be an advan­
tage to have some demonstration at an early stage. The 
Germans were now making up their minds. Possibly they 
thought that the Allied and Associated Powers would not 
march.
M. Clemenceau said that that was exactly what the 
Germans were saying. They believed the French Army inca­
pable of marching and that the United States Army was 
going home.
Mr. Lloyd George said that it might be too late ten 
days hence and he thought some action ought to be taken 
to show that the Allied and Associated Powers had made 
their minds up. He would like a demonstration made 
within a day or two. The most impressive form of demon­
stration would be to bring the cavalry to the front.
Marshal Foch said that his cavalry were too few for 
a great demonstration, but he proposed himself to make
2FRUS, V, 527-28.
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an immediate visit to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
various armies in such a way that while apparently 
secret, it would be known to everyone and all Germany 
would be puzzling to know what he was up to.
President Wilson suggested a secret journey with
careful leakage„
3Marshal. Focn said that this was what he intendeds
Impact of the Treaty 
Meanwhile, the German Delegation worked feverishly, 
making the most of their two weeks to learn the contents of the 
voluminous Treaty and prepare their written comments in the 
prescribed manner.^ The first job was to translate from French 
into German the very few copies of the 80,000 word document
3FRUS, V, 539; Riddell, pp. 77-78.
^Brockdorff-Rantzau commented on the initial German 
reaction in an interview for the Hamburger Fremdenblatt on May 
21s "On May 7, the Delegation considered whether there would be 
any kind of negotiation over this Peace, or whether the quick 
and unqualified refusal of it would not be preferable in spite 
of all the hazards that might arise from that. We did not choose 
this path, . e . which might have corresponded most of all to the 
state of mind in Germanv, but we made use of the right granted 
us to formulate our objections and bring them to the attention 
of the Allied and Associated Powers within the length of time 
provided." ^fijnable to complete their commentary in 14 days, the 
Germans asked for an additional week, which was granted.Jy "We 
could not," continued the Count, "go away remaining silent on 
certain aspects, as intolerable as they might seem, to us, in the 
hope that there would be an opportunity to discuss them after 
the conclusion of the Peace; or hoping that, in practice, their 
actual carrying out would not be interpreted go severely as the 
text of the Peace Treaty indicated. . . . We wish to sign only a
peace which we can actually observe. We abhor any double-deal­
ing, any deception, any mental reservation. As honorable peo­
ple we wish to fulfil those obligations accepted by us.," Brock­
dor f f-Rantzau Dokumente, pp. 129—30.
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that were available to them.5 Translation posed many serious 
problems due to the vagueness of the French text in some places. 
Of great significance was the interpretation of Article 231, the 
"war-guilt. clause," for the Treaty's reparations and punitive 
clauses rested upon it,^ The previous notes from Dr« Solf and 
Brockdorff-Rantzau requesting neutral investigation of the 
causes of the war had been curtly rejected by the Allies with 
the observation that German guilt was already accepted as fact.
Outside the innermost councils, others at the Peace Con­
ference knew as little of the details of the Treaty as the Ger­
mans. The document in its entirety was unknown to nations small 
and large on the Allied s i d e . 7  utmost secrecy had characterized 
the entire Peace Conference, and a summary of the Treaty terms
^Victor Schiff tells how they were obliged to tear the 
May 7 copy and a few others into sections in order to expedite 
the all-night labors of the translators before the various com­
mittees were able to study the treaty as a whole. Schiff, p. 74; 
Novak, p. 2 26.
^The ambiguity of Article 231 resulted in the war guilt 
issue. Did Germany's "responsibility" for "aggression" involve 
only legal liability or moral guilt for the whole war? The 
genesis of Article 231 and the resulting interpretations are 
carefully examined in R 0C. Binkley, "The 'Guilt' Clause in the 
Versailles Treaty," Current History, XXX, (May 1929), pp. 294-300
^Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations; A Personal 
Narrative (Bostons Houghbon “Mifflin Co., 1921), pp. 239-40- 
Colonel House said* "The Germans are giving us an example of open 
diplomacyo They print the Treaty as soon as it is given them, 
and we are getting in Paris the German edition. It is being 
sold in Germany and Holland and nearby countries at a ridicu­
lously low price, something like fifty cents a copy. Neverthe­
less, be it remembered, the United States Senate has never seen 
the Treaty as a whole." Edward M. House, The Intimate Papers 
of Colonel House, Arranged as a Narrative by Charles Seymour (4 
vols o; Bostons Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1926-1928), IV, 472, Here­
after cited as House Papers.
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had been distributed only hours before the meeting of May 7. In 
contrast to the Wilsonian principle of "open covenants, openly 
arrived at," secrecy had served as a smoke screen for the disa­
greements and old-time diplomacy of the framers of the Treaty.® 
Victor Schiff, who was also one of the Secretaries of 
the Delegation, refers to the next episode at Versailles as the 
"war of notes,, When the translators had finished, the commit­
tees of German experts went to work on their written commentary. 
On May 9, their opening volley in the note-war pointed out the 
incongruity of the Treaty with the Fourteen Points and concluded 
inauspiciously: "The draft of the treaty contains demands which
no nation could endure; moreover, our experts hold that many of 
them could not possibly be carried out."10 The next note encom­
passed a German plan for a League of Nations Covenant, observ­
ing,
At this time the German delegation desires to point out 
the contradiction which lies in the fact that Germany
80n April 5, Lord Riddell asked: "Will the peace terms be
published before they are discussed with the Germans?" Replied 
Lloyd Georges "No, certainly noti They will be handed to the 
Germans when they come to Versailles. If the terms were pub­
lished beforehand, the position of the German Government would be 
made impossible. The terms might lead to revolution. We shall 
be very strict about any infraction of this arrangement, and 
shall punish any paper that publishes the terms before we make 
them public..15
Clemenceau did not even allow Marshal Foch to see the 
terms before the Germans were summoned late in April. See Rid­
dell, pp. 46, 61.
^Schiff, p. 84. General Seeckt, ready to leave on the 
8th of May, referred sarcastically to the forthcoming "Papier- 
kr ieg. 1 Rabenau, p. 172.
■^Luckau, p. 2 25 .
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is asked to sign the covenant of the League of Nations 
as an integral part of the treaty, although she is not 
among the governments which have been invited to join 
the League. The German delegation wishes to know under 
what conditions an invitation to become a member of the 
League would be extended.^
The bid for entry into the League comprised the first written
German observation, because, explained Brockdorff-Rantzau to the
Deutsche Allgameine Zeitung, the League came first in the Treaty
and everything else was contingent upon it. To the Europa Press
Bureau he gave a complete statement;
We ourselves know that the new Germany has broken with 
the principles and practices which are the cause of 
the distrust of our enemies. Blit it must be made clear 
that until now we have had no opportunity to offer 
proof of this on the level of international negotiations. 
Therefore we cannot ask at the outset that our assur­
ances of the inward and outward revolutions /in Germany_J7 
be blindly accepted by our adversaries. We can and must 
demand that the Entente grant us the opportunity to 
demonstrate, through our actions a compelling proof of 
the new political convictions of the new Germany. Not 
through words alone, but above all through deeds, must 
we offer something . . . better in place of the politique
that was formerly followed by the representatives of the 
previous Germany at the Hague peace conferences and also 
during the w a r / ^
A complete discussion of the Treaty provisions and the 
German counterproposals is beyond the scope of this thesis. In 
her comprehensive book, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace 
Conference, Dr. Alma Luckau has admirably covered this subject. 
Denied oral communication with the Allies, Germany's Delegation 
was determined to place her views before the world arbiters.
The criticisms leveled at the Treaty by the Foreign Minister
11Tbid.
^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp. 120, 122-23. The
German stand on the League was No. 10 of eleven subjects covered 
in the "Instructions Given to the German Plenipotentiaries of 
Peace" formulated in April, 1919. See Luckau, pp. 199-209.
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and his experts came under several general headings. In addi­
tion to Germany's exclusion from the League of Nations, other 
areas of the Treaty considered vulnerable by the German experts 
involved labor legislation, disarmament, self-determination of 
peoples in disputed areas, repatriation of prisoners, economic 
strictures, reparations, and the "points of honor." This last 
category included extradition of the Kaiser and other "war crim­
inals" for trial, and the infamous Article 231.
Brockdorff-Rantzau considered the war guilt assertion a
legal device whereby the Allies could stave off a peace settle-
13ment indefinitely, to Germany's material disadvantage. On 
May 13 he requested, by note, the report of the Allied Commis­
sion on the Responsibility for the War, which Clemenceau re­
fused to divulge. The "Tiger's" note to Brockdorff-Rantzau 
said that such reports were "documents of an internal character 
which cannot be transmitted to you." German guilt, added 
Clemenceau, went back to the Lansing Note of November 5, 1918,
according to which Germany, by accepting it, admitted responsi­
bility for all "aggression.
Brockdorff-Rantzau countered with a blast at the 
methods of the Peace Conference. In a note to Clemenceau he 
wrote that Germany had never "assumed the responsibility for the 
origin of the war," and therefore Germany could not:
l^Dickmann, p. 83.
14Luckau, pp. 242, 254; Binkley, p. 300n.
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consent to be put off with the remark that the data on 
the question of responsibility collected by the Allied 
and Associated Governments through a special Commission 
are documents of an internal nature of these Govern­
ments. This, a question of life and death for the Ger­
man nation, must be discussed in all publicity; methods 
of secret diplomacy are here out of place.
The economic sphere was equally important, for it was 
here that the Count and his highly competent team continually 
affirmed Germany's intentions of meeting reparations obliga­
tions to the greatest feasible extent, provided the economic 
capacity to do so was not denied her. While stripping Germany 
of colonies, territory, and natural resources, the Treaty de­
manded Germany's unconditional assent to as yet unspecified 
reparations payments: a "blank check." German experts held 
that the result would be internal chaos and economic collapse 
endangering all Europe. Brockdorff-Rantzau expressed his feel­
ings to his fellow Delegates in a bitter precis of the French 
text of the Treaty, wherein countless clauses began with "Ger­
many renounces . . ." Snarled the Count; "Das dicke Buch war
ganz dberfIhssig. Es ware einfacher gewesen, man hatte erklart;
L'Allemagne renonce k son existence. L a t e r ,  in a press 
interview, he expressed his opinion for the benefit of the out- 
side worlds The economic conditions of the Treaty represented 
a "new kind of Einkreisungspolitik" on the part of the Allies, 
which would only generate new and dangerous pressures in Ger­
many, comparable to the pre-war militarism.^
^Luckau, pp. 271-72. l®Novak, p. 228; Rabenau, p. 169.
1^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp. 146-49.
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Efforts toward German Unity
To present his case to the Allies, Brockdorff-Rantzau
needed the confidence and support of his Government at home.
Judging from the plenary session of the National Assembly in
Berlin on May 12, the Delegation in Versailles retained strong
backing. The Treaty was immediately denounced by every group
in the National Assembly, led by Ebert and Scheidemann. Demon-
1 8strations of mourning and defiance were seen all over Germany.
But even as the Foreign Minister conferred with the 
Cabinet at Spa on May 18, regarding the financial and economic 
proposals to be made by the German Delegation, the fabric of 
resistance was weakening. That very weekend Matthias Erzberger, 
who still considered Colonel Conger the best link with Wilson, 
met with Conger and a Major Henrotin whom he had asked to come 
to Berlin. Count Bernstorff was also present at this meeting 
and held fast to the official stand that the Treaty could not 
be signed as it stood. Erzberger met the two Americans alone 
the following morning; without Bernstorff, who had irritated 
them, he indicated that Germany could not postpone the peace 
and that he could be instrumental in bringing about an agree­
ment based on three face-saving proposals. The Americans con­
vinced Erzberger that the Allies were ready to march in and 
occupy Germany. ^
l®Luekau, pp. 94-100. Opposition to the Treaty, however, 
was based upon diverse reasons, as Dr. Luckau points out.
■^Epstein, pp. 305-07; Zimmermann, p. 63.
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A second meeting between the Foreign Minister and govern­
ment representatives at Spa occurred on May 22, Both Scheidemann 
and Erzberger were there. It was the last attempt to reach a com­
promise before the German counterproposals were submitted. Brock-
dorff-Rantzau5s personal antipathy toward Erzberger is well known, 
but the group managed to come to an understanding. Erzberger's 
ideas had some influence on the final form of the counterpro­
posals, and the Delegation agreed to refer the decision for or
against signing to the Cabinet.20
Although other disruptive forces were at work, Erzberger 
more than anyone revealed the disintegration of solidarity in the 
German stand. Brockdorff-Rantzau had thought it an advantage to 
have the Delegation called to Versailles, since this might enable 
them to present an appearance of greater unity, and the home 
front would be less demoralized without the victors in Berlin,2  ^
But the Allies and neutrals were soon well aware that Erzberger 
or someone else could be found to sign.
The Counterproposals Fail
On May 29, which was also Brockdorff-Rantzau's fiftieth 
birthday, the Germans submitted their counterproposals to the 
Allies, who had granted a week's extension to the original fif­
teen days. An accompanying cover letter (Mantelnote) expressed 
good faith and presented an outline of a specific German repara-
2(^ Luckau, p. 103.
9 I
Richard Grunfcerger, Germany 1918-1945 (London; B,T» 
Batsford Ltd., 1964), p„ 53.
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tions plan going 51 to the extreme limits of what is possible." 
Again, pleas were entered for a neutral investigation of war- 
guilt and for the inclusion of Germany in the League. The con­
cluding paragraph faced facts, yet appealed to reason:
Germany must sign the treaty that has been presented 
to her and must carry out its conditions. Even in her 
misfortune, right is too sacred to her for her to stoop 
to accept conditions that she can not promise to fulfill. 
/previous treaties based on "the right of might" caused 
and prolonged the world war ._7 The lofty aims which our 
enemies have been the first to give to their way of con­
ducting a war, require a treaty in a different spirit.
Only the collaboration of all nations . . . can create a
durable peace. We are under no illusions as to the depth 
of the hatred and bitterness which are the fruits of this 
war; and nevertheless the forces working for harmony in 
humanity are to-day stronger than ever. The historic 
task of the Peace Conference at Versailles is to bring
about this h a r m o n y . 2 3
The letter bore Brockdorff-Rantzau's signature, but had been pre­
pared by Dr. Guttmann of the Frankfurter Zeitungo ^
The German counterproposals were voluminous and time did 
not permit their translation from German into French and English, 
although the Mantelnote was correctly submitted in those lan-
^Luckau, p. 304 „
23Ibid., pp. 305-06; Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp.
144-45.
9 A "The suggestion that this responsible task should be 
entrusted to a newspaperman, and not to a delegate or an expert, 
originated with Commissioner General Simons, who believed that 
Guttmann1s style might be more adapted to appeal to public 
opinion than a concise and legal formulation." Luckau, pp. 85, 
126.
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g u a g e s Q 2 5  They consisted of Genera], Remarks" followed by 
eleven sections enumerating Germany s acceptance of obligations 
and her requests for revisions of the Treaty.
Most noteworthy among the Counterproposals were Section 
I (on the League) ,7 proposing immediate and complete disarmament 
of Germany in return tor League memberships and Section IV (on 
Reparations), which defined financial commitments to be under­
taken by Germany.
Germany is ready, within four weeks after the rati- 
fication of peace, to issue government bonds for 20,000,- 
000,000 gold marks, payable not later than May 1, 192 6,
in instalments to be stipulated by the Allied and Asso­
ciated Powers, and for the remainder of the total indem­
nity to draw up the required deeds in the same manner 
and to pay them in yearly instalments without interest, 
beginning May 1, 1927, with the understanding that the
total compensation shall on no account exceed the sum of 
100,000,000,000 gold marks 0 726
Their labors concluded for a while, the German Delegates 
wondered whether the Allies would break off negotiations. The 
Count and Dr. Simons discussed every contingency of signing or 
not signing, should the Allies refuse to consider changes; both 
also realized that their policy of reasoned protest, could now 
easily be overruled in Weimar., The ultimate goal, of the Dele­
gation had always been oral negotiations leading to an agreement
2 5Drc Simons began a letter on May 30, "Yesterday and 
the day before we gave the enemy more than 300 pages, folio size, 
to swallow; and if they do not throw it; back at once, it will, 
take them some time to digest it..." Luckau, p. 122. Harold Nic- 
olson noted in his diary on -Tune 1st: "A foul day,, owing chiefly
to my having to spend the whole morning and afternoon translating 
German Notes which descend upon us like leaves in V a l l o m b r o s a 0 
„ o" Nicolson, p. .355.
26Luckau,7 pp_^  353, 382. Germany also asked to retain her
colonies and large merchant ships.. In this thesis the term "'mil­
liard" will be used instead of the American term billion. ,B
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on economic clauses and the alleviation of conditions detri-
27mental, m  their opinion, to the fulfillment of obligations0
Brockdorff~Rantzau chided the German press for speaking 
only in terms of accepting or rejecting the Treaty. "Our task," 
he wrote in a memorandum, "is not purely negative." He granted 
that Germany must sign peace terms meeting certain requirements 
of the Allies, but maintained also that a reasonable agreement 
had to be reached whereby Germany would not be reduced to 
nothingness or slavery. "It has not come to oral negotia­
tions, " he continued, "but 1 have not given up the hope that 
the other side will yet find itself ready for t h a t , T o  a 
German reporter on June 6, he said:
Oral negotiations are not taking place, neither openly 
nor secretly. The fence, behind which they are protecting 
us, is not only a courtesy, but a symbol. I can almos t 
believe that they fear the power of my discourse /Bered- 
samkeit /„ We must therefore wait until it pleases the 
enemy to allow us to receive their written answer.2^
Discussion of Treaty obligations, where appropriate, 
with the Germans was no longer without, strong advocates on the 
Allied side. On May 10, the Germans had requested ’direct 
conversations," regarding repatriation of prisoners of war, but 
the Allies at the time refused this until Germany signed the
2^In a letter home on June 10, Dr. Simons reveals how 
eighteen days passed while the Delegation awaited the Allied
response to the counterproposals. “We are deep in preparations
for the face-to-face negotiations with the Allies, which, how­
ever, for the time being, are not going to take place. 0 . . ”E
Luckau, p. 131.
28"Nachlass B-R," 9105H/3443/H235 318-19.
2^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, p. 168.
Treatyo28 Although the Germans had contacts who could provide 
some indication of the state of mind of the Council cf Three,2! 
they had always overrated Wilson's .influence on Clemenceau and 
this misconception prevailed even after the submittal of Lhe 
counterproposals. The discussions of Wilson, Lloyd George, and 
Clemenceau from May 21 through une 9, as recorded by David 
Hunter Miller, reveal the desire, not shared by Clemenceau, to 
meet with the German representatives,
"On May 21, 1 noted Hunter Miller, “President Wilson 
advocated that the economic and financial, experts of the Allied 
and Associated Powers discuss questions of detail with the Ger­
man experts." Clemenceau disapproved, but Lloyd George agreed 
that "a few small concessions would give them excuse to sign. '22 
Meetings of the “Big Three" were held during the first week of 
June, while the German counterproposals were being studied.
The three heads of state disliked the no interest5 feature of 
the German offer of 1.00 milliard gold marks. However, Lloyd 
George and Wilson strongly advocated the naming of a definite 
reparations suiru in Wilson s words: The object of the figure
was to get the Germans to agree L 2 22 A meeting on June 9 was
3 0 Luckau, pp 2 40, 2 5 3-
2^Dra Simons mentions news from such a source in a let­
ter of June 1, 1919, Luckau, p, 12 9„
David Hunter M i l l e r M y  Diarv at the Conference of 
Paris (20 vols,; Privately printed, 1928 , XIX 276-77*
22 Ibid . / p 2 79. Cf FRUS, v;} 147- 60, where the Coun­
cil of Three, on . 'une .3, discussed the idea of giving Germany 
three months to submit another financial proposal, after signing 
the Treaty* At this meeting, '^resident Wilson pointed out that, 
if the German proposal could be accepted, half the objections 
would disappear. 15
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devoted to reparations schemes. M 0 Loucheur, the French finan­
cial expert, had said that “the Germans would not accept as 
high a figure as would have to be fixed." The discussion then 
foundered on the number of months needed to name, in Lloyd 
George’s words, "a figure which would satisfy public opinion 
either in Allied or enemy countries."24 Considering the incred­
ibility of such a figure, Hunter Miller’s record of Wilson’s 
next remarks is highly interesting:
President Wilson said that personally he was satis­
fied with the reparations arrangements of the Treaty, 
provided it was properly explained to the Germans, but 
the important thing was to induce the Germans to make 
peace quickly and if the concession of naming a definite 
sum, even arbitrarily, would reassure the Germans the 
concession was worth making. It was also important to 
leave the Germans sufficient assets to start their trade 
again and to bear the burden of reparations; "he could 
not ask the United States bankers to give credit if Ger­
many had no assets*
A glance at the minutes of a meeting of the Council of Three 
two days previously shows how Clemenceau had squelched the idea 
of oral negotiations on the financial clauses with the compel­
ling argument that: "The object of the Germans in asking for
conversations was to divide the Allies. They would say that a 
Mo Loucheur said one thing, lord Cunliffe another, and Mr.
Keynes a third.'*28
Contrary to Clemenceau,,. both Wilson and Lloyd George 
favored Germany’s early admission into the League; Wilson was 
prepared to give a "general, assurance of this to Germany as
3 4Mi 11 e r l7 My_ Diary , XIX , 2 79, 280 .
35ibid, , pp. 280-81. 36FRITS, VI, 2 36
soon as the Allies were convinced that the changes in her govern
ment were " s i n c e r e * B r i t i s h  and American Delegates and eco­
nomic experts deplored the harshness of the Treaty in strong 
wordso Colonel House voiced his disapproval, much to Wilson's 
distress, On June 5, Herbert Hoover sent President Wilson an 
extensive memorandum , saying he was convinced -
that (a) the demands made are greater than the economic 
surplus; (b) that the regime and controls are such as 
endanger the stable democracy in Germany; and (c) that 
the Germans will never sign the Treaty i.n its present 
form. The present Government in Germany is the only 
alternative to either Reactionary or Communistic Govern­
ment, and if it fails we have political debacle in any 
event. . . .38
Harold Nicolson, of the British contingent, observed in a let­
ter on June 8, "the real crime is the reparation and indemnity 
chapter, which is immoral and senseless."39
Early in June Lloyd George (in a "perfect funk" according 
to Wilson48) feared the possibility of Germany's not signing 
and the terrible implications of this. On the third of June he
2^ibid., pp. 157-58o
^Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, Vol. I, 
Years of Adventure 1874-1920 (3 vols.; New Yorks The Macmillan 
Co o , 1952) , pp. 464-6 5 o Hoover, humanitarian and realist/had
begun his memorandum with this sentences "In any discussion of 
the draft treaty, I think it must be accepted as a premise that 
real justice can never be meted out, for no adequate punishment 
of German crimes is conceivable or even encompassed in the pres­
ent draft treaty."
^Nicolson, p. 359.
40Bailey, p. 292. According to Bailey, Wilson was an­
gered because Lloyd George pressed for concessions on France's 
part instead of giving up any advantages accruing to Britain 
from the Treaty.
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had suddenly offered the startling thought that if Brockdorff- 
Rantzau would not sign, he would probably be replaced by some­
one else, whose signature might be of little account,* '!42
As the month of June began, Woodrow Wilson suffered
from the effects of his illnesses and the physical strain of
six months of arduous discussions. Other business demanded the
attention of the Council of Three at the same time the German
case was considered; committees agonized over an Austrian
treaty, while simultaneously the German counterproposals were
translated and replies framed, bit by bit., Wilson declared
his disinclination to change the achievements represented by
the German Treaty, finally formulated after disagreements which
had persisted until the literal eve of presentation. June
third was the day he had made his often-quoted statement"
that the time to consider all these questions was when 
we were writing the treaty, and it. makes me a little 
tired for people to come and say now that they are 
afraid the Germans won't sign, and their fear is based 
upon things that they insisted upon at the time of the 
writing of the treaty; that makes me very sick. D 0 .
These people that overrode our judgment and wrote things 
into the Treaty that are now the stumbling-blocks, are 
falling all over themselves to remove these stumbling- 
blocks. o o «,
Though we did not keep them from putting irrational 
things in the Treaty, we got very serious modifications 
out of them. If we had written the Treaty the way they 
wanted it, the Germans would have gone home the minute 
they read it.42
41FRUS, VI, p., 1.59. Italics mine.
42Seth P. Till,man, Anglo-Arnerican Relations at the Paris 
Peace Conference of 1919 (Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 
355; House Papers, IV, 47 5-76. One of the best presentations 
of what Wilson did achieve at Paris in the face of extreme Allied 
demands is Paul Birdsall's Versailles Twenty Years After0
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Years later, Lloyd George attributed Wilson’s adamant stand to an 
earlier cause; "The effect /of Brockdorff-Rantzau;s speech on May 
1 J  on President Wilson's mind was to close it with a s n a p . " 4 8
A letter from Andre Tardieu to Colonel House on June 
tenth finally put an impossible situation into words:
For more than five months the heads of Governments 
and their experts have studied the terms of Peace to 
be imposed on Germany» They have reached an agreement 
and they have communicated to the Germans a text which, 
if it does not yet bind Count Brockdorff-™in any case 
unquestionably binds the Allies„
Could the Allies suppose that, this text would be 
satisfactory to Germany? Of course not. However, 
they adopted it. Germany protests, as it was certain 
she would. Immediately a modification of the text is 
undertaken. I say this is a confession of weakness 
and a confession of lack of seriousness, for which all 
the Allied Governments will pay dearly in terms of 
public opinion! Is it an impossible Treaty? Is it an 
unjust Treaty? Count Brockdorff believes it is. If 
we change it, we admit that we think as he does. What 
a condemnation of the work we have done during the 
past sixteen weeks!44
The Council of Three had found it impossible to agree 
to accept any of the major German counterproposals. Now they 
had to inform the German Delegation of this, and demand that 
Germany accept the Treaty virtually as it was on May 7. Weary 
with work and argument, the "Big Three" again checked with 
Marshal Foch on the availability of an invasion force, should 
it be necessary. Wilson offered to get American troops back 
if he could request a specific n u m b e r ,,48
48Lloyd George, The Truth , I, 676,.
44House Papers, IV, 476-77 .
45FRUS, VI, 501-09, 523, 543-52. The seven day ulti­
matum eventually given Germany stemmed from the fact that, the 
Armistice would expire on June 23„ Lord Hankey, pp. 174-75..
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On June 13, with Clemenceau's vigorous approval, Lloyd
George "advocated a renewal of the blockade in the event of
the Germans refusing to sign as if this were known in Germany
beforehand, it would have a great effect." President Wilson
preferred a military occupation; with arguments strangely akin
to those of the German Foreign Minister he said that "he did
not believe in starving women and children," and that "the
imposition of the blockade would shock the sense of mankind."
He added that "starvation would only bring about Bolshevism and
chaos." it was decided that day that ostentatious preparations
for the re-imposition of the blockade should be made, for in
the opinion of Lloyd George,
the mere noise of preparing a blockade would do more 
to make the Germans sign than the military occupation.
There were important elements in the population such 
as the rich industries and the wealthier classes of 
Berlin who would probably welcome an occupation as a 
means of ensuring order. The mere threat of a block­
ade, however, would terrify the whole population.48
The final reply of the Allies reached the German Dele- 
gation on June 16, reiterating Germany's war guilt. The "re­
vised" Treaty contained minor changes hand written in red ink; 
a plebiscite granted in upper Silesia, and the Saar mines were 
to be returned after fifteen years, if a plebiscite so decreed. 
Other than this and a previous promise to admit Germany to the 
International Labor Organization before her undetermined entry
A 7
into the League of Nations, no other changes were made. Ger-
46FRUS, VI, 371-7 2 .
47Luckau, pp. 89-90; Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, p.
171; Novak, pp. 261-62. In a letter to Clemenceau dated June 
20, Brockdorff-Rantzau pointed out that there were several
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many had five days to sign or the Allies would invade. The 
Delegates now had to consult their Government before a final 
decision was made, and two extra days were granted in view of 
the distance from Woimar* That evening, the German Delegation 
left Versailles in a shower of stones thrown by the local 
populace .48
Defeat in Weimar
Aboard the train, they drafted a memorandum to be 
presented to the National Assembly, recommending the rejection 
of the Treaty as it stood. The unanimous opinion of the Dele­
gation was against signing--the "revisions" were inconsequen­
tial. Nothing altered the spirit of the Treaty or alleviated 
any of the economic pressures and humiliating conditions0 The 
Delegation held that the Allies neglected to consider that the 
greatest burden would fall upon the working class, whose rights 
were ignored. Germany’s entrance into the League depended 
upon her "good conduct35 in regard to the Treaty, but that docu­
ment's impossible demands provided the Allies with the means 
of excluding Germany from the League as long as they wished.
It would be better to refuse to sign a Treaty which, in the
discrepancies in the texts of the Allied reply to the German 
counterproposals, the copy of the revised Treaty, and the Treaty 
which the Germans had received on May 7. Luckau, pp. 473-740
48Stern-Rubarth, p 0 106; Riddell, p. 92; Novak, p„ 263.
A lady secretary was hit on the head and permanently disabled. 
See Schi.ff, pp. 125-26, and New York Times, June 18, 1,919, p.
1, which has the following triple headline: "GERMANS INSIST
THEY WILL NOT SIGN; PARIS INCLINED TO BELIEVE THEY WILL; VER­
SAILLES MOB STONES DELEGATES 0
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considered opinion of the Delegation and their: experts, was 
intolerable, unf ulf illable, unjust, and dishonest, than to 
accept the impossible and then be held accountable for it.49
By this time, violence and unrest gripped the city of 
Weimar. The very night before the Delegation arrived from Ver­
sailles, an attempt, had been made to storm the Weimar Schloss 
and murder President Ebert and all the other Ministers.^8 On 
the morning of June 18, a car carrying Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dr. 
Simons, and others, made its way from the Weimar station to 
the Schloss. An armed soldier stood on either side of the 
automobile, since the possibility of assassination or a Putsch 
was very much feared by those in Weimar.8! The Foreign Minister 
soon presented the Delegation’s unanimously approved report to 
the Cabinet.
For two days that body sat in almost continuous session, 
arguing over the alternatives of signing, not signing or 
signing without accepting Articles 227-231, which was Erzber­
ger ' s i n s p i r a t i o n .52 The final Cabinet vote was so close that
4^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp. 171-82; Schiff, pp. 
139-40. _ _ _ _ _
88Erzberger, pp. 37 5-76; Noske, p. 169f.
5 LBMS, 1690H/1013/397 240.
52LUCkau? p. 106. Questioned by Noske on June 19, Hi.n= 
denburg and Groener considered military resistance on the 
western front out of the question. They finally agreed to the 
Erzberger acceptance formulae Ibid,, pp„ 110-11 . C f - Goerlitz, 
pp. 216-17.
Brockdorff-Rantzau would have nothing to do with the 
Erzberger plan. It had no prospect of success, as it attempted
to cut out Article 231, which was a cornerstone upon which the 
Treaty demands were based.
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Ebert said the decision must be referred to the National Assem­
bly. Chancellor Scheidemann1s Cabinet resigned on the 19th, 
without the Foreign Minister having a last chance to present 
his case to the National Assembly. His carefully prepared but 
undelivered speech held that the Allies would try to exact 
every tarthing it Germany signed and that they would condemn 
her as a peace breaker if, as was certain, she could not fulfil 
every condition to their satisfaction. The written speech 
ended with an appeal to the German people for one last sacri­
fice of the Great War — at stake now was peace and their own 
freedom:
Will the enemy governments really dare to commit the 
crime of shamefully humiliating and oppressing the 
German people, because they have refused to meet with 
our representatives in honest oral negotiations con­
cerning the restoration of the war damages? Will 
they commit the madness of requiring new and unpre­
dictable military burdens of their own people in 
order to extort from the German people more than the 
great offer made to them of their own free will? Well, 
in that case these peoples will not support their 
governments” demands to the bitter end; then the time 
will come, when it will be possible for peoples to 
speak to peoples and to establ.i.sh the workers 1 asso­
ciation without which the new Europe cannot arise.
The peroration alluded to the fateful hour in which Germany's
duty involved not only the German people, but all Europe. It
was now a question ofs
a world-mission which the German people is called 
upon to fulfil, but whxch it. can only fulfil if it 
does not give itself up. The German people fights 
no longer for the laurels of war, but for the vic­
tory of peaceful democratic ideals in the w o r l d . 8 3
83Stern~Rubarth, pp. 113-1.7. The text of this speech, 
found among his papers after his death in 1928, was not made 
public until then. Brockdorff-Rantzau believed, and Dr. Simons
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With this last opportunity to appeal for unity lost, the fall
of Scheidemann's Cabinet, and support crumbling away as each
hour passed, Brockdorff-Rantzau submitted his resignation to 
Ebert on June 2 0th.
President Ebert wanted the Count to reconsider his
resignation. A messenger came on the afternoon of the 20th to
ask Brockdorff-Rantzau to present his views once more, this
time to a meeting of the Minister-presidents and representatives
from the various parts of Germany. This the Count did, and his
own memorandum covering the events of that turbulent day
includes his last appeal to refuse the Treaty as it stood:
The Entente would not survive this extra stress 
/Belastunqsprobe 7  and would break up. I believe 
that after two or at most three months we could
come to oral negotiations leading to truly accept­
able conditionso To strengthen my position I read 
an expose of the situation and state of mind in the 
enemy countries. In closing I read a telegram from 
the Minister, Adolf Muller, in Bern, which ended 
with the words, "We would, by accepting the Treaty, 
not only make ourselves disliked abroad, bub con­
temptible." I closed saying that the prospect of 
being disliked did not dismay me, in any case we were 
already disliked. The limit of my attitude was our 
honor, which I had already stressed in my first 
policy speech, and I will not overstep these bounds 
under any circumstances* I have already submitted my 
resignation, but I am, ready to carry on further in 
this office if the gentlemen here will agree with my
agreed, that he and the Delegation members were prevented by the 
maneuvering of the political parties from appearing before the 
National Assembly's apparently brief meeting. BMS, 1690H/1013/ 
397 226, 249„
Brockdorff-Rantzau thought that Germany should have laid 
up supplies of coal and food after the Armistice and during the 
weeks gained by the Peace Delegation in Versailles, in order to 
be better able to wait out the hard times which would follow a 
refusal to sign. He thought a treaty imposed by actual force 
would provide Germany with a more potent legal basis for later 
rectification o See BMS, 1690H./1013/397 248, 250.
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judgment and declare for refusal /of the Treat 
I do not need to add that I intend to give myself 
over entirely to the support of this position (mit 
meiner ganzen Person ftir die Durchfuhrunq einzutreten) .
I appeal strongly to you gentlemen, in this fateful 
hour for the Reich and the German people, to: follow 
me and not deny me your c o n f i d e n c e . 54
In their policy of refusing to sign and holding out 
for a few months, Brockdorff-Rantzau and the Peace Delegation 
reckoned that disagreements among the Allies and the general 
longing for peace would lead ultimately to an acceptable nego­
tiated settlement. Months of bitter hardship might be in 
store for Germany until more just terms were evolved, but 
signing now meant the economic destruction of the country and 
enslavement of the people. Matthias Erzberger called this 
policy a "gambler's throw" (Vabanquespiel) and feared political 
dissolution of the country as its result. He urged signature 
to any terms m  preference to the horrors of military invasion.
54BMS, 169Oh/1013/397 202-03.
^Stern-Rubarth, p. 107; Novak, p. 267. Still another 
alternative to signing or not signing was the extreme, solution 
proposed by Walther Rathenau,. Writing for Zukunft on May 31, 
he said that if the Allies made no concessions. Count Brockdorff- 
Rantzau, as plenipotentiary, should hand over to the Allied 
Governments the decree of dissolution of the German National 
Assembly together with the resignations of President Ebert and 
the Cabinet, thus forcing the Allies to take over the sovereignty 
and government of Germany and the responsibility for her 60,000,- 
000 people. See Harry Graf Kessler, Walther Rathenau, Sein 
Leben und sein Werk (Eerlin-Grunewalds Hermann Klemm, 1928), p.
2 83; Eric C. Kollmann, "Walther Rathenau and German Foreign 
Policy," Journal of Modern History, XXIV (1952), 133. Other
prominent German scholars, Max Weber and Hans Delbruck* shared 
this view. See FRUS, XII, 127. Weber and Delbruck, together 
with Count Max Montgelas and Alfred Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, com­
prised the German committee to investigate the causes of the 
war's outbreak. Dr. Simons also expressed a similar thought in 
a letter on May 20, 1919s "Perhaps the one thing left is to put
Germany wholly in the hands of the League of Nations and let the
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War weariness, hunger, and chaos all sustained Erz­
berger 's acceptance plea. There were those who were glad to 
see a Foreign Minister who put dignity and ethics above poli­
tics, but as the hours ticked away, most of those who hesitated 
were swayed by Erzberger's dire predictions. For more than a 
day, Germany had no Cabinet and no Foreign Minister. In agree­
ment with their Chief, the members of the Peace Delegation and 
Dr. Simons had resigned also.
Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter of resignation as Foreign 
Minister is noteworthy, in view of Germany's ultimate accept­
ance of the Treaty. "The foreign policy which I have led," he 
wrote to Ebert on June 20,
could only depend on intellectual weapons. Through 
military defeat, political r-evolution, and the econo­
mic demands of the armistice, Germany was eliminated 
as a material power factor. Despite this, I believe 
I can say that it was possible for me to raise her 
political credit abroad.
The discussions in Weimar made it obvious, continued the Count, 
in view of the suffering of the people, that solid backing for 
his policy no longer existed. "For the present," he said, "I 
must turn back at the threshhold of success." He explained 
his view to Ebert that an official of state did not ordinarily 
have the right to refuse his cooperation whenever circumstances 
forced a change in policy, but in the case of a Foreign Mini­
ster it was different. Should he go along with such a rever-
League extract from Germany, economically, as much as they care 
to be responsible for." See Luckau, p. 122.
88Luckau, p. 109.
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sal, after publicly denouncing it, he "would endanger the dig­
nity and credit of the Reich." Germany’s world-mission was now 
to stand for democracy and social justice in the place of the 
capitalistic and imperialistic designs of the present peace 
document. "If Germany accepts the peace conditions," he con­
cluded,
the political result of this enormous sacrifice should 
be the easing of /tensions_/, . . . the withdrawal of
enemy troops, and the preparation of the way for real 
peace negotiations. This would be endangered, and per­
haps entirely in vain, if the new conditions had to be 
accepted by the same man /as Foreign Minister// who 
had opposed them so sharpTy/^
Brockdorff-Rantzau traveled almost immediately from 
Weimar to Berlin, where he put affairs at the Foreign Office in 
order after his resignation. On the third of July he left Ber­
lin and retired to Annettenhoh, his unpretentious estate in 
Schleswig. He had hoped that the days of "a scrap of paper" 
were over. in Germany’s name, he would sign "neither our 
death sentence nor the abnegation of our national honor,"88 and 
in the German Delegation’s opinion the Treaty of Versailles de­
manded Germany's public admission of war guilt and extorted 
terms ruinous to her existence. To the Allies he was the inso­
lent Hun; to many Germans the Count, remained a symbol of dig­
nity. Over the doorway of Annettenhoh, the Brockdorff coat of 
arms surmounts the plattdeutsch motto; bummer de Kopp baben"
— "Never bow your head."88
^Brockdor f f-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp. 183-86.
58Ibid., p. 135. 89Klatt, p. 14.
CHAPTER VII
AFTER THE TREATY: 1919-1922
German Acceptance of the Treaty
After the resignation on June 20, 191.9, of the Scheide-
mann Cabinet in which Brockdorff-Rantzau had been Foreign Mini­
ster, only three days remained for the German Government to 
reorganize and make its decision on the Treaty, Weimar was 
like "a madhouse" during those days. In the National Assembly 
furor mounted as the choice was weighed? it was soon only a 
matter of hours before "the enemy /would__/ march, " and politi­
cal conviction gave way before the tumult/ Opposing the Treaty, 
President Ebert had wished to resign also, but after party col­
leagues convinced him that his presence meant continuity in­
stead of complete chaos, he remained in office as the Weimar 
Government's polestar02
A new Cabinet, with former Minister of Labor Gustav 
Bauer as Chancellor, tried to accept the Treaty without the 
"points of honor," Articles 227-231, which was the formula 
devised by Erzberger and accepted by the Republic's military 
leaders. It did not work* The P a n s  Peace Conference shot
^BMS, 1691H/1013/397 240; Erzberger, Erlebnisse, pp. 
382-83. “
2Luckau, p. 108; Schiff, pp. 140-41.
^Luckau, pp. 110-11. Cahen, p. 331, says Erzberger 
claimed that Conger assured him the Allies would accept this. On
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back a reply refusing anything but unconditional acceptance of 
the complete Treaty within the next twenty-four hours. The 
possibility of German military resistance having been ruled out 
of the question on June 19, the Bauer Government could do 
nothing but yield.4
The actual affixing of signatures to the Treaty on 
Germany's behalf was done by two members of the Bauer Cabinet, 
who traveled to Versailles for that unhappy duty. Representing 
the German Republic at the famous ceremony in the Hall of 
Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles on June 28, 1919, were
Social Democrat Hermann Muller, who was now the new Foreign 
Minister, and Catholic Centrist Dr. Johannes Bell.
In Paris, Colonel House had noted on June 2 3 that Ger­
many's "signified intention of sending only one /sic_/ unimpor­
tant and unknown representative here to sign is indicative of 
temper and unreliability . . . "  But five days later, House
wrote of the Hall of Mirrors ceremony;
When the Germans had signed and the great Allied 
Powers had done so, the cannons began to boom. I had 
a feeling of sympathy for the Germans who sat there 
quite stoically. It was not unlike what was done in 
olden times, when the conqueror dragged the conquered 
at his chariot wheels. To my mind it is out of keeping 
with the new era which we profess an ardent desire to
June 3, Erzberger had said vividly; "Suppose someone tied my 
arms and placed a loaded pistol against my chest, and asked me 
to sign a paper obligating me to climb to the moon within 48 
hours. As a thinking man I would sign to save my life, but would 
say openly that the demand simply could not be fulfilled." Ep­
stein, p. 318.
4with but two hours to spare, the Bauer Government tele­
graphed to Clemenceau: "Yielding to overpowering might, /the
German Republic accepts__/ the peace treaty imposed by ±Jie Allied 
and Associated governments. But in so doing /Germany/ in no 
wise abandons its conviction that these conditions of peace rep­
resent an injustice without example." Luckau, p. 112.
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promote. I wish it could have been more simple and 
that there might have been an element of chivalry, 
which was wholly lacking. The affair was elaborately 
staged and made as humiliating as it well could b e .^
In her memoirs twenty years later, President Wilson's widow
recalled some frivolous, but interesting, impressions of that
tense scene;
Then fell a silence, broken at length by the sound 
of footsteps as the German signatories were conducted 
to their place. . . . They seemed embarrassed and
ill at ease, and were uniformly stolid, uninterest­
ing- looking men, I  could not help feeling had I  
been sending men, 1 would have selected more impres- 
sive-looking ones. They reminded me of prisoners 
before the bar of justice <.6
Germany was the first nation to ratify the Treaty of
Versailles. In the National Assembly on July 9, 1919, the
action passed by a vote of 208 to 115, with 99 deputies ab- 
7staining. The same day, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, at his desk 
at Annettenhoh, wrote:
The whole work of the /German Peace__7 Delegation was 
directed toward improving the draft Treaty and then 
to sign /TtJ7 . . . «,
But now that the representatives of Germany . „ „
have signed the Peace, and ratification is imminent, 
now we must not allow the suspicion to arise that
5House Papers, IV, 484, 487 . House 8s first observation 
was probably influenced by the scuttling of the German fleet., 
interned at Scapa Flow, on June 21st.
6Edith Bolling ^/SaltJ7 Wilson, My Memoir (Indianapolis; 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co,, 1939), p. 269. After the ceremony, 
Muller suffered a nervous collapse in his hotel room. See 
Schiff, p. 171.
^Literary Digest History of the World War, X, 350.
This was done even before the~NaO'ona1 Assembly ratified the 
German Constitution on July 31, 1.91.9.
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Germany signed the Peace in order to sabotage it 
later through secret dealings. Where it is unful- 
fillable must be proved to the other side.
Now that the Treaty was an obligation accepted by the Republic,
he advocated a new post-Versailles rationale for Germany. As
the embodiment of resistance to the Treaty, he felt that he
must remain in the background. His version of Erfill lung spoil-
tik was intended to demonstrate the economic impossibility of
the treaty conditions, leading eventually to more realistic
negotiations. But his original stand against the Treaty had
rested upon what he thought was much firmer ground. Had the
Treaty been imposed upon Germany by the Allies with actual
military force, the judicial case for ultimate revision of the
harshest and most humiliating terms would have been much
stronger than under the existing circumstances whereby Germany
had accepted the Treaty under the mere threat of force.9
While still in Versailles at the end of May, the Count 
had made a portentious statement to the press at the end of 
the same interview in which he characterized the new economic 
"Einkreisungspolitik" against Germany, as revealed in the 
Treaty;
Among the economic experts of our opponents, the 
socializing of economic life ought to be compared 
with the now destroyed Prussian militarism. , . .
a danger to world peace could develop if a nation­
alistic socialism were to replace a nationalistic
^Brockdortf-Rantzau, Dokumente und Gedanken, pp. 125- 
26; Rosenbaum, p. 13.
9BMS, 169l.H/1013/397 250.
1.36
capitalism; if nationalism, organized down to the 
finest detail, were to manifest itself as a weapon, 
as an army.
Each force generates a counter“force. . . „
He carried this argument further by prognosticating that ag­
gressive nationalistic socialism in Germany would represent a 
threat to the capitalist structure of England and the United 
States. Yet the threat of latent militarism in a national 
socialist society "organized down to the last detail" is here 
the salient thought.
Brockdorff-Rantzau1s Retirement
The German Republic's whole struggle for existence 
after November, 1918, together with the humiliations and frus­
trations of Versailles and the mental travail under pressure 
of time, had worn down the Count’s health and strained his 
nerves to the lim.it. From the standpoint of his own health 
and personal affairs, both of which he had necessarily neglec­
ted for many months, he needed a period of recovery at Annet­
tenhoh. The first weeks at home were difficult? he brooded 
over past events and Germany's uncertain future, and suffered 
from insomnia at this time. Letters and expressions of con­
gratulation and approval arrived daily, but in August he wrote 
to Dr. Simons that?
. . . here in solitude I am often overcome with
very bitter moods, especially since /the departure 
of_7 my brother, whose efforts to distract me were
^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp. 148-49. See 
Chapter VI, p. 113, supra„
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touching. The thought, to have been so near to 
success and have to give way to stupidity and 
vileness gnaws at me more than I care to admit
He continued to lead a secluded life, writing articles, but he
kept in touch with important, events and persons in German
politics by occasional visits to Berlin where he would stay at
his twin brother's house in the Viktoriastrasse.
The Republic wished to avail itself of Brockdor ff™ 
Rantzau's service and authority after Versailles. The rela­
tionship between him and President. Ebert continued to be one 
of mutual respect and confidence. Ebert soon offered the Count 
the post of Ambassador in Vienna, but he declined it. He later 
refused similar positions in Rome and Madrid.3-3 After the 
frightening rightist-military Kapp Putsch in March, 1920, Ebert 
asked Brockdorff-Rantzau to become Foreign Minister again, 
which Ebert thought would strengthen the government's flagging 
domestic authority. Turning this offer down, the Count ex­
plained he knew the results of feelers in London about his 
taking that office again. Lord Hardinge of the British Foreign 
Office had told the German Ambassador in London, Dr. Friedrich 
Sthamer, that it would be regarded as an "unfriendly" act.
The Count also knew "that the French would move Heaven and Hell 
to obstruct my appointment."33
33BMS, 1691H/1013/397 256, 259. Cf. Rosenbaum, p. 13.
3^BMS, 1691H./1013/397 264; Stern-Rubarth, p. 123.
13BMS, 1691H/1013/397 267, 269. Earlier that month 
Brockdorff-Rantzau had declined the same offer because he con­
sidered the Bauer Cabinet "transitional."
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After the adoption of the Republic’s new Constitution, 
the possibility of a presidential election arose in January,
1920, since Ebert had been elected by the National Assembly, 
not the people. The Democrats sought Brockdorff-Rantzau as their
^candidate, but he declined, although he appreciated this honor.
"The Social Democrats will want to put up their own candidate
doubtlessly," he said, and he did not want to run against 
14Ebert. n o  election was held; the National Assembly decided 
that Ebert should complete the five year presidential, term, 
Brockdorff-Rantzau retained only his position as Chairman of 
the Red Cross Central Committee and the welfare positions re­
lated to it, which he had taken on as Foreign Minister, This, 
however, could always be a clever means of engaging in polit­
ically "unofficial" missions, if such occasions arose.33
Brockdorff-Rantzau had written a memorandum on his 
meeting with Ebert right after his resignation as Foreign Mini­
ster in 1919, Ebert had praised his stand in Versailles, 
saying it "would later be fully appreciated by history." The 
Count then took his leave, explaining, according to his memor­
andum, "that I did not have the intention of withdrawing from, 
political life and was ready, whenever the Reichspresident 
believed he had a mission for me, to place myself at his dis­
posal." Yet he had been reluctant to accept any of the posts
34BMS, 1691H/1013/397 274.
15BMS, 1691H/1013/397 263, 3070 Rosenbaum, p. 20f dis­
cusses a talk between Brockdorff-Rantzau and Ebert on April 25,
1921, when the Count said he "would be willing to go to Moscow, 
as a prominent member of the Red Cross, to ascertain whether it 
was possible to resume relations."
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offered in the next, year and a half. In March, 1920, the 
Count explained to Ebert his current views on re-entering 
political life. A difficult job, he said, would never deter 
him: this he had proved i.n December, 1918. But now, he added,
"I have decided, after the part I played at Versailles, which 
was tragic but at least not insignificant, to accept only a 
post in which I would be inwardly convinced that I could accom­
plish something positive."36
At Annettenhoh the Count wrote a defense of his Ver­
sailles policy, and the resulting volume, Dokumente, appeared 
in two editions, in 1920 and 192 2. As the name implies, the 
work is a chronological presentation of documents, interviews, 
and statements from the time of his appointment as Foreign 
Minister to the fall of Scheidemann's Cabinet and his own 
resignation. The commentary extends into the years immediately 
following. "Documents," he concluded, "should speak for them­
selves. The less they require commentary, the more convincing 
they are. . . . /Readers cannot deny that_7 my policy was con-
s istent."3^
In the summer of 1920 and the first two months of 1921 
numerous conferences took place attempting to implement the 
various clauses of the Treaty and solve the many problems pla­
guing Europe after the war. So far, an acceptable reparations
36BMS, 1691H/1013/397 267, 397, 333-339,* Rosenbaum, p. 15
3^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, p. 187. The second 
edition had the same title, and a third edition, Dokumente und 
Gedanken urn Versailles, with much additional commentary by the 
Count, appeared in 1925.
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figure eluded statesmen and experts, while bitterness on all 
sides increased., A meeting in Paris in February, 1921, eventu­
ally placed Germany8s debt at 226 milliard gold marks. All the 
old arguments against the German Delegation's offer of 100 mil­
liard gol4 marks in 19.19 were brought up again.
From Annettenhoh emanated more trenchant remarks during 
the 1921 Paris Conference. The 100 milliard offer at Ver­
sailles, wrote the Count, had been attacked at the same time 
as an attempt to becloud the issue by mixing ^/erquickung) the 
questions of reparations, economic clauses, and the determina­
tion of German borders all together. On February 12, 1921,
he wrote bitterly of the opportunity which had been missed in 
May and June of 1919:
At that time the German Peace Delegation in Versailles 
actually represented the honest desire of more than 
three-fourths of the German people for voluntary rep­
aration and disarmament. The Allies had the best op­
portunity to come to an honest understanding with the 
German republican parties. They willfully scorned 
this possibility. They preferred the Versailles 
Treaty and this drove great masses of the German peo­
ple into the arms of the extremist, parties. Today it 
will be very much harder to win the millions, who 
have defected to nationalism or communism, over to a 
policy of voluntary sacrifice and a sincere desire 
for understanding„
The entire article of February 12 is a classic example of Brock
dorff-Rantzau's sarcasm and penetrating commentary.
^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente und Gedanken, p. 134; 
Stern-Rubarth, pp. 121-22.
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Germany was invited to send delegates to a conference 
in London at the beginning of March, 1921, in order that the 
Paris plan might be put into effect <> There the Count's friend 
and associate at Versailles, Dr. Walter Simons, who had been 
German Foreign Minister for almost a year, protested Germany0s 
inability to pay the 226 milliard decided upon in Paris. De­
tails given in newspaper accounts suggest that it was almost 
Versailles all over again. The German Delegation encountered 
hostility upon arriving in London, and Dr. Simons delivered an 
ill-received speech on the first of March, offering to pay a 
total of 50 milliard.^ Indeed, the London Morning Post 
averred that "Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, in his insolence and 
arrogance at Versailles, did much to stiffen the Allied yraver- 
ers, but Dr. Simons in London has outdone even that supercil­
ious and unbending protege of Potsdam."20 Blaming Germany for 
the war, France and Britain refused to consider the German case
The New York. Times, March 1, p. 1, related how the 
railway porters refused to carry the Germans 8 luggage, and how 
"at the /savoy_7 hotel the Germans met with equal coldness from 
the servants and generally their reception was formal."
On March 8 , the New York Times, p. 1, mentioned General 
von Seeckt's presence ’in~ful1 Prussfan uniform," which certainly 
didn't help matters.
2 0As reported in the New York Times, March 3, 1921, p. 2.
See also Eyck, I, 17 7. Dr. Simons actually offered only thirty 
milliard, maintaining that twenty milliard had already been paid 
in kind. This was extremely irritating to the statesmen of the 
former Allied nations. Ibid., pp. 174-75.
Lloyd George's reaction was reminiscent of Wilson on 
May 7, 1919. After Dr. Simons's speech he said to Lord Riddells 
"What a people they are! They always do the wrong thing! Their 
proposals are absurd. They have done their best to alienate the 
sympathies of those who were in favour of moderation. We are 
not going to be jack-booted by the Germans!" Riddell, p. 282.
C f . Introduction, p. 4, supra.
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or modify their demands. Dr. Simons left London with the famil­
iar words of May and June, 1919s "There is only one way to ar­
range our difficulties--by conference."2^
Since Germany had failed to accept the Paris sum by the 
March 7th deadline, France marched troops into Dusseldorf, Duis­
burg, and Ruhrort the following day. in April, Dr. Simons ap­
pealed to the new President of the United States, Warren G. Hard 
ing, to be an impartial mediator on the reparations question, 
but Harding agreed only to transmit information regarding any 
new German proposals. At the beginning of May the President 
rejected the revised German figures as insufficient, leaving no 
doubt that America would not oppose the Allies on the question 
of r e p a r a t i o n s . 22 Meanwhile Germany was experiencing early indi 
cations of the economic distress which led" to inflation and the 
downward plunge of the mark in 1922 and 1923.
The aftermath of the London Conference was a reparations 
figure of 132 milliard gold marks, served upon Germany as a sec­
ond ultimatum on May 6, with no economic restrictions removed, 
Germany was given six days to accept it or the Ruhr would be occu­
pied. Once again, as at Weimar in .1919, a new Government had 
to be formed for the purpose of acceding to the Allied demands.
^ N e w  York Times, March 9, 19 21, p. 1. Before leaving
for London” Dr. Simons had given a very moving speech in Ger­
many, promising "never to give in to the impossible " New 
York Times, March 25, 1921, p. 3.
22Erich Eyck, I, pp. 172-79, presents a good assessment
of the pressures on Simons from all sides and concludes that
"the Allies assembled at the London Conference regarded Simons 
in a much less favorable light than his ethics and his politics 
deserved."
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Cn the occasion of President. Harding's inauguration 
during the course of the conference in London, Brockdorff-Rant- 
zau pondered over what the future held for Germany and wrote 
his impressions 2
I don’t believe in miracles in politics„ But I 
believe in justice and understanding. . „ . No reason­
able person in Germany expects that the new president 
will, pursue a policy that is not in the interest of 
the United States„ But the interests of America em­
brace the entire world,, The United States has a 
world-mission 7* it is called upon, after having decided 
the outcome of the war, to give the world peace again.
. . . Mr, Earding has indeed not presented fourteen
points to the world as did Mr, Wilson, We do not know/ 
what he intends, but we have faith that he will up- 
hold what he has promised. Justice and understanding 
implies a program worthy of the leader of the might­
iest nation, and I am sure, that the realization of 
these two points will bring greater blessings than 
fourteen points that were not carried out.
The rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the United 
States Senate in March, 1920, and the election of Harding, who 
seemed to be Woodrow Wilson’s antithesis, indicated that Amer­
ica's post-war desire was to disentangle herself from the web 
of Europe 3s problems. This suggested the possibility of 
changes in the Germ.an-Ameri.can relationship and might even have 
been an opportunity promising enough to induce Brockdorff-Rant- 
zau to come out of. retirement.. At the beginning of 1921, he 
was alleged to be among the candidates being considered for
2 3grockdorff-'Rantzau, Dokumente und Gedanken, p. 201. 
Harding gave his inaugural address on March 4, 1.92.1« In his 
commentary, Brockdorff-Rantzau refers to the two points
"Recht und Vernunft„" Harding’s speech includes both terms
(rendered here as "justice and understanding") singly through­
out the speech. See U„S„, Senate, 67th Cong.,, Special Sess.,
S o D . 1 , 1921 , p p c. 4-6, passim.
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the future post of German Ambassador in Washington, D „ C . ^  But 
the very real, question of his acceptability in Washington never 
arose, because his interests and energy were directed strongly 
eastward after the events of early 1921.
The Road to Moscow 
Because of Germany's location between East and West, 
the German relationship with Russia had always been one of the 
Count's primary considerations. He was a follower of the old- 
time Bismarckian tradition of insuring Russian friendship. All 
during the first half of 1919, Brockdorff-Rantzau had sought to 
keep a way open to the East while working toward a peace settle-
New York Times, February 17, 1.921, p. 5. This article 
said in pa r t, " B r oc kdor: ff-Rantzau visited Berlin recently, it
is stated, for the express purpose of urging his own candidacy.
He is believed to have the support of the Centrists and Demo­
crats, and possibly eventually that of the Socialists, and may 
be regarded as having the best chance, unless, for reasons not 
yet apparent some outsider should be appointed." Other candi­
dates mentioned were % von Haniel, Dr, Albert, Admiral von Hintze, 
and Maximilian Harden,
After a separate Treaty between the United States and 
Germany in August, 1921, restored diplomatic relations, the 
post of German Ambassador in Washington was given in May, 1922, 
to Otto Ludwig Wiedfeldt, "a board member of the Krupp works." 
Holborn, "Diplomats," p, 1.53. Wiedfeldt had also been Chair­
man of the Economics Commission of the German Delegation, at 
Versailles„ Luckau, pp„ 60, 190, 192,
Brockdorff-Ra.ntzau 1 s lack of English would certainly 
have been a major obstacle if there was any truth in the 
allegation that he was on the list, of candidates. Bernstorff, 
in My Three Years in America, pp. 18-19, observed that "The 
English language exercis*es_rfore absolute power in the United 
States than even in England itself. . . .it would never occur
to any diplomat in Washington to transact his business in any 
other language than English . . . ”
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ment with the western powers .^5 He feared a premature commit.” 
ment to either the western powers or Soviet Russia after the 
war's e n d « 2 6  Germany, he wrote, needed to defend herself 
against Bolshevism, "an overpowerful Russia," and Poland. Re­
alizing the dangers inherent in the now explosive Polish ques­
tion, he recommended in a policy memorandum the establishment 
of "neighborly relationships" and the "creation of an economic 
field of activity, without revealing whether both of these pro­
gram points concern Russia or the eastern countries in g.ent­
eral „ "27
The Count had hoped that the very real Bolshevist 
threat to Germany could be used to advantage since the Allies 
had a vested interest in making peace with a non-Bolshevik 
Germany if they expected to collect extensive reparations. But 
the negotiated settlement for which he strove never material­
ized. The Versailles terms, plus the London ultimatums, con-
0 RBefore the war ended, Brockdorff-Rantzau urged that 
Germany conclude a peace with Russia "that would leave no bit­
terness on either side," instead of harsh demands such as 
those of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. "Nachlass B-R," 9101E/ 
3439/H232 315; BMS, 1689H/1012/396 927 and 1690H/1013/396 941. 
See also Chapter II, p„ 37, supra
^"Nachlass B-R, " Memorandum of April 4, 1919, 9.105H/
3443/H235 186-89; and Brockdorff-Rantzau to Langwerth, May 3, 
1919, 9.105H/344.3/H235 264-65.
^ S e e  undated memorandum, by Brockdorff-Rantzau, "Nach­
lass B-R," 9105K/3443/H235 177. Herbert Helbig, p. 21, says 
this memorandum was written sometime before May 7, 1919. It 
ends with a paragraph which bears this out; "It must be recog­
nized that the general lines which Germany must follow in or­
der to reach these goals are difficult to outline, because of 
the indistinctness of the relationships in the East, and in 
view of our own uncertain situation, and finally because of the 
vacillating decisions on the side of the Entente."
146
vinced Brockdorff-Rantzau that the only way to combat, the 
Vernichtunqswi 1 len and what he termed f'Erpresserpolit.iki; of the
-------------------------------------------------------------^  —r.- Hill ........  I ■ ’* 1 T T  HUB ■
Entente powers would be to establish better relations with 
Soviet Russia Opinion was divided, but certain members of the 
Foreign Off ice, and General von Seec kt, also thought this might 
be mutually advantageouso23
the Allies were not unmindful of the Russian problem, 
either„ International conferences continued with the purpose 
of establishing the bases of European peace, After the Wash­
ington Disarmament Conference at the end of .1.921, the European 
powers discussed the world's financial problems at Cannes, 
France, in 1922, and then met again in Genoa, Italy, in April. 
The Genoa Conference, which German representatives also at­
tended, sought to resolve the economic questions and the tick­
lish problem of relations with Soviet Russia, represented 
there by the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgi V. Chicherin.
The Germans feared that the French would work, toward a 
rapprochernenf with Russia by offering her the Russian share of 
German reparations under Article 116 of the Treaty of Ver­
sailles on the other hand, the Russians had long sought
official German recognition of the Soviet regime to forestall 
any danger of Germany -s participation in counter-revolutionary
23BMS, 1691H/.L013/397 291.-97; Eyck, I, 169-70, 204-07; 
Rosenbaum, pp.. 1.3-21 <, Brockdor ff-Rantzau thought in terms of 
economic and commercial, ties, not military collaboration or an 
alliance
29EM:S g 169iK/1013/397 3.1.7 ; Bliicher , pp.. 154, 160-6.1;
Rosenbaurn, p * 26,
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movements. 30 Less than a week after the Genoa Conference 
opened, Soviet Russia and Germany carried the results of dis­
cussions earlier in the year to fruition., Represented by their 
Foreign Ministers, Chicherin and Walter Rathenau, the two 
countries signed a treaty at nearby Rapallo, mutually renounc­
ing war damages and officially restoring diplomatic relations.,
Needless to say, the former western Allies became 
alarmed at the .Rapallo event. BrockdOrff-Rantzau was disturbed 
also, because of the flagrantly 111.1 loyal.I! appearance it gave 
Germany in western eyes. He had long favored a German-Soviet 
rapprochement, but not in this open and brazen manner. The 
proper time for it in his opinion had been missed--right after 
the London ui t.imaturns . 31 Brandenburg described the Genoa Con­
ference as "the first time that Germany appeared at an inter­
national meeting as an equal participant„ At all previous con­
ferences, she was treated as the accused, the defaulting 
debtoro"32 Talking with Ebert a month after Rapallo, .Brock­
dor ff-Rantzau put it much more succinctly. In a rather tele­
graphic memorandum of this meeting on May 10, he wrote of the 
Rapallo Treaty?
Will net criticize, do not know what I myself would 
have done0 Believe in any case, I would not have 
allowed myself to depart from, a line of action once 
taken c, Appears to me, no politique was evolved in
3®Eyck, I, 2 04-05.
3 : BM3, 169.1H/1013/397 317 -21; Rosenbaum , pp, 19, 26, 30.
3 23MS, 16 91H/1013/3 9 7 317,
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Genoa, rather, things were handled rashly. It is 
clear that Erf til lungs men like Rathenau and /chan- 
cel.lor_7 Wi.rth brought the whole so-called trust 
of us by the Entente into question because of the 
Rapallo Treatyo We were actually invited for the 
first time on an equal, basis and behaved ourselves 
like a "man who spits on the c a r p e t . 33
Although Brockdorff—R.antzau referred many times to the 
Treaty of Rapallo as a liability, or “burden" for Germany, he 
revealed to Ebert that “despite this, the Rapallo Treaty can 
signify a turning point in our policy, and we must take our 
stand, when it is ratified, upon the slippery ground of given 
factso"34 jjow that Rapallo was a fait accompli, the possibil­
ity of 'accomplishing something positive" had materialized.
The Count wanted to be offered the post of first German Ambas­
sador to Soviet Russia, believing he could manage and maintain 
such a delicate relationship to Germany’s advantage. President. 
Ebert, whose confidence in Brockdorff-Rantzau never waned, sup­
ported his candidacy for Ambassador in Moscow, although others, 
such as Chancellor Joseph W.i.rth and General von Seeckt., vigor­
ously opposed it at first.-. The whole story of the battle over 
Brockdor ff-Rantzau ' s appo.rnt.ment is brilliantly portrayed by
D r = Rosenbaum.35
^BMS, 1691H./1013/397 333 Cf_, Rosenbaum, p. 3Ct,
34BM.S, 16919/1013/397 321, 333, 353, 392, 398..
General von Seeckt. feared that Brockdorff-Rantzau 
would not countenance secret military collaboration between 
Germany and Soviet Russia. Wirth had hesitated because of 
rumors about the Count’s eccentric habits '-'nocturnal working 
hours, extreme nervousness, cognac drinking, and the unfounded 
rumor that he was a morphine addict., See B.M.S* 1691H/1013/397 
386, and Rosenbaum., Chapter I, “From. Brest-Litovsk to Rapallo," 
pp. 26-48.
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On their part, the Soviets actually preferred to deal 
with ''conservative professional diplomats“ instead of a Social 
Democratic representative of Germany, Indeed, they were not 
averse to welcoming ul!a member of the high nobility „ "^6 Brock- 
dorff“Rantzau served in this capacity from autumn of 1922 
until his death six years later. "I believe," he had said pre­
viously, “that the disaster of Versailles can be corrected from 
M o s c o w . "37 H j_s  experience and tactics in Copenhagen offer many 
parallels with his later policies in Moscow.
36'Eyck, I, 205; Biticher, p. 149; George W„F. Hallgarten, 
“General Hans von Seeckt and Russia 1920-1922," Journal of 
Modern History, XXI (March, 1949), 32.
o n
' 8tern.~R.ubar th, p. 123.
CHAPTER VIII
RETROSPECT t BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU AT VERSAILLES
The Allied Attitude
After a war of unprecedented size and involvement, one 
would expect an unprecedented peace. A peace, however, based 
wholly and amicably upon political and economic precepts such 
as President Wilson's Fourteen Points embodied, would indeed 
have been an innovation in the history of international rela­
tions. Instead, the "Book" presented to the German Delegation 
at Versailles on May 7, 1919, was a harsh document of 440
Articles— the result of war-engendered hatred and four months 
of disagreement among the Allied and Associated Powers, finally 
molded into tangible form by the arduous toil of the various 
drafting committees.
The chief representatives at the Peace Conference were 
admittedly in Paris to punish Germany; in the words of Profes­
sor Shotwell, "it was fear of political opposition back home 
which more than any other influence prevented the statesmen in 
Paris from recasting, in part at least, the terms of the 
Treaty."^ other writers speak of Europe's dread of facing the
!James T. Shotwell, What Germany Forgot (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1940), pp. 84-85. Clemenceau's government fell 
in 1920 because he had not engineered a harsher treaty or suc­
ceeded in obtaining sufficient guarantees against future German 
aggression.
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post-war economic problems without American help. It was 
largely due to this apprehension that the League Covenant was 
made an integral part of the Treaty as Wilson insisted, while 
Wilson eventually agreed to certain demands of the others, 
devoutly hoping that the millenium promised by the concept of 
the League of Nations would offer an ultimate means of solution 
for present and future international problems,2
The finished text of the Treaty, kept strictly secret 
until just a few hours before its presentation to the Germans, 
prompted outspoken criticism from prominent American and Brit­
ish Delegates in Paris, among them Herbert Hoover, General 
Tasker H. Bliss, Robert Lansing, Colonel House, Bernard Baruch, 
John Foster Dulles, John Maynard Keynes, General Jan Christian 
Smuts, and Harold Nicolson. Hoover's story of a preoccupied 
stroll at dawn on May 7th is often mentioned in memoirs and 
histories of the Peace Conference. Meditating unhappily about 
the final form, of the Treaty, a copy of which he had just 
received and read, Hoover met Smuts and Keynes, both equally 
depressed and worried. "We agreed," wrote Hoover, "that it was 
terrible and we would do what we could among our own nationals 
to make the danger clear."3
3m  Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, p. 180, Thomas 
A. Bailey has characterized Clemenceau's agreement to the 
League Covenant as a part of the Treaty of Versailles as an 
attempt to "humor a rich uncle."
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Hoover, Memoirs, I, 461-62. In his Diary, Lord Rid­
dell quotes Lloyd George’s Secretary, Philip Kerr, who said on 
June 3, 1919; "It is most desirable that the Press should not
comment upon the attitude of the British Delegation in refer­
ence to German concessions." The next day Kerr told Riddell
1.52
How did the Treaty of Versailles becone the rigid docu­
ment upon which Wilson's mind "closed with a snap"? Many his­
torians and diarists reveal that the concept of a "preliminary 
treaty" to be negotiated instead of imposed, existed as the 
Peace Conference convened, and Wilson himself still considered 
this in jnid-Marcho Harold Nicolson of the British Delegation 
has described the process of "drift" from a preliminary to a 
final text. He wrote that "subconsciously we thought in terms 
of a 'Conference' of Allies, followed bv a "Congress' of all 
belligerents and neutrals," As the technical clauses in each 
article of the Treaty were laboriously drafted, "the conception 
of a Preliminary Treaty merged gradually into the conception of 
one final Treaty covering the whole,. "4
Many agreed at the time that Paris, the capital of 
justified war hatred, was not the place for the .peace Conference 
to be held. Germany's first thought i.n September, 1918, was 
that President Wilson should "call a peace conference at Wash­
ington, at the same time asking for an immediate cessation of 
hostilitieso"  ^ Other possible locations included Brussels, 
Lausanne, The Hague, and Geneva.^
that "Smuts is very weak on the Peace Terms. 0 » He is 0 » „
so obsessed with the necessity for making concessions that the 
effect is a pro-German attitude." Riddell, pp. 85-86.,
^Nicolson, pp. 96, 98-99. See also Shotwell, At the 
Paris Peace Conference, pp. 38-39.
Spreliminary History of the Armistice, p. 6., This 
appears in a dispatch from Foreign Secretary-von Hi.nt.ze to the 
Foreign Office, September 29, 191.8 u
^Nicolson, pp. 76-77 o Ni.cc.lson writes that Wilson un­
accountably ruled out Geneva as "saturated with every poisonous 
element and open to every hostile influence."
153
The press, as the only means of penetrating the secrecy 
and censorship of the Conference, trafficked in hearsay and 
conjecture, when nothing more reliable could be found. As the 
Conference continued and bitter arguments developed, almost no 
one was spared vilification« Wrote Harold Nicolson as early 
as February 11th: "A dreadful attack on Wilson yesterday in
the 1 Figaro. 1 I hear he is furious and threatens to transfer 
the Conference to Geneva. It would be a good thing if he did.n/ 
Lloyd George and Clemenceau did not escape severe criticism, 
either. And when the French newspapers turned their fire on 
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and the German Delegation there were 
no restraints. There was no fear of contradictory material, 
for the Germans could make no public reply in the press.
Little truthful information regarding the German Delegation 
was available, and had there been more, it would doubtless 
have been ignored or slanted to suit the overwhelming anti- 
German attitude fostered by the most influential sector of the 
French press.®
The German Republic fared no better than its Peace 
Delegation at the hands of the French. The British and Ameri­
can Governments had received, from their Ministers in Holland, 
Denmark, and Switzerland and their missions into Germany at
^Ibid., p. 261. A good description of the secrecy and 
censorship of the Paris Peace conference is found in E,J. Dillon, 
The Inside Story of the Peace Conference (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1920), pp. 117-35.
®One of the finest treatments of this aspect of the
Peace Conference is George Bernard Noble, Policies and Opinions
at Paris, 1919. See especially Chapter X, "Peace Conditions
and the Treaty," pp. 353-88. Only the left wing papers admitted 
any validity of the German position.
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the close of the war, frequent advice to accept and encourage 
the leaders of the Republic in view of the collapse of the 
Empire and the desperate internal conditions within Germany. 
But the French politicians and press scorned the who!e idea 
of German "democracy"--it. was a bluff, a subterfuge, a shame- 
less fraud.^
Indeed, when only outward appearances counted, "in 
Brockdorff-Rantzau the young German Republic had picked the 
worst possible representative0 Though he undoubtedly was an 
able man, he was the very image of the Prussian Junker as 
depicted in Punch.n10 Completely unaware of Brockdorff-Rant­
zau 8 s more Danish than Prussian background, his past record 
of independent views, his liberal and anti-militaristic 
leanings, the Allied leaders saw only the arrogant, high- 
collared Junker. "Ramrod straight, abrupt in speech and man­
ner, stern and, at the moment, overflowing with hatred and 
frustration, his very presence seemed to link the German 
Republic with the authoritarian Imperial Reich .the Allies had
g
Writing m  1930, Clemenceau spoke of the new German 
Government and its representatives at Versailles; "I was not 
sufficiently well acquainted with the people we had to deal 
with. Later on, when at Versailles Brockdorff-Rantzau addressed 
me in the language of the bearer of a challenge, I was forced 
to realize that the German Revolution was mere window-dressing, 
and that, with the aggressor of 1914 not a whit cured of his 
insane folly, we should continue without,respite to be sub­
jected, in a new setting, to the same attack from the same 
enemy." Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, 
tr . FoMo Atkinson (New York; Harcourt., Brace and Co., 1930), 
p. 106.
lOFerdinand Czernin, Versailles. 1919 (New York; G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1964), p. 339. Cf„ Cahdn, p. 136.
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been f ighting0n 1  ^ Ferdinand Czernin, son of the last Austro- 
Hungarian Foreign Minister, has said it well in his recent, 
book, Versailles, 1919, Commenting in his Diary that Brock­
dor ff-Rantzau appeared to be ill and under a great nervous 
strain on May 7th, Lord Riddell continued his first visual 
impressions of the Count; "He strikes one as a stiff, precise, 
industrious, mechanical., tactless sort of m a n  ."12
Brockdorff-Rantzau c s Qualifications
This, then, is the heart of the matter. BrOckdorff- 
Rantzau met the peculiar qualifications of Germany in her hour 
of need at the end of the war from the German standpoint only. 
Although his appearance and demeanor were automatically mis­
understood by the Allies, he was a high-ranking, professional 
diplomat who had broken with the old regime. Describing him­
self often as "an optimist with faith in the future of the 
German people," he looked toward Germany's resurgence through 
democracy and economic recovery and was determined to secure 
that chance for his country. He was a diplomat of the old re­
gime, but unsoiled with the planning and intensification, of 
the Empire’s war policies„ Never a sycophant at the Court of 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, Brockdorff-Rantzau was actually disliked
1 1Ibid. Actually, his posture is usually described as 
"a little stooping„" See, for instance, Bonn, p. 228. He often 
leaned on his ebony walking stick, and the occasional limp was 
probably due to a riding accident in his youth. G f . Stern- 
Rubarth, p. 35.,
- ^ R i d d e l l ,  p c 71• see the preceding part of Riddell's 
comment in Ch. y, supra, p. 100„
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by the military, the Pan-Germans, and most conservatives. He 
was affiliated with no political party,, but actively willing 
to back the Social Democrats and the Weimar Coalition after 
the war. As a result of his connection with the German Repub­
lic he became estranged from many of his social class, including
1 o
members of his own family^
Though they tried it,, the Count was a man that the 
German Generals and Admirals could not push around or manage, 
Well before the war's end he had criticized Ludendorff to his 
face and opposed the Admiralty on many occasions. Brockdorff- 
Rantzau did not accept the military's "stab-in-the-back" accus­
ation against the post-war civilian government-. He repudiated 
this "DoIchstosslegende1 on the evening of April 4, 1919, when
he said to General Groener that "the disaster which has broken 
over Germany originated with the Army; it was there that the 
collapse took place." Groener, although he cooperated with 
the Republican Government, of course maintained the opposite 
view that the military collapse was a result of happenings on 
the home front
Pelvis, 1961H./.1013/397 386. There is a story, possibly 
apocryphal but very much in character, that after the war the 
Count had been asked by members of the Brockdorff family to 
give up that name. Brockdorff-Rantzau is said to have answered 
that the Rantzaus had already requested that he no longer use 
the name of Rantzau. "What should I call myself, then," asked 
the Red Count-, "Perhaps Graf Bi.ndest.rlch?" The hyphen was all 
that was left. Klatt, p. 28,
14”Nachl.ass B-R,” 9105H./3441/H234 212.
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The Count's disagreement with General Groener was 
relatively minor, but his feuds with Generals von Seeckt and 
Ludendorff lasted for years. At Versailles, Seeckt had openly 
accused Brockdorff-Rantzau of sacrificing Germany's national 
honor by denouncing German militarism in his support of the 
Republic and his refusal to press for a German Army far in 
excess of the 100,000 men permitted under the Treaty- On the 
26th of May, 1919, General von Seeckt wrote a letter to this 
effect, sending copies of it to the Count, the other German 
Delegates, and to Weimar- "Since your Excellency has not con­
sidered it necessary," Seeckt flung at Brockdorff-Rantzau,
to seek the advice of the military experts in these 
military matters, j must conclude that only pure 
political considerations have determined the stand 
of the Delegation. . . . I consider myself duty-bound
and justified to speak out that Germany has, through 
this act of disarming brought about by political judg­
ments of the moment, sacrificed her last and highest 
possession, her national honor.15
For the Count it must have been a tremendous inner struggle to 
retain his temper, but he was determined to allow no indica­
tions of discord and animosity among members of the German 
Delegation to reach the ears of the A l l i e s I n s t e a d ,  the 
Delegation voted unanimously to remove Seeckt from the mili­
tary commission present at Versailles and the Count made
^Rabenau, p- 1.78 „
^ I b i d . C f . Ch - V, supra» p. 90 and p., 9.1n, where 
Dr. Simons referred to the "silent battle" between Brock- 
dorff-Rantzau and the German military representatives at 
Versailles.
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1 7a request to the Government that this be done. On June 1, 
1919, Brockdorff-Rantzau wrote to Baron Langwerth (also his 
cousin) in the Foreign Office:: "It is too bad that in these
times we have to knock about, with such psychopaths /as von 
Seeckt JT. "18
Brockdorff-Rantzau especially disliked and distrusted 
General Ludendorff, who wrote an article in a weekly military 
publication in February, 192.1, accusing the Count of fomenting 
the revolution in Russia and collaborating with "the eastern 
Jew Parvus-Helphand" to put the Bolsheviks in power. The 
article implied also, said Brockdorff-Rantzau, that from Copen­
hagen he had worked toward inducing a collapse in Germany—  
nothing less than an accusation of high treason. He replied in 
the press with a vitriolic open letter to Ludendorff containing 
the incontrovertible fact that the General had assured Chancel­
lor Hertling in May, 1918, of the complete confidence which 
the Supreme Command and Ludendorff himself had in the "Impe­
rial Minister Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, The Count would leave
it to history to decide whether Ludendorff1s actions during and 
after the war were, in the end, more useful than his own, Un­
17Rosenbaum, p, 36; Rabenau, p e 180, According to 
Rabenau, p, 178, Seeckt had expected a challenge to a duel at 
Versailles. Three years later Seeckt objected to the appoint­
ment of Brockdorff-Rantzau as Ambassador to Soviet Russia, 
saying that his conduct at Versailles had been "unpatriotic," 
This time the Count was indeed ready to meet Sccckt with pis­
tols, but the difference was settled peacefully although with 
great difficulty. See Holborn, Diplomats,5’ p, 170, and, for 
a more detailed account, Rosenbaum, pp, 35-480
18rlNachlass B-R," 9105H/3443/H255 351,
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fortunately I was called too late to the position of leadership,"
Brockdorff-Rantzau concluded,
or I would have attempted to make it easier for your 
Excellency to admit that after the failure of the 
offensive in July, 1918, if not before, that mili­
tarily for us the war was lost„ Whether or not your 
Excellency knew this consciously or subconsciously I 
do not know; not to have come to this decision re­
mains as the monstrous responsibility which you bear 
before the German people and history^ ^
When the General retracted nothing, Brockdorff-Rantzau issued
a challenge to a pistol duel which was also declined,, He then
let the matter drop, but wrote prophetically in a letter to
Professor Delbrucks
In the present situation I see in General 
Ludendorff one of the greatest danger^ to our poor, 
misguided, apolitical people. Z.TIleY_-/ can only, if 
ever, be free of their idolatry /Gbtzenglauben / 
when they recognize how frivolously many demi-gods 
assume the heaviest responsibilities and how deplor­
ably they behave when one day they are actually 
called to account,^
While he was "a resolute hater of generals meddling in 
21foreign affairs," Brockdorff-Rantzau was able and willing to
get along with the politicians, businessmen, bankers, and 
intellectuals, many of them Jewish, who were prominent in the 
Republic"s early days, His social eminence, his own reputa­
tion as a gentleman and an intellectual, together with his 
economic and legalistic approach to national problems facil­
itated such cooperation. There is no doubt that he had tremen-
19BMS, 1691H/1.013/397 277. 20BMS, 1691H/1013/397 284.
^Holborn, "Diplomats," pp. 132-33.
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dous personal arrjb.ition which transcended party politics, and 
that some found him. a "difficult colleague, 1 But in early 
1919, this remarkable man acted as a sort of catalyst in the 
process of establishing the Republic's authority, Although 
he was not without, critics in the. new Germany, his presence 
signified prestige and continuity when the Republic needed it 
most.22
Discussing Brockdorff-Rantzau1s approach to democracy, 
Professor Hajo Holborn says; "The Russian and German revolu­
tions impressed him with the strength of the masses and, 
though he was no genuine democrat, he considered the intro­
duction of democracy as inevitable and as the only bulwark 
against b o l s h e v i s m . "2 3  therefore took steps to apply
democratic principles. Especially for the foreign press the 
Count stressed the importance of the fact that decisions in 
the new Germany were now made by the Reichstag majority. Dur-
2 2A. member of the German Delegation informed Brock­
dor ff-Rantzau that Matthias Erzberger was loudly declaring 
"in the beer halls of Weimar” that the Count was a man who 
"must be dismissed from office as quickly as possible— his 
policy is dangerous to the State." BMS, 1691H/1013/397 220; 
Epstein, p. 302.
Count Anton von Monts, another nobleman and ex-lmpe- 
rial Ambassador who realized the importance of the working 
man in the modern nation, wrote of Brockdorff-Rantzau in a 
letter to his nephew in early 1919: "When even B . shines as
a light, the darkness must be enormous. The intelligence of 
Count Rantzau is indisputable. But can he not be compared 
to a puffed-up frog „ . .? The man has managed affairs very
badly and continues to do so, with the help of falsehood and 
deceit „ 1 "Nachlass B-R,” 9.105E/3441/H234 177 . On Monts, 
see David Balfour, The Kaiser and His Times (Boston: Hough- 
ton-Mifflin, 1964), pp. 270-71.
2^Holborn, "Diplomats," p„ 133.
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ing his tenure as Foreign Minister, he initiated the long- 
needed reform of the Foreign O f f i c e . 24
However he may have appeared to the Allies, Brock­
dor ff-Rantzau was quite aware of the extent of Germany‘s mili­
tary defeat. He approved the idea of a league of nations, to 
be established after the conclusion of a just peace. His pre­
ferred term;., Vblkergemeinschaft, or "community of nations," 
implied economic cooperation as well as the league's primary 
position as an international arbiter,25 when presented, the 
Treaty of Versailles included the League Covenant inextricably 
bound up with the stringent peace terms, all based upon the
assumption of Germany's war guilt.
German Weaknesses 
Operating under great pressure at Versailles, not to 
mention the humiliations to which they were subjected, the 
experts of the German Delegation repeated the errors already 
made by the framers of the Treaty. They overstated their case
2^Ibid,, p. 150. The reorganization, under the direc 
tion of Geheimrat Edmund Schuler, was intended, among other 
things, to liceralize the selection of personnel. See also 
Brockdor ff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp., 43, 83-94, 96-97 .
Paul Seabury, The Wilhelmstrasse, A Study of German 
Diplomats under the Nazi'''''Regime Tbnlversity of California 
Press, 1954), pp, 11-21, describes the "Schuler Reforms" and 
notes that the program faced resistance from, the right and 
that "the aim of 'democratizing' German diplomacy seriously 
failed of its mark."
O c:
Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp. 13, 105-07.
See also Stern—Rubarth, p. 77, The accepted German term 
for the League of Nations was Volkerbund.
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and overwrote, and the resulting reply of over 300 pages 
solidified their stand just as the Treaty had crystallized that 
of the Allies. The result was intensified anger on both sides. 
Once again, the words of Professor Shotwell are relevant to 
each situation. His observation that "the failure in states­
manship lay in the fact that when one added all the parts of 
the treaty together 'the whole was greater than the sum of the 
parts'" can certainly be applied to the German effort as well.2^
Oral negotiations over the financial and economic 
clauses of the Treaty were the unswerving goal of the German 
Delegation. Handled by like-minded men on both sides, who 
realized the grave necessity for a settlement, such meetings 
could well have resulted in agreement. On May 2, 1919, the New 
York Times reported a meeting of German and Allied representa­
tives held in the Trianon Palace Hotel several days before the 
formal Treaty presentation. Those present included the Ameri­
can financial experts Thomas W, Lamont and Henry F, Davison, 
and the German bankers Max Warburg and Karl Melchior.2”7 Al­
though he was very unimpressed with the general ability and
2^See Shotwell1s Preface in Luc.kau, p, vi „
27New York Times, May 2, 1919, p. 2. The article reads
in part; rtA meeting of the German and Inter Allied Finance Com­
mission was held this morning at the Trianon Hotel. The German 
Delegates,, numbering eight, arrived on foot, walking across the 
park under the escort of a French Captain, The American and 
other inter-allied delegates drove from Paris in automobiles.
The delegates embarked on a prolonged discussion, apparently a 
continuation of the negotiations at the Chateau Plessis-Millette, 
at Senlis, near Compiegne."
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training of the German businessmen, present in Versailles with 
the Delegation, Professor Moritz J. Eonn considered Melchior, 
especially, a highly capable, reasonable man, respected by the 
Allies and Germans alike. Bonn also mentions some furtive 
meetings of German experts, including himself, with French and 
British representatives in spite of the ban on communication 
with the Germans.28 As pointed out in Chapter VI of this 
thesis, the desirability and possibility of oral negotiations 
over the technical financial clauses of the Treaty was actually 
considered by the "Big Three," and abandoned largely due to the 
influence of Clemenceau. Others realized that the psychologi­
cal effect of even relatively minor oral negotiations would 
have palliated the Germans' indignation and cleared the air.
It is often pointed out that the Germans believed Wil­
son's position at Paris to be much stronger than was actually the 
case. Perhaps, as Professor Brandenburg has suggested, the 
fact that no American had been present at the Armistice pro­
ceedings nourished the illusion that Wilson would be stronger 
vis-a-vis Clemenceau and fight for the principles of the Four­
teen Points.28 The very fact that "German foreign policy and 
propaganda under Count Brockdorff-Rantzau represented the Ger­
mans as the true champions of pure and unadulterated Wilson- 
ianism"30 contributed to Allied hostility and weakened the 
German position. Holborn discusses how the extreme German 
interpretation of the war-guilt clause obliged the Allies to
28Bonn, pp. 231-37. 29BMS# 1691H/1013/397 048.
88Holborn, "Diplomats," p. 134; Rosenbaum, p. 7.
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stand firm, on Article 231, which:
had been written to cap a delicate political com­
promise among themselves which would have been 
endangered if they had disavowed its text c More­
over in public they would have appeared as betray­
ing a main tenet of common faith. For everybody 
in the Allied camp was convinced of Germany's war 
guilt. 31
Clemenceau never wavered in his idea of how to deal with 
the Boche. The unimaginable strain of the Peace Conference 
caused Wilson to become ill in April, after which he was less 
and less inclined to cope with the physical and mental, demands 
of the problems of peace and wanted only to preserve what had 
been accomplished. In the end, ironically, Wilson's views did 
prevail: the Treaty was signed without any changes to speak of.
In addition to overstating their cases, other parallels 
appear in the actions of the Allies and the Germans at Ver­
sailles. Each group was aware of disunity on the opposite side 
and hoped, while not exploiting it oveitly, to benefit from it.
In Germany, Brockdorff-Rantzau's whole Versailles policy de­
pended upon a solid majority, which indeed existed to start 
with, but crumbled as Matthias Erzberger's agitation, especially, 
became vociferous and known to the Allies, When Brockdorff- 
Rantzau presented the report of the Delegation to the Cabinet 
in Weimar on. June 18, 1919, and recommended the refusal, of the
Treaty as it stood, he remarked ironically that:
during three years of the war I have fought against 
two slogans; one was "hold out," and the other was 
"time is on our side." Today I must declare my 
deepest conviction that both sayings are really 
applicable now, and that with a refusal /to sign_J7
^Holborn, .."Diplomats," pp. 143-44.
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we will split the bloc of the Allies„ Through 
the institution of oral negotiations in the course 
of which the impossibility of carrying out the 
Treaty conditions will become apparent we will 
surely be able to arrive at a feasible peace.32
Both the Allied and German stands required "holding out" and
for Germany this proved to be impossible.
Later Years
In the words of Edgar Stern-Rubarth, Versailles was "a 
personal Amfortas wound in the soul of Brockdorf f-Rantzau „ 1 33 
In later years he became morose about it, expressing once to his 
brother that had he been killed during the stoning of the German 
Delegates at Versailles, perhaps the German people would have 
united behind a firm stand for treaty revision„ He died in Ber­
lin at the age of fifty-nine, on leave from his post in Moscow, 
a victim of long-neglected heart trouble and incurable throat 
c a n c e r j n  his last hours he had said to his brother, "The 
only thing that upsets me is how the English and French, when I 
die, will rejoice over my death."35 in actual fact, the London 
Times obituary was scrupulously correct in its detailed account 
of his life, ending, "Brockdorff-Rantzau will long be remembered 
here as the Foreign Minister who resigned, with the other mem­
bers of the government of the day, rather than sign the Peace
32BMS, 1691H/1013/397 197, £f. Novak, p. 264.
33Stern-Rubarth, p. 152. In Wagner's Parsifal, Amfortas,
chief of the Knights, suffered from a wound which could only be 
healed by a eacred spear,
^Stern-Rubarth, pp. 106, 149-63; Helbig, pp. 147-48.
33Ibid., p. 156.
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Treaty."35 The New York Times ended its article with the sen­
tence, "With his passing, Germany loses one of the most fearless 
figures of her history."37 Hermann Lutz notes that in 1940 the 
French historian and political philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel, 
"interpreted the Count's conduct as 'an effort of dignity on the
O o
part of the vanquished.8" Perhaps the most striking reference 
at the time, however, was the French newspaper which, with its 
obituary, ran a picture of the Count with the caption: "The man
who offered us 100 milliard marks at Versailles, which we un­
luckily refused."35
In subsequent years, some strange things have happened 
in Germany, too. The history of the Weimar Republic, blackened 
by the acceptance of the punitive Treaty of Versailles, and 
buried under the rubble of Hitler's Third Reich, is all but for­
gotten. "Oftener than one would expect," said a recent article 
in the historical journal Beitrage zur Schleswiger Stadt<- 
geschichte, "is Brockdorff-Rantzau mentioned as the signer of 
the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s ."40 A modern emotional historical 
novel by Bruno Brehm portrays him as a signatory in the Hall 
of Mirrors.41 article in the Schleswiger Nachrichten in
35The Times (London), September 11, 1928, p. 17.
37New York Times, September 10, 1928, p. 25.
3^Lutz, p. 209, n25. 35Schiff, pp. 110-11.
^5Klatt, p. 33.
^Bruno Brehm, Die Throne Sturzen, Romantrilogie (Wien; 
Buchgemeinschaft Donauland, 1951), pp. 679-82.
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April, 1961, mentioned the Count as co-signer of the Treaty with 
Dr. Bell. The following edition, however, ran an article to 
correct this error; “Count Brockdorff-Rantzau did not sign the 
Friedensdiktat gf Versailles, which /was_/ signed by Reichs- 
kanzler /s'ic___/ Hermann Muller and Dr. B e l l . " 4 3
"That man who placed his services at the disposal of the 
Republic," wrote the German Socialist journalist Victor Schiff, 
who was a Secretary of the Delegation at Versailles, "who made 
for all future generations one necessary gesture of protest . , . 
is worthy of a place of honor in German Republican chronicles.
Did anything, then, result from this symbolic gesture? In San 
Francisco in 1951, American Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles concluded with Japan "a final peace treaty which repre­
sented the greatest unity for peacemaking the world has ever 
known. . . ." The Japanese Prime Minister added, "This is not
a treaty of vengeance but an instrument of reconciliation."
Dulles then..continued,
I had seen the handiwork of the so-called "realists" 
in other treaties. Most notable of their achieve­
ments was Versailles. I remember vividly how, there, 
the members of the German peace delegation were put 
in a barbed-wire enclosure, exposed as animals in a 
zoo, denied any personal contact with Allied dele­
gates. We know the consequences of that realism.
What happened at San Francisco showed, at a time when 
it needed showing that not merely physical, but moral 
law has reality and power.44
43Schleswiger Nachrichten, April 1, 1961; April 3, 1961
43Schiff, p. 44.
44Stanley High, "The Momentous Aim of John Foster 
Dulles," The Reader's Digest, January, 1955, pp. 66-67.
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In Conclusion 
After almost fifty years, the events of Versailles 
have begun to fall into historical perspective., As hopefully 
made clear in the preface, this thesis is not an attempt to 
"whitewash" Germany's Count Brockdorf f-Rantzau ,7 nor to exon­
erate him from the mistakes in strategy which he unquestion­
ably made. Such mistakes were indeed made on both sides of 
the fence at Versailles. But little factual information re­
garding him has thus far been easily available to the American 
student. What does exist in English is often strongly biased 
and incomplete, or simply ignores his ability and the very 
real qualifications which he brought to the jobQ With a 
few exceptions, all extensive material, abides in hard to ob­
tain German sources„
In his recent book Gustav Hilger has discussed Brock­
dorf f-Rantzau ’ s philosophy at the close of the Great War;
Rantzau had no illusions of turning back the wheel 
of history. His conception of the well born leader's 
function was a positive one of leading a German peo­
ple 0 s state toward better days0 Beneath these con­
siderations a deep pessimism and despair were hiding; 
he seems to have been dimly aware that his idea of 
leadership in democracy was the last conceivable task 
left for the aristocracy before it would disappear 
altogether. Moreover, he must have had semiconscious 
doubts concerning Germany's ability to make a comeback.43
After Philipp Scheidemann hastily proclaimed the German Repub­
lic amidst the chaos of November 9, 1918, it was still, uncer­
tain what forces would fill the political void left by the 
collapse of the Monarchy and the revolution. Brockdorff-Rant-
43Hilger, p. 89.
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zau9s long-standing relationship with the Social Democratic 
leaders was instrumental in replacing anarchy with the author­
ity of the Majority Socialists and their plan for a National 
Cons LiLuent Assembly. He was of the caliber of a statesman; 
his singular role as "Count and Democrat" facilitated Ger­
many's transition from a defeated Empire to a people's Republic.
But he failed the Republic in several respects. Amaz­
ing as was his ability to work constructively with the demo­
cratic forces of the future, his concept of the nature and pur­
pose of diplomacy was incompatible with democracy in operation. 
His idea of foreign policy never changed--it was to be formu­
lated at the top level and carried through by the Foreign Mini­
ster without interference. This suited the time of Bismarck, 
but in a twentieth century democracy public opinion could be 
expected to have some bearing on diplomatic decisions. As Erich 
Brandenburg points out, the Count sincerely believed in the 
rights of the common people, but he had never really been close 
to them in daily life. Believing that only those ablest and 
best qualified should and would attain positions of leadership 
in a democracy, Brockdorff-Rantzau also accepted the principle 
that the people had the right to remove from office anyone who 
no longer retained their confidence. As long as he was entrusted 
with high office, this "stubborn Holsteiner1( demanded complete 
authority in a carefully predetermined sphere of activity and 
expected full cooperation from his subordinates. He sought the 
advice of colleagues and experts, but final policy decisions 
were his own. He was often impatient with those who hesitated
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on decisions, and once he had formulated a clear-cut policy, 
he seldom deviated from it. As a minister of state he was an 
exacting and uncompromising chief; it must not be forgotten, 
however, that he was equally determined to assume full and 
complete responsibility for his actions and decisions.
Although Brockdorff-Rantzau was a capable, adaptable, 
and brilliant man, his many-sided personality had insuperable 
deficiences. Dr. Simons once characterized him as "our some­
what overcivilized Count. It was a good assessment of his
exceptional and compelling personality. Brockdorff-Rantzauas 
innate aloofness and egoism, his aesthetic and high-strung 
nature, and his unremitting feudal sense of honor and dignity, 
all combined with a lawyer's meticulous intellect, made him 
irascible and unrelenting when he felt that his own or Germany's 
honor was threatened. He continued to believe fervently in 
the policy of his "ephemeral Ministry," and the historic signi­
ficance of his tragic role at Versailles/^
Someone had to face the ordeal for Germany when the 
chiefs of the Paris Peace Conference requested German plenipo­
tentiaries to come to Versailles. Logically, the task fell to 
the German Foreign Minister, and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau had 
been peculiarly suited to serve in this capacity in the German 
Republic's first turbulent months. But when Germany sent her 
"last Knight" into the lists at Versailles, he sought honorable 
treatment on equal terms and was hopelessly misunderstood.
46Luckau, p. 124. 47BMS, 1691H/1013/397 380.
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